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Abstract 
In the last decade the number of countries that have enacted Freedom 
of Information (FOI) laws have increased dramatically. In many respects FOI 
laws have become a democratic ‘right of passage’. No FOI, no ‘proper’ 
democracy. 
The promises of FOI regimes are far-reaching: access to personal 
information and increased transparency in the form of third-party independent 
access to government-held information will prevent corruption and 
maladministration and encourage the public to participate more fully in the 
political process. But are the promises borne out by the practice of FOI? 
To answer this question this thesis will track a number of real-life FOI 
requests in five countries. Based on this and other data this project will lay the 
foundation for the first International Freedom of Information Index, ranking five 
countries on how their FOI regimes deliver on the promises made. Included in 
the ranking will also be an evaluation of the legal situation for media 
whistleblowers and shield laws for journalists. 
The thesis will show that it is easier to promise information access than 
to implement it. It will demonstrate that for most of the countries of study FOI 
laws serve more as a PR tool projecting an illusion of an informed public, rather 
than granting real independent access to quality information.   4
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Introduction 
When Don Chipp
1 in 1977 coined the phrase ’keeping the bastards 
honest’ he articulated on a practical political level one of the essential 
ingredients of any democracy – there must be a way to keep track of and 
scruitinise what our elected representatives are doing to ensure they deliver on 
their promises and follow the principles of good governance during the course 
of their political term. 
The genesis of this project dates back to 1994 when I began working as 
a freelance journalist in Australia. I had trained and worked as a journalist in 
                                                 
1 Don Chipp was the founder of the Australian Democrats, a political party which in 1977 broke away 
from the main conservative party The Liberal Party of Australia. Among other things Chipp and the new 
party vowed to act as a scruitiniser of politicians (‘the bastards’) that used the system and did not deliver 
on their promises…assuming that the elected members of the new party had not yet become ‘bastards’ 
themselves…   10
Sweden, other European countries and the Middle East. I was amazed at the 
differences between Australia and Sweden in terms of access to government-
held information. What would have taken me a matter of hours to access in 
Sweden would take weeks and months in Australia and would be of a lesser 
quality, assuming I could get access to it in the first place. Why these vast 
differences in information flow between political systems that, at least on the 
surface, seemed to share common goals and values? And if and how might this 
impact on journalistic content? These and other questions led to an MA project 
(Lidberg, 2003) which in turn developed into this study. 
Many have made the argument for Freedom of Information (FOI) laws 
and the support for the FOI concept has grown overtime to become close to 
universal among the democratic community – at least in theory. FOI enlists 
support from a multitude of sources such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (UN, 1948: 
Article 19) 
Although FOI laws are potentially one of the most potent accountability 
tools to date this thesis will demonstrate that, based on a five country sample, in 
some cases the laws are little more than a toothless paper construct and 
democratic ’showcase’ rather than the effective scrutinising tool they were 
intended to be.   11
This thesis is about how FOI laws work in practice. The theoretical, and 
legal, promises of FOI are tantalizing and fascinating. In general they tempt 
prospective users with three aims: 
•  To provide access to government-held records concerning 
individual and personal information 
•  To provide third party access to the public to increase 
transparency in the governing process and thereby increase 
accountability and prevent maladministration and corruption 
•  To provide third party access to increase the publics’ knowledge 
of the political process and thereby encourage and foster public 
participation in the political process 
The first aim, to provide access to personal records (also called first 
party access), is met in most functioning FOI regimes (Banisar, 2004: 4-5), 
which in itself is a very positive effect of FOI. However this study is concerned 
with the second and third objectives, which in most cases involve third parties 
such as journalists and media organisations, requesting information. 
In the last 10 years the numbers of FOI laws around the world have 
increased dramatically. At last count there were 58 active FOI regimes and 
about 30 in development (Banisar, 2004: 2). It would appear that FOI has 
become a democratic ‘right of passage’, a way for political systems to 
demonstrate their commitment to democracy and transparency. So far, so good. 
The problem occurs at the level of translating FOI promise into practice.   12
The most frequent, experienced, and at times frustrated, users of FOI 
are journalists and media organisations. It can be argued that FOI needs 
journalists to realise its potential as a political accountability tool and journalists 
need FOI to fulfil their role as the fourth estate, scrutinising societal power in 
general and political power in particular. 
This tension between the public’s demands for increased transparency 
and politicians’ and public servants’ demands for protective confidentiality lead 
to the formulation of the overall research question for this project: to what 
extent, if any, are the promises made by FOI legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? This in turn gave rise to three sub-
questions each of which needed to be answered in order to examine the 
workings of the legislation more forensically. The sub-questions were: 
1.  What are the aims of the different FOI legislations and what do 
they promise to deliver in terms of information access? 
2.  What are the attitudes towards FOI and protection of journalistic 
sources among leading politicians and public servants? 
3.  In practice, does FOI supply journalists (and media 
organisations) with independent access to government-held 
information? 
The countries included in the sample were: Australia, South Africa, 
Sweden, Thailand and the United States.   13
Question one was addressed in sub-study one: ‘the promise’. This 
study evaluated the aims and objectives of the laws based on a number of set 
parameters such as cost, turnaround time and appeal options.  
Question two was covered in ‘the spin’. This was in essence a survey 
study of the ministers and the chief public servants in each country of study in 
an attempt to capture their attititudes towards the principles of FOI. 
Consequently, Presidents George W Bush and Thabo Mbeki; and Prime 
ministers John Howard, Göran Persson and Thaksin Shinawatra
2 received 
questionnaires. 
Question three tracked real-life FOI requests in the countries of study. 
Three investigative journalists in each country were recruited as research 
collaborators to complete ’the practice’ sub-study. 
In sum: ’the promise’ evaluated the legislation, ’the spin’ studied the 
administration of FOI and ’the practice’ mapped the use of FOI. 
A second challenge concerned the presentation of the resulting data. If 
it was possible to translate the data into numerical comparators it might be 
possible to compile a Freedom of Information Index. The index would allocate a 
rank for each country of study, indicating in graphic terms the comparative 
practical functionality of their FOI regimes. 
This project is unique in three respects: firstly, it is the first study to 
systematically track real-life FOI requests on an internationally comparative 
                                                 
2 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra resigned on April 3, 2006. He was however, PM at the time of  
implementation of the Thai study. 
Deleted:    14
basis. Secondly, it is the first study to include an evaluation of the level of 
protection for media whistleblowers and the journalists they choose to work with 
as part of the overall FOI system. Thirdly, it lays the foundation for the first 
International Freedom of Information Index. 
Part I of the thesis describes the background and theoretical pillars on 
which this project rests. It also presents the overall methodology and describes 
the development and trial of the research instruments. 
Part II situates the countries of study politically and presents and 
analyses the data captured. Chapter eleven is in many ways a capstone 
chapter. It brings together all data and provides the comparative overview.  
Freedom of Information is, in some countries, a very powerful 
accountability tool and safeguard for open government. Banisar’s Global FOI 
survey (Banisar, 2004) is at present the only comprehensive international 
project covering FOI. However, the survey evaluates only the letters of the law, 
it does not compare what the different legislations deliver in practice. In this lies 
the main justification for this project. 
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Part I 
Chapter One: Theory and Background 
Introduction 
This thesis will argue that FOI rests on three pillars: political 
representation, political accountability and the scrutinising role of the media as 
the fourth estate. This chapter will define and explore these concepts in relation 
to FOI. Chapter one will also investigate the link between these pillars and 
democracy. 
All countries that have adopted FOI legislation can claim to have 
political systems incorporating, if not all, at least most traits of democracy (the 
concept of democracy and its definitions will be dealt with later in this chapter), 
albeit in some cases at an emerging level if you chose to have liberal 
democracy, LD, as the benchmark (Banisar, 2004: 1). Hence, it would be easy 
to draw the conclusion that the foundation for FOI is democracy. However, the 
roots of FOI can be traced back to well before LD was conceived (Lamble, 
2002b: 2-8) and although democracy certainly plays an important role in the 
emergence and evolution of FOI, it is not its genesis. It will be argued that FOI 
grew out of a demand for increased political accountability in systems based on 
political representation. 
Political Representation 
Being ruled is at times a painful experience. It can be a source of great 
frustration to feel unrepresented by the party/parties in government. It can be   16
equally frustrating when the elected representatives renege on their earlier 
promises. Dunn puts it thus:  
To be ruled is both necessary and inherently discomforting (as well as dangerous). 
For our rulers to be accountable to us softens its intrinsic humiliations, probably 
sets some hazy limits to the harms that they will voluntarily choose to do to us 
collectively, and thus diminishes some of the dangers to which their rule may 
expose us. (Dunn, J., 1999: 342) 
Dunn covers a lot of ground: political representation, political 
accountability and the impact on those who are ruled. These concepts are all 
disciplines in their own right and to cover them in some depth would require 
numerous chapters, indeed several theses. Nevertheless, they are the 
theoretical foundation for the FOI Index project and there is a need to at least 
touch on them to provide some background. 
In most political systems, ranging from totalitarian to liberal 
democracies, some degree of representation exists. Whether they are installed 
via force such as military coups or more democratically via general elections 
representatives usually claim to rule on behalf of the people. Their rule is built 
on a contract with the citizens where the representatives in many cases have 
gained power by promising to deliver a number of outcomes. In the case of an 
election, the citizens have fulfilled their ‘contractual obligations’ with the casting 
of their votes. It is now up to the representative to deliver on his or her 
promises. It can at times be very tricky to keep track of if and how the 
representative delivers. This is where the accountability mechanism comes in 
and where (as will be pointed out and discussed in various ways throughout this 
thesis) independent access to government-held information plays a vital role. 
But let us first deal with the concept of representation.   17
 
 
Heywood defines political representation in its most basic form as ‘a 
relationship through which an individual or group stands for, or acts on behalf 
of, a larger body of people (2000: 143).’ As is further discussed below, there is 
no single, widely accepted theory of representation. There are four main strands 
of political representation. 
The first is a model identified and defined by Edmund Burke (1729-97) 
often labelled the ‘trustee model’ (ibid: 144). The argument in this model is that 
the representatives best serve their constituents by acting independently and 
basing their actions on their own thinking and judgement. The main criticism of 
this model is that it favours and breeds an elitist political class. 
The delegate model emerged as a reaction to the perceived elitism of 
the first model. In this model the representatives are conduits for those that they 
represent and do not express own views or opinions. Heywood points to 
ambassadors as an example of this model (ibid). Criticisms of this model 
include that it limits the parliament’s debating and manoeuvring options. 
The third model has the mandate at its core. This means that the 
representatives should only carry out the policies and actions that have been 
ratified by an election, i.e. given a mandate. The same critique as for the 
delegate model applies. 
The fourth model involves a ‘representative cross-section’, that is: a 
parliament should ‘constitute a microcosm of the larger society’ to form a   18
parliament with numbers of representatives that ‘are proportional for the size of 
the groups in society (ibid).’ The criticism here is that this model suggests that 
only women can represent women and only immigrants can represent 
immigrants. 
It is important to keep in mind that political representation is not a liberal 
democratic invention. Pitkin illustrates this point well. She divides the nature of 
representation into two main categories: authorized representation and 
accountable representation. She defines the difference thus: 
Whereas authorization theorists see the representative as free, the represented as 
bound, accountability theorists see precisely the converse. The authorization 
theorist defines representative democracy by equating elections with a grant of 
authority: a man represents because he has been elected at the outset of his term of 
office. The accountability theorists, on the contrary, equate elections with holding 
to account: an elected official is a representative because (and insofar as) he will be 
subject to re-election or removal at the end of his term (1967: 55-56). 
 
Pitkin points out that the concept of representation was conceived well before 
the first stumbling steps of liberal democracy. She bases her argument and 
case on Hobbes ‘Levithan’ and observes that ‘when Hobbes called his 
sovereign a representative, he implies that the man is to represent his subjects, 
not merely do whatever he pleases (1967: 33)’. Although Pitkin does give 
Hobbes some credit for coming up with the ‘contemporary’ concept of 
representation, she also points out that Hobbes view of representation was very 
narrow, taking into account ‘only one kind of representation (1967: 37)’
3.  
                                                 
3 I suggest that Pitkin is a bit hard on Hobbes considering ‘Leviathan’ was written in 1651 well before the 
benefit of the hindsight provided by our more contemporary political systems. For Hobbes to describe 
society as a living organism embodied by its sovereign who should at least to a certain extent do the will 
of the people was truly new and a revolutionary thought of its time. The fact that Hobbes is still discussed 
shows how important his ideas were and are.   19
Pitkin goes onto discuss the mandate/independence controversy, ie. the 
tension between doing the will of the constituency and maintaining the 
independence of the representatives. She illustrates this tension by posing the 
following questions: ‘Should (must) a representative do what his constituents 
want, and be bound by mandates of instructions from them; or should (must) he 
be free to act as seems best to him in pursuit of their welfare? (1967: 145)’. This 
highlights the conflict between the wishes of the voters and the welfare of the 
voters, leading on to the point that the wishes, quite often being short term and 
individual, do not always contribute to welfare, which by way of contrast is more 
often collective and long-term. Independence theorists view the representative 
as a free agent, an expert who is best left alone to do his/her work. This view of 
political representation is close to elite theory that is a property of the trustee 
model discussed above. 
Pitkin uses Burke’s writings to describe elite representation. According 
to Burke the constituency is so fragmented that it is practically impossible to 
represent according to wishes. Pitkin points out that Burkean theory is based on 
the elite being the ‘natural aristocracy (1967: 169)’ that knows what is 
collectively best for the country and hence for the individual citizen. The second 
point, which underscores the elitism of elite theory, is that according to Burke, 
the representatives do not have to consult with their constituencies because 
‘government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment (ibid)’ tacitly 
implying that voters do not always have reason and judgment. Again, as with 
Hobbes, Burke did his work at the time of the emergence of contemporary 
political representation and the nature of politics has evolved since then.    20
Pitkin concludes that representation will always include some form of 
trusteeship. She also points out that none of the theories describe and deal with 
what goes on during representation: 'how a representative ought to act or what 
he is expected to do, how to tell whether he has represented well or badly 
(1967: 56).' This is where FOI fits in. A far-reaching and smoothly working FOI 
regime will provide the scrutinizers of government (the opposition, the media 
and individual citizens) with the information they need to determine whether the 
elected representatives are doing a good job during their term.  This will be 
dealt with in more detail later on in this chapter when we look at the issue of 
accountability. 
Przeworski et al agree with Pitkin that the key issue of debate and 
controversy is ‘over what was supposed to go on during representation (1999: 
3).’ The main point argued in the impressive work of Przeworski et al is summed 
up thus: 
The founders of representative government expected that the formal arrangements 
they advocated would somehow induce governments to act in the interests of the 
people, but they did not know precisely why it would be so. Neither do we today 
after two hundred years (ibid). 
Przeworski et al list a number of generic reasons why governments 
may act in a representative fashion: 
1.  Representatives are ‘public spirited’ 
2.  The vote will be used to select those who represent the ‘identical 
interest’   21
3.  The threat of being voted out will make governments deliver on 
their promises 
4.  The separation of powers (different in each political system) 
creates a balance between the government, the legislature and 
judiciary that may contribute to governments acting in the 
peoples’ best interests (1999: 3-4) 
In their discussion Przeworski et al point out that dictators can be 
representative. Indeed it could be argued that they could be very effective 
representatives. If they know what the people want, nothing prevents them from 
doing it. The problem is of course the ‘nothing prevents’. If a subject is not 
pleased with how the dictator represents him or her, nothing prevents the 
dictator from ‘convincing’ the subject that the ruler is a marvelous 
representative. However, as Prezworksi et al note, there is a connection 
between representation and democracy: ‘A central claim of democratic theory is 
that democracy systematically causes governments to be representative (1999: 
4).’ They base the claim on a number of democratic theorists such as Dahl, 
Riker, Schmitter and Karl. Importantly for this project the same democratic 
theorists also provide support for the argument put forward by this thesis, that 
political representation was identified long before it was viewed as one of the 
cornerstones of liberal democracy (ibid) leading to a need for political 
accountability with FOI as one of its tools. 
On elections and political representation Przeworski et al conclude that 
‘elections are not a sufficient mechanism to ensure that governments will do 
everything they can to maximize citizens’ welfare’ because ‘governments make   22
thousands of decisions that affect individual welfare; citizens have only one 
instrument to control these decisions: the vote. One cannot control a thousand 
targets with one instrument (1999: 50).’ This conclusion is further backed by a 
study by Chiebub and Przeworski where 102 democratic regimes were 
analysed. In discussing the results Cheibub and Przeworski points out that  ‘we 
should observe that incumbents who generate a bad performance are more 
likely to be thrown out of office. We do not observe it…this implies that elections 
are not an effective instrument for inducing representation (1999: 225).’ 
 One aspect of representation that is often overlooked is the role of the 
public service (or civil service as it is called in some countries). In theory the 
public servants are supposed to be independent and give objective advice to 
the ministers and execute the decisions made by the legislature and the 
executive. In practice this is not always the case. Delmer Dunn observes that 
the mix between elected and non-elected officials is important because it 
‘…determines the extent to which government reflects more nearly the 
preferences of elected officials or the preferences of the un-elected public 
servants (Dunn, D., 1999: 298).’ This is yet another reason for a smoothly 
working FOI regime. It has the potential to work as an accountability tool for 
both elected and un-elected officials. 
Political Accountability 
The second theoretical pillar of FOI is political accountability. Most 
writers seem to agree that accountability ‘is a retrospective mechanism, in the 
sense that the actions of rulers are judged ex post by the effects they have 
(Chiebub and Przeworski, 1999: 225).’ Delmer Dunn points out that   23
‘accountability at its most basic means answerability for one’s actions or 
behavior (1999: 298).’ Drawing on Stokes, Dwivedi and Pennock, John Dunn 
defines political accountability thus: 
,…the relation of accountability holds fully where persons exercising these powers 
are (1) liable for their actions in exercising there powers, (2) predictably 
identifiable as agents in the exercise of these powers to those to whom they are 
liable (in the democratic case, ultimately to the demos distributively), (3) 
effectively sanctionable for these acts once performed, and (4) knowably so 
sanctionable for them in advance (1999: 335) 
So why do we need political accountability? John Dunn justifies the 
need thus: 
The quest for democratic accountability is not best seen as a search for magically 
efficacious casual mechanisms for rearing the fabric of felicity by the hands of 
reason and of law. Rather, it is an attempt to draw an ever brighter line between the 
freedom of action that professional political agents require in order to act boldly 
and effectively, and the degree of personal privilege that they can excusably claim 
for their actions from the citizens on whose behalf they purport to act, It reconciles 
the formers’ freedom at one time with their responsibility then and later by 
insisting on the citizens’ right of informational access to (their right to know about) 
these actions, once they have been performed: not necessarily immediately, but at 
least at some definite point in the future (1999: 341). 
What John Dunn is saying is that there must be a clear connection 
between the ‘principal’ (the citizens in whose names the representative rule) 
and the ‘agent’ (the representative). Further, this should be a connection that is 
not only valid on election day and in the political campaigns, but is ongoing and 
where the principal does have the tools, using force if necessary, to make the 
representative listen. However, because of the complicated structure and 
workings of current political systems, John Dunn points out that ‘political 
accountability today cannot be direct, peremptory and reliable. To work benignly 
(and, over time, probably to work at all) it must be very elaborately mediated, 
somewhat tentative, and mutually pretty patient (1999: 336).’   24
Defining accountability and justifying the need for it is the easy part. 
Much harder is making it work in practice. John Dunn identifies two main 
accountability tools (apart from elections): criminal law and the freedom of 
information regime. The legal option is very limited and can only be utilised 
when criminal misconduct is suspected and then there is still the issue of 
proving the misconduct. Much more often the public is concerned with the 
representatives not fulfilling their end of the ‘contract’ – delivering on their 
promises – a ‘misconduct’ not covered by the law. This is where we turn to FOI 
and our expectation for it to grant independent access to government-held 
information. Przeworksi et al summarise the importance of this access for the 
accountability mechanism: 
Yet, to evoke Kant, "All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are 
wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public." Bobbio 
(from which this passage is taken, 1989: 84) comments further that "a precept not 
susceptible to being publicized can be taken to mean a precept which, if it was ever 
made known to the public, would arouse such a public reaction that one could not 
put it into action." We do not want governments to take actions that they would 
have not taken had we known why they are taking them. But this means that we 
have to know what the governments are doing and why independently of what they 
want us to know. Our authorization to rule should not include the authority to hide 
information from us. Thus, even if elections give governments a broad 
authorization to rule, this authorization should not extend to informing us. Our 
information must not depend on what governments want us to know. The 
institutional implications are obvious: we need offices, independent statistical 
agencies. To coin a term, we need ‘accountability agencies’, independent of other 
branches of government and subject to direct popular control, perhaps through 
elections (1999: 24).  
Numerous suggestions to improve political accountability have surfaced 
during the evolution of political systems. Dunn and Uhr propose the following 
‘accountability agencies’: 
(1) an independent board to assure transparency of campaign contributions, with its 
own investigative power; (2) an independent auditing branch of the state, an 
auditor-general (Worldbank, 1994) in the vein of the Chilean contraloria; (3) an  
independent source of statistical information about the state of the economy; and   25
(4) a privileged place for the opposition in overseeing the publicly owned media 
(cited in Przeworski et al, 1999: 50) 
All sound suggestions, however they do not address the issue at the 
core of the accountability problem: the need for citizens to have independent 
access to government-held information. This is supported by Heywood: 
…accountability is effective only under certain circumstances. These include that 
the mechanisms for monitoring performance are rigorous; that ‘higher’ institutions 
or bodies have sufficient access to information to make critical and informed 
judgements (2000: 117). 
Back to John Dunn again and his point that ‘citizens can only choose on 
the basis of what they are enabled to know (1999: 341).’ Dunn also emphasizes 
that no ‘accountability agency’ is perfect and FOI regimes are certainly open to 
manipulation and hypocrisy ‘but the development and deepening of practices of 
public exposure – of putting politically consequential conduct tendentially under 
the floodlights – must be essential to any coherent project of rendering the most 
democratically generated of rule effectively accountable (Dunn, J., 1999: 340).’ 
Perhaps what is needed is a combination of several accountability agencies, as 
suggested by Dunn and Uhr, in addition to a smoothly functioning and far 
reaching FOI system. 
Thus far we have examined modern versions of political accountability, 
but just as with political representation, it is important to keep in mind that 
political accountability pre-dates modern liberal democratic ideas. The driving 
force behind the first FOI related legislation in the world, the Swedish 
parliamentarian Anders Chydenius (1729-1803), sought inspiration regarding 
political accountability from the Chinese Tang Dynasty that ruled China from 
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618 to 907
4. Lamble points out that ‘there is absolutely no doubt that he was 
inspired by the precedent of the Imperial Chinese Censorate and its 
relationships to human rights, individual freedoms and transparency of 
government (Lamble, 2002b: 3).’ It is interesting to note that Chydenius 
translated the more than 1000-year old Chinese experiences into his 
contemporary political climate by choosing the Press as the main ‘accountability 
agency’. It is a tribute to Chydenius’ intellectual capacity that he was able to 
locate the Chinese sources and draw these parallels in 1765.  In our times a 
similar connection between ancient Chinese politics and today’s press and 
information freedom has been done by Steinberg: 
The Chinese, and the Koreans emulating the Chinese model, developed an 
institution that was critical to how power was executed, and institutionally 
provided some modest exposure to different views within the general Confucian 
ideological configuration. This was the Imperial Consorate. It was composed of 
officials who had access to the Emperor, and whose function was to tell the leader 
when things were right or wrong, when he was being led astray, and when plans or 
actions were likely to have deleterious effects or be contrary to moral or 
established principles… 
[Today] the press has become, or perhaps better has the potential of becoming, the 
equivalent of the Chinese Censorate…If the press does not fulfil this function, the 
country is the poorer for it, and in greater danger. The press is to provide 
transparency to the processes of decision-making and to the decisions themselves, 
because bureaucracies generally abhor light, even when upright and responsible. 
Without the press, the modern emperor – whether dictator or elected president – is 
insulated, encapsulated in a cocoon of many who are either sycophants or who are 
truly awed by those in power. They do not directly question the leader, sometimes 
because protocol inhibits it, sometimes because of social ostracism. Even in 
democracies, this may be difficult. The staff may believe they are protecting the 
leader, but it is a short-term service and a long-range disservice both to the 
individual and to the state. So if the Imperial Censorate is gone, and if the press is 
not free to perform this role, then the arrogance associated power will grow, 
reinforced by a supportive wrapping that inflates egos and hides reality (Steinberg, 
1997: 1-2). 
                                                 
4 It is not surprising that Chydenius was inspired by the Tang dynasty. This stable and relatively peaceful 
time in China saw many advances such as printing on paper using movable wooden type. It was also a 
great period for literature and the arts and has been referred to as China’s ‘golden age’ Gillian Denton, 
ed., The Dorling Kindersley History of the World (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 1998).   27
So who will use FOI to access the precious raw, non-spun and non-
sanitised government information? In those FOI systems that keep statistics 
tracking and identifying FOI use, the data clearly shows that the media are the 
most frequent third-party users (Waters, 1999; Evans, 2003). But before further 
exploring the role of the media as a modern day ‘Imperial Censorate’, there is a 
need to situate political representation and accountability within the concept of 
democracy. 
Democracy 
If direct democracy were the dominant political system there would be 
no need for political accountability. We would all be accountable to ourselves for 
our own political decisions and actions. However, it is a fact that the vast 
majority of democratic regimes use a representative system in some form and it 
is because of this that political accountability exists. The entry in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Politics observes that ‘when democracy was reinvented in 
the eighteenth century, every system was indirect: voters elected 
representatives who took decisions for which they were answerable only at the 
next election. Rousseau argued that this was no democracy…but he was a lone 
voice (McMillan, 2003: 140).’ There was renewed interest in direct democracy in 
the 1890s and 1960s and the computer age has removed many of the technical 
and practical problems with the system. However, direct democracy remains 
very unpopular with contemporary political representatives for the simple reason 
that they would largely become obsolete and many academics and political 
philosophers subscribe to Schumpeter’s argument ‘that direct democracy is 
incompatible with responsible government (ibid).’   28
Even though the etymology of democracy is ‘people rule’ (from the 
Greek words ‘demos’ for people and ‘kratos’ for rule (Held, 1996: 1)), it is just 
another form of rule with ‘people power’ delegated to others. Agreement on a 
definition for democracy is as hard as getting consensus on a definition for good 
art, and for much the same reasons – the beauty of art, like that of democracy, 
is in the eye of the beholder. Held puts it thus: 
The history of the idea of democracy is curious; the history of the democracies is 
puzzling. There are two striking historical facts. First, nearly everyone today 
professes to be a democrat. Political regimes of all kinds throughout the world 
describe themselves as democracies. Yet what these regimes say and do is often 
substantially different form one to another. Democracy appears to legitimate 
modern political life: rule-making and law enforcement seem justified and 
appropriate when they are 'democratic' (1996: xi) 
 
Following Held, Heywood concludes:  
Now, however, we are all democrats. Liberals, conservatives, socialists, 
communists, anarchists and even fascists are eager to proclaim the virtues of 
democracy and to demonstrate their democratic credentials (2000: 126). 
In its first incarnation in the city-state of Athens in 590 B. C. democracy 
took the form of direct democracy where all citizens of Athens took direct part in 
both legislating and governing. All Athenean citizens were expected to attend 
when the Assembly (the Athenean parliament) sat and it has been estimated 
that up to 6000 citizens participated (McMillan, 2003: 140). Some 
representational features such as appointment of chair people, executive public 
servant positions and generals to defend and expand the city-state existed, but 
on the whole it was a direct democracy. These public positions were most   29
commonly assigned by lot (Elster, 1999: 225). 
5 There was only one form of 
political accountability and this was towards the individual citizens. One 
example is that voting in the assembly was compulsory. Interestingly they were 
not punished for not voting, but did receive a payment for voting (Elster, 1999: 
277), the opposite of, for instance, the Australian compulsory voting system. 
There were several accountability mechanisms for citizens holding office. Some 
of the sanctions were severe indeed, with execution topping the list. There were 
other less harsh sanctions. One of the more intriguing ones was ostracism. As 
opposed to the loose use of the term in modern English, in Athenian democracy 
this meant that a citizen who had misused his powers or in other ways not 
performed well was sent into exile for ten years. If it was any consolation he did 
not loose his property. Note the use of the term ‘he’: this is because only free 
males were allowed to become citizens and hence vote in the assembly. 
Women, slaves and metics (resident aliens) were not allowed to participate 
(Elster, 1999: 259). To be fair it should be noted that Athenian democracy did 
evolve from allowing only the aristocracy to become citizens to in the end 
including all free males regardless of economic standing. When you bear in 
mind that this was the first democracy this is an amazing achievement. 
Athenian democracy ended in the year 322 with military defeat of the 
city-state and subsequent suppression of the system (ibid). Hence, democracy 
Mark I survived for roughly 700 years. It would take close to 1500 years for 
democracy Mark II to arrive. That version has yet to celebrate its 200th birthday. 
                                                 
5 It is of course plausible that democracy was conceived and practiced long before the city state of 
Athens, but there are no historical records. Also the fact that the word ‘democracy’ is based on a Greek 
word does speak in favour of the Greeks as the founders of democracy   30
It is difficult to pinpoint the birth of what we today call democracy. Was it 
during the Enlightenment? Or during the revolutionary era? Did it start with the 
French revolution and the consequent crumbling of the divine monarchs? 
There are many definitions of democracy Mark II. The Oxford Concise 
Dictionary of Politics simply refers to it as ‘majority rule’ (McMillan, 2003: 139). 
Heywood, like most political writers and analysts, adopts a very cautious 
attitude towards defining democracy.  
In being almost universally regarded as ‘a good thing’, democracy has come to be 
used as little more than a ‘hurrah’ word, implying approval of a particular set of 
ideas or system of rule…In reality, democracy is a contested concept: there is no 
agreed of settled definition of the term, only a number of rival definitions. The 
most influential of these have been between direct and representative democracy 
(1998: 42). 
The exclusion of women, slaves and certain other groups from 
citizenship is perhaps the biggest difference between Athenian and modern 
democracy. You can also add political representation and the severity of some 
of the accountability sanctions to the list of differences. 
The sheer volume of work done on democratic theory is truly daunting. 
These are some of the chapters and headings in Held’s Models of Democracy: 
‘Classical Democracy: Athens, Republicanism, Liberal Democracy, Competitive 
Elitism, Pluralism, Corporate Capitalism, Democratic Autonomy (1996: vii-xi)’ 
and the list goes on. However for the purposes of this study, liberal democracy 
is the model that most clearly hosts the concepts of political representation and 
accountability, two of the three theoretical pillars for FOI. For all its inherent 
problems and weaknesses [one potent problem is identified by Schumpeter: 
representative ‘democracy is the rule of the politician’(Heywood, 1998: 45)]   31
liberal democracy is still a remarkably strong system with properties that seem 
to survive the most serious challenges, perhaps because of its partnership with 
the very successful capitalist  economic system. Or perhaps, as Heywood 
explains, the durability of liberal democracy is because ‘it is the only system of 
rule capable of maintaining equilibrium within complex and fluid modern 
societies (ibid)’. 
In spite of his unwillingness to define it, Heywood still tries. He points 
out that liberal-democratic systems have a hybrid character. As the name 
implies they contain two main features, one liberal, the other democratic. 
The liberal element in liberal democracy is the belief in limited government, the 
idea that the individual should enjoy some protection from the arbitrary action of 
public officials. The democratic element reflects the belief that government should 
in some way be accountable or sensitive to the people. In combination, the 
elements create a model of democracy that has three central features: 
First, liberal democracy is an indirect and representative form of democracy. 
Political office is gained through success in regular elections, conducted on the 
basis of formal political equality – ‘one person, one vote; one vote, one value’ 
Second, it is based upon competition and electoral choice. This is ensured by 
political pluralism, a tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs, conflicting 
social philosophies and rival political movements and parties. 
Third, liberal democracy is characterised by a clear distinction between the state 
and civil society. This is maintained both by internal and external checks on 
government power and the existence of autonomous groups and interests, and by 
the market of capitalist organisation of economic life (this authors emphasis) 
(1998: 46) 
As the emphasis above shows Heywood’s definition makes it clear that 
liberal democracy hosts the concepts of representation and accountability.  
At the moment it seems as if the liberal democratic model is the world’s 
favoured political system: most nations seem to want to claim to be democratic, 
or to be more democratic than others. Its adaptability is what makes it so 
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difficult to define, but it may also be the source of its endurance since it can be 
adjusted to fit into most known political ideologies (as pointed out by Heywood 
above). In a way democracy could be labeled a metaideology, one that spans 
many systems. It should also be kept in mind at all times that the hegemony of 
democracy is very recent. As Heywood points out: 
The mass conversion of politicians and political thinkers to the cause of democracy 
was one of the most dramatic and significant events in political history. Well into 
the nineteenth century the term continued to have pejorative implications, 
suggesting a system of ‘mob rule’ (ibid). 
Chiebub and Przeworski designed a study to investigate the 
relationship between democracy, elections and accountability for economic 
outcomes. They decided on a sample group of 135 countries between the years 
1950 and 1990. For the purpose of the study they classified the countries as 
follows: 
(1) the chief executive is elected (directly or indirectly), (2) the legislature is 
elected, (3) more than one party competes in elections, (4) incumbent parties have 
in the past or will have in the future lost an election and yielded office. All regimes 
that fail to satisfy at least one of these four criteria are classified as dictatorships 
(1999: 222-23). 
So, one basic democratic criterion out of four needed to be met - fairly 
generous one would have thought. In spite of this out of the 135 countries in the 
sample group 123 qualified as dictatorships, and only 99 met any of the 
democratic criteria. Hence, not even between 1950 and 1990 was democracy 
the most widespread political system (1999: 224) 
Democracy does have its problems, but so do other political systems. 
There is unlikely to be any single political system that will satisfy all citizens. 
However because democracy hosts the concepts of political representation and   33
accountability, it has played and will play an important role in the advancement 
of FOI. 
The Fourth Estate 
The last theoretical pillar of FOI and this project is the concept of the 
media as the fourth estate. The term as such is a bit confusing, because its 
meaning varies between countries. In Australia, and in most liberal 
democracies, the first three estates are defined as the legislature (Australia: the 
House of Representatives and the Senate), the executive (Australia: the 
Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister) and the judiciary (universally made up of 
the court system and the police). In other countries, for example Sweden, you 
come across terms such as the third estate. The reason for this is that the 
executive and the judiciary are referred to under the same heading in the 
Swedish Constitution. The Swedish judiciary is less clearly defined as a 
separate estate compared to for instance the US and Australia. However, in 
practice, the Swedish judiciary is still quite independent from the other estates 
(SOU, 1999: 7-8). The variations continue all the way up to the ‘seventh power’ 
in former Yugoslavia (Schultz, 1998: 47). However they all allude to the same 
concept: the idea that the media should independently scrutinize government 
and the corporate sector and be a watchdog over the execution of power in 
general, and of political power in particular. The role is further strengthened by 
the notion among journalists that the public has delegated the role of 
scrutinising power to the media (Tanner et al, 2005: 27). This line of reasoning 
is supported by international research that clearly shows that the media, in the 
form of individual reporters, are by far the most avid users of FOI, especially in   34
those countries that have far reaching and well functioning FOI regimes (Evans, 
2003: 13, Lidberg, 2003: 82-90). 
It is important to keep in mind that the concept of the fourth estate is 
dependent on the media delivering on its side of the bargain. Tanner et al 
explain: ‘the power of the media is based on a simple trade-off: access in 
exchange for ‘doing the right thing’…If the media do the wrong thing and lose 
the confidence of the public they may kill the goose that lays the golden egg 
(2005: 28)’. The media’s end of the bargain is not to abuse the scrutinizing 
powers delegated to them by the public. However, it is not in the media’s 
interest to be considered ‘just another business’: 
Those self-appointed custodians of the power of the Fourth Estate have also been 
determined not to see it devalued. The power, influence and profitability of the 
contemporary news media depend in no small measure on this independent 
standing. It is scarcely surprising then that media owners, editors, managers, 
journalists and producers are such determined advocates of the idealised Fourth 
Estate. Without it, the media would be just another business and its status 
significantly devalued (Schultz, 1998: 48). 
The values underpinning the concept of the fourth estate derive from 
the ideas of the Enlightenment in the 19
th century:  
…a period when democratic idealism emerged in the wake of the revolutionary 
turmoil of the previous century. People power grew out of the embers of the 
American revolution in the New World and the French revolution in the Old, and 
essential to the new order were freedom of speech and the free flow of information 
to the public. Both would ensure that governments were accountable and that the 
public was informed enough to participate fully in the democratic process (Tanner 
et al, 2005: 27). 
The first editor/journalist to define in practical terms the meaning of the 
fourth estate was John Thadeus Delane, editor of The Times. In 1852 the paper 
had drawn fierce criticism from the future British Prime Minister Lord Derby 
about the frank coverage of some controversial political events. Lord Derby 
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pointed out that ‘if the press wished to maintain influence it should adopt a tone 
of moderation and respect (cited in Schultz, 1998: 24).’ Lord Derby’s criticism 
prompted Delane to attempt to define the roles of parliament and newspapers. 
His main argument was ‘for the separation of the responsibilities of journalism 
and statecraft (ibid)’: 
We cannot admit that a newspaper’s purpose is to share the labours of 
statesmanship or that it is bound by the same limitations, the same duties and the 
same liabilities as the Ministers of the Crown. The purpose and duties of the two 
powers are constantly separate, generally independent, sometimes diametrically 
opposite. 
The dignity and freedom of the press are trammelled from the moment that it 
accepts an ancillary position. To perform its duties with entire independence, and 
consequently to the utmost public advantage, the press can enter into no close or 
binding alliances with the statesmen of the day, nor can it surrender its permanent 
interests to the convenience of the ephemeral power of any government. 
The first duty of the press is to obtain the earliest and most correct intelligence of 
the events of the time and instantly by disclosing them to make them common 
property of the nation. The press lives by disclosures… 
The duty of the press is to speak, of the statesmen to be silent, we are bound to tell 
the truth as we find it without fear of any consequences – to lend no convenient 
shelter to acts of injustice and oppression, but to consign them to the judgement of 
the world… The duty for the journalist is the same as that of the historian – to seek 
out truth, above all things and to present to his readers not such things as statecraft 
would whish them to know, but the truth as near as he can attain it (cited in 
Schultz, 1998: 24-25). 
As Schultz points out, Delane is considered by many later writers and 
researchers to be ‘declamatory, pompous, self-congratulatory and sentimental 
(1998: 24)’. Nevertheless, Delane’s editorials are still cited by many journalists 
as the standard definitions of the fourth estate role.  
The etymology of the term ‘fourth estate’ is uncertain. Some have 
credited the English statesman Edmund Burke who in 1790 ‘is said to have 
pointed to the press gallery in parliament and said: “There are three estates in 
Parliament but in the reporters’ gallery yonder sits a fourth estate more   36
important far than they all”  (cited in Pearson, 2004: 49).’ Others credit Lord 
Macauley who ‘first acknowledged the presence of reporters in the House of 
Commons and described their location with the grandiose title the Fourth Estate 
(Schultz, 1998: 25)’. It is interesting to note that Delane wrote his editorials 
nearly two decades after Burke’s and Lord Macauley’s label, sixty years after 
the First Amendment (guaranteeing freedom of expression) to the US 
constitution was passed in 1791, and 86 years after Sweden passed the then 
most progressive freedom of the press and access laws in the world in 1766.
6 
The fourth estate, its effectiveness and how important and seriously its 
role is viewed by journalists are matters of debate. In 1992 Julianne Schultz 
surveyed Australian journalists on the importance of the fourth estate ideal and 
how well they defended the ideal. Her surveys clearly showed that to the 
majority of those surveyed, the fourth estate concept was very important as a 
role model to aspire to and one of the key reasons for them becoming 
journalists. The surveys also showed that the majority of the journalists 
surveyed were quite prepared to defend the fourth estate role (Schultz, 1998: 
65, 134-35). 
From an international perspective it is also clear that the fourth estate 
concept plays a vital role in defining journalism. Despite the high costs of 
investigative journalism, many newsrooms and media organisations do aspire to 
have at least some of their reporters designated as investigative journalists. An 
international example of the fourth estate role in action is the ‘right to know 
                                                 
6 In international research Sweden’s leading role in press and information freedom is often overlooked. 
The most likely explanation is the language barrier. One underlying, albeit not driving, motive for this 
project is to make the Swedish FOI regime more well-known for other researchers, the public and 
journalists to draw upon.    37
articles’ published by freedominfo.org. These articles show what can be 
achieved if journalists have the advantage of operating in a country that has a 
functioning FOI regime (Freedominfo, 2004).  
One of the main threats to the functioning of the fourth estate is the 
concentration of media ownership. The big media owners are now powerhouses 
in their own right and should ideally be scruitinised by the journalists they 
employ. Instead there is a great risk that journalists will be pressured to serve 
their employers’ interests, taking fewer risks in rocking the boat and in the 
process becoming mere mouthpieces for politicians and corporations. There are 
compelling reasons to question the independence of large parts of the 
mainstream media and consequently the extent to which they would be willing 
to take advantage of FOI as an accountability tool. As media barons gain more 
power the important democratic and societal role of journalism may take second 
place to the economic bottom line. An example of this is the apparent Dr Jekyll 
and Mr Hyde transformation of one of the most powerful media players in the 
world. This is a quote from a speech made by a young Rupert Murdoch in 1961: 
Unless we can return to the principles of public service we will lose our claim to be 
the Fourth Estate. What right have we to speak in the public interest when, too 
often, we are motivated by personal gain (cited in Schultz, 1998: 230). 
It shows a different Rupert Murdoch from the originator of Fox News, 
the culture of which is well captured in the documentary Outfoxed. The film 
clearly illustrates how opinions have replaced journalism at Fox News, leaving a 
void where the fourth estate role should thrive (Greenwald, 2004).  
For all its flaws the fourth estate role of the media is still alive, at least 
as a source of inspiration and motivator for journalists, as Schultz’s research   38
has shown. The fourth estate role will always be a matter for debate and, as 
Schultz points out, is constantly negotiated between its members and the 
members of the other three estates (Schultz, 1998: 93). This is a sign of 
strength.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that FOI rests on the three theoretical pillars: 
political representation, political accountability and the concept of the media as 
the fourth estate. It has shown how representation and accountability have been 
accommodated within the modern dominant political model of liberal democracy 
and the role FOI plays in this context. 
As Przeworksi et al note in their study of democracy, representation and 
accountability, the democratic system affords opportunities for creativity that 
have been largely unexploited: 
The fact is that during the past two hundred years we have thought little about the 
institutional design of democracy. Since the great explosion of institutional 
thinking, when the present democratic institutions were invented – and they were 
invented – there has been almost no institutional creativity. Except for the never 
implemented provisions for workers’ comanagement in the Weimar Constitution, 
the discovery of proportional representation in the 1860s was the last major 
institutional invention. All democracies that have sprung up since the end of the 
eighteenth century, including the most recent ones, just combine in different ways, 
often piecemeal, the preexisting institutions, Hence, there is lots of room for 
institutional creativity (1999: 51) 
It could be argued that FOI is an example of just this sort of ‘institutional 
creativity’ manifested by the different forms it has taken in more than 50 
countries around the globe. In the next chapter we will examine in more detail 
the origins and evolution of FOI.    39
 
Chapter Two: The evolution of Freedom of 
Information 
 
Introduction 
The political ideals underpinning FOI are, as pointed out in chapter one, 
not new. However it was not until after World War II that FOI started to get 
international political traction. This chapter looks at the evolution of FOI and 
analyses and compares the two systems which provide the basic templates on 
which all the others are modeled: Sweden and the United States. It will also 
examine the role of the whistleblower and, the symbiotic relationship between 
FOI and the media. 
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FOI defined  
The vast majority FOI laws in the world are broadly similar and build on 
the same three principles summarised by the former West Australian FOI 
Commissioner: 
The first one is concerned with human rights and privacy. It enables people to gain 
access to information about themselves and to correct that information if necessary. 
The second is the principle of accountability and it seeks to open governing 
processes to public scrutiny to facilitate efficiency and competency in decision-
making. The third principle is that of democratic participation to allow public 
participation in the policy process and in government itself (Keighly-Gerardy, 
1999: 1). 
There is little controversy concerning the first point, providing access to 
personal information for individuals. The sticking points are the two other 
objectives: to allow public scrutiny of government processes and as a 
consequence of greater access to information to increase the publics’ 
participation in the political process. Why would anyone who is and has been in 
a privileged position with access to public funds for a long time want to be 
scruitinised? Banisar suggests that one reason could be to ‘assist in developing 
citizen trust in government actions and maintaining a civil democratic society 
(2004: 3).’ David Banisar’s global survey of all existing FOI systems currently 
provides the best overview of the different FOI regimes. In the latest revision 
(May 2004), 58 countries had enacted FOI legislation and over thirty were in the 
process of doing so (ibid: 2). It is interesting to note that although the concept of 
FOI has been around for centuries, more than half of the acts have been 
passed only in the last ten years (ibid: 3). But as this thesis will show, there are 
many problems with existing FOI laws, even those that are supposedly well 
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Many of the laws are not adequate and promote access in name only. In some 
countries, the laws lie dormant due to a failure to implement them properly or a 
lack of demand. In others, the exemptions are abused by governments. Older laws 
need updating to reflect developments in society and technology. New laws 
promoting secrecy in the global war on terror have undercut access. International 
organisations have taken over the activities of national government but have not 
subjected themselves to the same rules (2004: 2). 
Despite these problems, Banisar is still hopeful. ‘Access to information 
ebbs and flows in any country but the transformation has begun and it is no 
longer possible to tell citizens that they have no right to know (ibid: 1).’ 
Banisar points to a number of reasons why we have seen the steep 
increase in the number of FOI laws enacted in the last decade. 
International pressure. The international community has been influential in 
promoting access. International bodies such as the Commonwealth, Council of 
Europe and the Organisation of the American States have drafted guidelines or 
model legislation and the Council of Europe decided in September 2003 to develop 
the first international treaty on access. 
Modernisation and the Information Society. The expansion of the Internet into 
everyday usage has increased demand for more information by the public, 
businesses and civil society groups. 
Constitutional rights. The transition to democracy for most countries has led to the 
recognition of FOI as a human right. Almost all newly developed of modified 
constitutions include a right to access information from government bodies. Over 
forty countries now have constitutional provisions on access. 
Corruption and Scandals. Often, crises brought about because of a lack of 
transparency have led to the adoption of laws to prevent future problems. Anti-
corruption campaigns have been highly successful in transitional countries 
attempting to change their cultures (2004: 3-4). 
In other words FOI laws seem to have become ‘a right of passage’ for 
emerging democracies. It seems that to gain full access to the international 
political system a country must show that it supports the notion of transparency 
and openness in governance (at least in theory) by adopting FOI laws. 
The main differences that exist between FOI systems relate first, to the 
number of government agencies exempt from the law and second, to the appeal   42
options. Exemption regimes can range from, for instance, the Swedish system 
where no agency is formally exempt (although in practice documents from the 
security police that handle national security are very hard to obtain) to the much 
more restrictive Australian federal FOI legislation that has a whole list of exempt 
agencies (this will be further discussed in chapters six and seven). As to 
appeals, again compare Sweden where the appeal system is local, speedy and 
free of charge with Australia where the national FOI appeal system is remote, 
time consuming and prohibitively expensive. This thesis will also show that 
there are other major variations amongst different FOI systems. 
 
Two main systems: Sweden and the US 
The two main models for FOI are Sweden and the United States. The 
Swedish regime predates the American by 200 years. Before comparing the two 
systems, let us first examine the history of the Swedish system. This takes us 
back to the ‘father’ of Swedish FOI, Anders Chydenius (first mentioned in 
chapter one).  
In the middle of the 17th century Chydenius and his colleagues realised 
that they had been given a unique window of opportunity to introduce freedom 
of the press and access to document legislation. The process of how it 
happened is fascinating and is described in the entry on Chydenius in the 
Biography of Finland (Chydenius was born in Finland): 
In the parliamentary session of 1765, a faction was formed among the Caps party 
(as opposed to the Hats), promoting social reforms and opposing the supremacy of 
the nobility. This new wing was obviously led by the radicals in the clergy, and 
with a natural sounding board among the peasantry, and broad support among the 
burghers. Among the most radical in Sweden itself were some of the clergymen in   43
Skåne [the southern most province close to Denmark]. The radical movement 
among the Caps induced the conservative leadership, consisting of noblemen and 
prelates, gradually to seek a common line with their former opponents, the Hats. 
Chydenius and other radicals saw the necessity of improving the political 
competence of a broad cross-section of the population, consequently adopting the 
notion of freedom of the press with great zeal. Chydenius' memorandum on this 
matter in 1765 was signed by an elderly representative of the clergy. Furthermore, 
the radicals succeeded in making Chydenius a member of a parliamentary 
committee dealing with the freedom of press issue, and he became its most 
outspoken member in the winter session of 1765 - 66.  
The conservatives had a majority in the committee, but since they were extremely 
lazy about participating in the meetings, the freedom of press supporters could 
handle the planning stage almost by themselves. Most of the work was done by 
Chydenius, with enormous industry and competence. The conservatives could not 
find tenable arguments against him in the big deputation revising the committee 
report. In its final recommendation in spring 1766 the freedom of press committee 
suggested abolishing censorship on other than religious articles, which would be 
subject to cathedral chapter control. The committee also suggested giving the 
public free access to all official documents as well as parliamentary committee 
reports and records. The conservatives did not succeed in voting these propositions 
down. In autumn 1766 the parliamentary majority consisting of the three 
commoner Estates approved the propositions, even though Chydenius had 
meanwhile been expelled from the parliament. Thus the Freedom-of-Press and the 
Right-of-Access to Public Records Act came into force at the end of the year, and 
Sweden had acquired the most progressive freedom-of-the-press law in the world 
(Virrankoski, 1998: 3). 
It is interesting to ponder the fact that it was the complacency and 
laziness of the governing party that paved the way for the radical reform. It is 
quite clear that Chydenius himself considered the introduction of access laws 
that allowed all citizens access to documents to be his greatest achievement 
(ibid: 4). In the same year, 1766, the Swedish parliament also passed legislation 
establishing the world’s first parliamentary Ombudsman (‘ombud’ is the Swedish 
word for ‘delegate’), one of few Swedish words that have been directly 
‘exported’ to the English language in recent times. 
The incentive for the first Swedish FOI-related legislation came mainly 
from an information-starved political opposition that was given a rare chance to 
pass legislation that would grant them and all citizens more access to 
government-held documents and information. As has been pointed out earlier,   44
Chydenius drew inspiration from the early Chinese Tang dynasty as well as the 
contemporary 18
th century political thinkers and philosophers such as John 
Locke who were active during the Age of Enlightenment (known in Sweden as 
the Age of Liberty). The introduction to the Swedish Constitution describes the 
change in the political landscape thus: 
The death of Carl XII in 1718 brought to an end not only Sweden’s great power 
status but autocratic rule as well. The pendulum now swung back in the other 
direction. A new form of government took shape, which became known, 
significantly, as the Age of Liberty government, and captured the imagination of 
the great philosophers of the age like Voltaire, Rousseau and Mably (Riksdagen, 
2005). 
Sweden had been at war for the better part of the period since the rise 
of its military might 150 years earlier and had instigated and driven the 30-year 
war of the previous century. The country was drained both economically and in 
terms of manpower and was suffering from extreme war fatigue. The 
intelligentsia sensed this and its political manifestation was the radical press 
freedom and access to document acts that were so cunningly passed through 
Parliament. 
The US FOI model grew out of a global move towards more open 
government following the World War II. In the period of self-analysis 
immediately after the war, the US and several other members of the newly 
formed United Nations concluded that too much secrecy in too many countries 
had provided fertile soil for conflict. In May 1946 the US delegation to the UN 
persuaded the Commission on Human Rights to create a sub-commission on 
FOI (Lamble, 2002b: 5).  By 1953 a draft convention on FOI had been 
formulated. The idea was that this convention should serve as a template for all 
member countries. This would have had enormous impact on the flow of 
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government-held information globally, with anyone from any country being able 
to request documents from any member country. This was much too 
progressive and far-reaching and was seen by many member countries as 
compromising national sovereignty. The idea was dropped after opposition 
from, amongst others, some western journalists and editors. One of the leaders 
of this opposition was the Australian Sir Lloyd Dumas, the then managing 
director of the Advertiser Newspapers Limited, publisher of the Adelaide 
Advertiser. Dumas’ rationale was that if Australia backed the convention too 
much power over the Australian press would pass to federal government. He 
argued that the convention might have prohibited the publication of articles 
critical of foreign governments or it could have ensured that foreign 
governments were given an equal right of reply to any article which offended 
them (ibid: 5). After this international setback the US pursued its own version of 
FOI. A first attempt in 1958 resulted in an amendment to the 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act that made it mandatory for government agencies 
to keep and maintain records. The amendment was passed in 1966 and called 
the Freedom of Information Act. DeFleur summarises the amendment: 
This amendment, commonly called FOIA, placed the burden of compliance 
squarely on the agencies and required that they prove they were justified when 
denying access to records. It also clarified the conditions under which agencies 
could legally withhold records by specifying nine exemptions to the Act. In order 
to protect against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, the law allowed 
agencies to delete identifying details, but required that the agencies justify any 
decisions in writing. The FOIA amendment was written with some very real teeth 
to enforce its provisions. If records were not released, citizens could register a 
complaint in court about the agency. That could then enjoin that agency and order 
the production of any records improperly withheld. More forcefully, that statute 
stated that ‘in the event of non compliance with the court’s order, the district court 
may punish the responsible officers for contempt.’ Finally a provision was included 
requiring that such court cases ‘take precedence on the docket over all other cases 
and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and 
expedited in every way (1994: 50)   46
This excellent summary of the US FOIA clearly shows that the US 
legislation is similar to Swedish FOI, particularly with its emphasis that the 
request for documents should have priority, that real avenues for appeals 
should exist, and that legally binding rulings would ensure repercussions for the 
agencies/public servants that refuse to comply. However, there are also 
differences between the Swedish and US Acts. These are well summarised by 
Lamble in the table below. 
Model Sweden  United  States 
Influences  7
th to 18
th century Chinese 
culture, Lutheran church, 
academe, liberal libertarian 
ideals of individual 
freedoms and a free press, 
emerging democratic 
concepts 
Press interests, the United 
Nations, post World War II 
democratic ideals, 
presidential desire to help 
stop public service 
becoming a fourth arm of 
government 
Relevant legislation first 
enacted 
1707 and 1766  1947, 1958 and 1966 
FOI as a constitutional 
concept 
Yes No 
Links to press freedom  Direct, constitutional and 
very specifically and 
clearly stated in legislation 
No direct links but implied 
support in the First 
Amendment to the 
Constitution 
Perceptions and attitudes 
of legislators and officials 
A cultural tradition of 
administrative openness. 
Strong expectations of 
transparency as a natural 
right 
Ranging from enthusiasm 
to obstruction. A deep and 
long-standing pre-FOI Act 
tradition of administrative 
secrecy which was 
reinforced by the Cold War 
‘Ownership’ of 
information 
Expectations of public 
ownership and control 
A mixed perception of 
government ownership and 
control and public 
ownership 
Cost  Free, no access or 
processing fees 
[photocopying fees apply after 
the 10
th copy] 
Often expensive, nearly 
always a processing fee and 
photocopying charges. 
However, reduced charges 
or no charge for the press   47
and educational users if 
disclosure ‘in the public 
interest’ 
Processing times for 
requests 
Short, often within hours 
[or days depending on 
complexity or controversiality of 
request] 
Generally drawn out, 
usually at least a month and 
can take much longer 
Specific rules facilitating 
FOI access by journalists 
No specific rules in relation 
to FOI as all citizens, 
including journalists and 
editors, have equally free 
access [anyone including 
foreign journalists have access] 
Yes, but journalists are still 
not as free as in the 
Swedish model 
Relationships between 
journalists and public 
servants who administer 
Model 
Generally open and 
professional 
Often suspicious and 
distrustful 
Public and media 
awareness of FOI rights 
Generally very high  Generally poor to 
mediocre, although high 
among some journalists, 
media and rights’ groups 
Possibilities for appeal 
against refusal to release 
information 
Broad, either through an 
ombudsman or direct to a 
court. The vast majority of 
such appeals have been 
won by appellants 
Often a matter of official 
discretion or administrative 
appeal at first but can then 
go to court in many cases 
although outcomes are 
unpredictable 
Other nations which have 
adapted or adopted the 
model [see p. 48] 
Only a handful including 
Finland, Norway, Denmark 
and the US 
About 35 including 
Australia, Canada, South 
Africa, Japan, Thailand, 
Ireland and the United 
Kingdom 
Separation of powers  Original FOI laws framed 
at a time when there was 
emphasis on a separation of 
powers but the concept was 
abandoned in 1974 when 
the Instrument of 
Government was revised 
A clear three-way 
separation between the 
judiciary, legislature and 
administration/executive 
 
 
        (Lamble,  2003b:  53) 
With this overview it is clear that there are more similarities than 
differences between the Swedish and US FOI systems. The most important 
difference is that FOI is part of the Swedish constitution, which makes it very 
hard for the government of the day to alter FOI (for more detail see political   48
profile of Sweden below in chapter six). FOI in the US is a separate Act. 
Amendments to the constitution do support the publics’ right to know, but the 
standing of FOI in the US is weaker than in Sweden. An example of this is the 
vast increase in classified documents that has occurred in the US as part of the 
War on Terror. This form of classification exempts the documents from the FOI 
Act (Lamble, 2003a: 38-39). 
The other main points of differences are procedural: the processing 
costs of requests, the turnaround time and the appeal options. These could 
possibly be attributed to the much longer tradition of openness in Sweden (for 
further discussion and analysis see below, chapter eleven). 
Lamble argues that the US adapted the Swedish FOI regime to suit its 
own political system. Most other nations adopted, with very few changes, the 
US version. America has one of the clearest separation of power structures in 
the democratic world. There are very clear boundaries and checks and 
balances between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The most 
striking difference between the US and Westminster-based regimes (often also 
referred to as parliamentary systems) is that in the US the chief executive is 
elected directly by the public. In the Westminster system the legislative and 
executive powers operate within and are drawn from the parliament. The party 
or coalition that holds the majority in parliament forms government and some 
members of parliament are made Ministers heading government departments. 
Lamble points out that ‘there is therefore greater potential for legislators and 
public servants to work together in secrecy in a Westminster system and to   49
interfere in the administration of FOI than there is in the US system (Lamble, 
2003b: 54).’ 
Lamble’s view is that the Swedish model is more wide-ranging and 
would have been better suited for creating ‘generic’ FOI regimes. 
One of the underlying motivations for the introduction of FOI in the US was to 
help control the public service and make it transparent and accountable so that it 
did not develop into a fourth arm of government. That motivation is irrelevant in 
systems which do not have a full and clearly defined separation of powers. Such 
jurisdictions would be much better served if they had drawn on the Swedish 
precedent and developed a system of FOI that was constitutionally supported and 
safeguarded (2003b: 55). 
Terrill uses Australia as a case study to map the move away from 
secrecy towards openness in governance. His extensive work covers the period 
from Menzies to the present day. His main conclusion is that currently ‘secrecy 
regularly attracts criticism and requires justification and publicity has become an 
important tool for governing. Once anathema, openness has become a 
fundamental democratic value (Terrill, 2000: 232)’. This may be the case in 
theory, however as this study will show, practice does not always follow theory. 
Terrill also qualifies his conclusions of increased openness by pointing out that 
under successive Australian governments there has been an incremental 
growth in the size of their publicity departments in order to ‘manage openness’ 
(ibid: 235). Terrill also identifies the trend of ‘snowing’ as an effect of the 
breakthrough of FOI legislation. Snowing is when departments attempt to 
‘drown’ and disarm the public and the media with so much irrelevant 
information, via for instance websites, that you lose sight of what is important 
(ibid). Certainly this trend is observable not only in Australia but in other   50
countries as well. It has long been a well-known tool for less scrupulous public 
relations officers. 
It is interesting to note that neither the Swedish nor the US Acts allows 
any access rights to information held by private companies. The Swedish Act 
has been amended to cover government-run and -owned companies that have 
adopted a corporate structure, but it does not cover the private sector in 
general, and nor does the US Act. As we shall see there are however 
newcomers to the FOI family that have addressed this very important issue (see 
chapters nine and eleven). Achbar points out that the corporate sector probably 
has as much, if not more, influence on our daily lives as those who politically 
govern us (2003: chapter 21), but the accountability mechanisms between the 
public and the private sector are very limited indeed. The annual shareholders 
meeting is a very limited and blunt accountability tool, that only includes 
shareholders. The notion that ‘the market will regulate itself’ into accountability 
has been proven wrong time and time again. The concept of corporate 
accountability will be further discussed in chapter twelve. 
Information does not come in the form of documents only. The sources 
of information, those who collate the information, interpret it, and write the 
documents, play a pivotal role in the flow of public information. This thesis 
argues that a well-functioning FOI regime requires not only open access to 
documents but also the protection of the rights of sources who supply 
information - the whistleblowers.   51
 
Whistleblowing 
‘Whistleblower protection’, ‘legal protection of journalistic sources’, 
‘public servants’ public comment’, ‘collaborators of justice’, ‘shield laws for 
journalists’: there are many labels for the concept of encouraging public 
servants (who as the name suggests serve the public, albeit indirectly via their 
government department or agency) to speak their minds frankly not only to their 
Minister when something is wrong, but also to the public, often via the media. 
Important information on how the country is governed cannot be found in 
documents and written information only. Indeed, there is a strong argument that 
the inside knowledge and background information that public servants have is 
of much higher caliber than documents as such. Hence, any system that is 
serious about transparency and openness in government should have 
incentives that encourage public servants (and preferably also workers in the 
private sector) to provide information that is of high interest to the public. 
Whether the mechanism of public comment is embedded within the FOI regime 
or a separate entity, it plays a vital role in how the public gains access to 
government-held information. Hence, any study attempting to map how the 
overall FOI regime works in practice would be incomplete if it did not attempt to 
also evaluate the whistleblowing climate. 
Looking at the terms used to describe someone who decides to point 
out maladministration, corruption or other perceived injustices, there seems to 
be a sliding scale ranging from the quite benign sounding ‘public servants’ 
public comment (Terrill, 2000: 65)’ to the very dramatic sounding ‘whistleblower’   52
(Martin, 2004: 119). In between these two extremes you find the concepts of 
‘legal protection of journalistic sources’ (Australia, 1994: ix) and ‘collaborators of 
justice’ (Vaughn, 2002: 29). In an ideal politically open system public servants, 
and indeed employees of corporations, would be free to comment on policy and 
practice before any problem emerged. However, there is a strong argument that 
political leaders would never tolerate this on grounds that it is impossible to 
have public scrutiny at every stage of the policy process. There would be a risk 
that policies would take forever to develop. The other three concepts all imply 
that something has gone wrong, or is about to go wrong, and needs to be put 
on the agenda for fixing. Although the term ‘legal protection of journalistic 
sources’ is perhaps the most descriptively accurate, it is awkward and seldom 
used. The European Union uses the term ‘collaborators of justice’, which carries 
connotations of treachery. Hence, in this project the term ‘whistleblowing’ will be 
used to refer to the concept of the institutionalized ‘leak’.   
Vaughn finds that: 
Whistleblower provisions are closely linked to freedom of information laws. They 
share common values. They seek similar goals. Both are intertwined with the rights 
of free expression and association as human rights that form the foundations of 
democratic accountability. The enactment of freedom of information laws and 
whistleblower protections within the last decade illustrate their common 
connections and the attraction of values which they implement (2002: 32). 
However Vaughn also points out that there are several examples of 
whistleblower legislation that have become effectively a ‘Good Citizens 
Elimination Act’, indicating that whistleblower protection must ‘operate with 
other reforms which act to assure democratic accountability that ensures that 
whistleblowers are protected in reality and not only in theory (ibid).’   53
As with access to documents Sweden and the US again emerge as the 
two main systems and frontrunners when it comes to legal protection of 
whistleblowers. However, in the literature it is mainly the US Whistleblower 
Protection Act that is referred to, in spite of the fact that the Swedish system is 
more far-reaching (for further details see chapters six and eight).  
Martin defines a whistleblower as ‘a person who believes that truth 
should prevail over power: a successful whistleblower brings down corrupt 
people in high places purely by exposing information (Martin, 2004: 122).’ 
However he argues that according to research and experience institutionalized 
whistleblowing does not work. His interviews with whistleblowers paint a 
depressing picture. The stories often start with a public servant who wants to do 
the right thing and tell the public about something that is going wrong or has 
gone wrong. The result is all too often ‘rumors, ostracism and questioning the 
employee’s performance (Martin, 2004: 119)’. Martin divides whistleblowing into 
two categories: using ‘official channels’ such as whistleblowing protection acts, 
and ‘skill development’, which rests on the employee himself taking command 
of events and not using the official channels (ibid: 120). According to Martin’s 
studies the skill development approach is better for the individual. The main 
reason for this is that the official channel is controlled by the very entities that 
are the potential subjects of the whistleblower’s disclosure. However, Martin 
misses a vital point. His theories assume that the whistleblower always needs to 
disclose his or her name. This is not always necessary. Indeed, it can be 
argued that proper protection of whistleblowers should include a means of 
granting anonymity when needed. 
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Often the most effective avenue for whistleblowing is using the media. 
As De Maria points out:  
None of the schemes in other parts of the world, bar the United States, appears to 
protect media whistleblowers. It is common knowledge that the media is often the 
only door open to the whistleblower determined to expose wrongdoing. It is also 
common knowledge that government often will only move on allegations once they 
have been aired in the media (cited in Martin, 2004: 123). 
 
De Maria may be forgiven for overlooking the Swedish whistleblower 
protection. The legislation is part of the constitution (Riksdagen, 2005) and not 
referred to as ‘whistleblower protection’ but as ‘freedom of speech’. In the 
Swedish whistleblower protection scheme public servants know that, rather than 
being penalized themselves, their employer will be penalized if they investigate 
who ‘leaked’ today’s front-page story. The Swedish ‘whistleblower’ is further 
protected by the fact that the journalist is bound by law not to disclose the 
source (if anonymity has been agreed upon between the source and the 
reporter), risking a heavy fine and a one-year prison term for doing so. Swedish 
journalists can only be forced to reveal their sources on grounds of national 
security, treason and if the source has broken confidentiality agreements 
(Sefastsson, 1999: 116-27). 
One of the most well-known examples of whistleblowing is Woodward 
and Bernstein’s main source in the Watergate story, code named ‘Deepthroat’. 
In 2005, more than 30 years after Watergate, the identity of Deepthroat was 
revealed, by the source himself. Anonymous sources do pose journalistic 
problems, but these can be overcome as the practice of extensive whistleblower 
protection in Sweden has shown. The main upside is that the whistleblower 
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need not fear for his/her job and reprisals. Only the Swedish whistleblower 
protection system guarantees the whistleblower anonymity in most cases. On 
the federal level the US system does not guarantee anonymity. This is further 
discussed in chapter eight. Martin concludes by underscoring the importance of 
whistleblower protection offering anonymity if needed. 
A well-informed and well-connected employee will not turn to official bodies 
unless they promise better prospects than what individuals can achieve through 
their own efforts. Why make a protected disclosure when a leak or a well-planned 
campaign is safer and more effective? This suggests that the best way to improve 
the performance of official channels is to develop workers’ understanding and 
skills (2004: 129). 
Again it is instructive to look at how Australia has dealt with 
whistleblowers. There are a number of state-based laws attempting to provide 
protection for whistleblowers. They are what Martin would label prime examples 
of ‘official channels’ and none deal with protection if a potential whistleblower 
decides to talk to a journalist. On the federal level there is no whistleblower 
protection at all. In the early 1990s there were a number of high profile court 
cases where Australian journalists refused to reveal their sources of 
information. A number of journalists were subsequently found to be in contempt 
of court and some of them served short prison terms. This triggered a Senate 
inquiry into ‘Shield Laws for Journalists’ Confidential Sources’ (Australia, 1994: 
ix). The report states that: 
The media have been pressing for legislative action to protect journalists from the 
law of contempt, based on the argument that the ability to keep a source 
confidential is essential to the free flow of democracy necessary to a democratic 
society and that sources of information will dry up if journalists are forced to 
disclose them (this author’s emphasis) (ibid). 
This goes to the heart of whistleblowing via the media: if you are not 
protected, why should you risk everything? The inquiry was quite thorough and   56
heard many opinions and arguments from most stakeholders. It explored who 
can be defined as being a journalist, the role of investigative reporting and the 
role of the fourth estate, and the conflict between the journalists’ code of ethics 
and the legal system. The report made a number of concrete recommendations, 
partly sympathetic to greater protection of journalistic sources. However, it did 
not recommend increased legal protection of journalistic sources along the lines 
of doctor-patient confidentiality. The main argument was that journalism is not 
‘regulated’, as are for instance the legal and medical professions. Hence 
journalists cannot be trusted with the great power and responsibility that comes 
with having legal protection for their sources, in effect overriding the contempt 
law (Australia, 1994: xx-xxi). The inquiry’s main argument, which flows out of 
the lack of professional accreditation of journalists, is the lack of accountability 
for journalists. If you are to be granted legal protection of your sources, there 
should be some accountability, the report argues. 
The accountability point is crucial. But who is to hold journalists to 
account? The government? This is hardly an appropriate power for those most 
likely to be scruitinised: what impact might this have on independence and 
quality of journalistic scrutiny? The whole idea of the media taking on the role as 
independent scruitinisers of power rests on the notion that they come from 
outside government and are not tainted by power – at least according to the 
ideal.  
As for how to hold journalists to account, it is hard to conceive of any 
regulatory system which would not compromise journalistic activity (as is 
already exemplified by the chilling effect of extensive and prohibitive defamation   57
laws in some countries, like Australia). Regulation would render impossible the 
fourth estate capacity to scruitinise those in power. The compromise solution 
that many countries have come up with is a set of ethical guidelines for 
journalists to follow. Policing these guidelines is a perennial problem, not only in 
terms of enforcement but also in terms of what sort of penalties, if any, should 
be imposed on transgressors. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the evolution of FOI and described the 
Swedish and US models which are the main templates for FOI around the 
world.  It has shown the symbiotic relationship between the FOI and fourth 
estate and underscored the importance of whistleblower protection for the 
effectiveness of any FOI regime. However there are two sides to the FOI 
relationship – the seekers after information and the holders of information. This 
brings up further vital questions, which are addressed further in chapter three: 
who owns the information held by government - the people or the government? 
How do politicians and public servants see their role as information keepers? 
Do they see themselves as facilitators that dispense information on request 
from citizens because they keep the information on behalf of the public? Or do 
they subscribe to the Sir Humphrey Appleby view that the less the public knows 
about government and governing the better. These attitudes at the core of FOI 
determine how well the regime works in practice.    58
 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
Scene: The Civil Servants Club Westminster, London. The Permanent 
Secretary to the British Prime Minister, Sir Arnold (SA), has just been served a 
brandy. Joining him is Sir Humphrey (SH), the Permanent Secretary to the 
newly appointed Minister for Administrative Affairs. As they discuss what the 
new Minister is like the Minister’s private secretary Bernard (B) joins them. Sir 
Humphrey’s main concern is that the new Minister wants ‘open government’ 
reform. 
SH: As long as we can head him off from this open government nonsense. 
B: But I thought we were calling the white paper Open Government? 
SH: Yes, well, always dispose of the difficult bits in the title. Does less harm there 
than in the text.   59
SA: The less you intend to do something, the more you need to keep talking about 
it. 
B: But, I mean, what’s wrong with open government? Why shouldn’t the public 
know more about what’s going on? 
SA: Are you serious? 
B: Well, yes Sir, it is the Minister’s policy after all. 
SA: But, my dear boy, it’s a contradiction in terms. You can be open, or you can 
have government. 
B: But surely the citizens of a democracy have a right to know? 
SH: No, they have a right to be ignorant. Knowledge only mean complicity and 
guilt, ignorance has a certain…dignity. 
B: But if the Minister wants open government…. 
SH: You just don’t give people what they want if it’s not good for them. Do you 
give brandy to an alcoholic? 
SA: If people don’t know what you’re doing, they don’t know what you’re doing 
wrong. 
B: Well, I’m…I’m sorry, Sir Humphrey, but I am the Minister’s private secretary, 
and if that’s what he wants… 
SH: My dear fellow, you will not be serving your Minister by helping him make a 
fool of himself. Of the Ministers we’ve had, every one of them would have been a 
laughingstock in three months had it not been for the most rigid and impenetrable 
secrecy of what they were up to. 
B: What do you propose to do about it? 
SH: Can you keep a secret? 
B: Of course 
SH: So, can I. (BBC, 1979) 
This time the Minister lost. Sir Humphrey outmanoeuvred him and the 
white paper on open government withered and died. Although the above dialog 
is satirical in nature, it still goes to the core of how well a freedom of information 
regime works in practice. As pointed out in chapter one, it raises the key issue 
of who ‘owns’ government information and what role politicians and public 
servants play: are they guardians of this information or facilitators for dispensing   60
government-held information to those that request it? This question is 
addressed in the three sub-studies that make up the research design for this 
project. 
The way FOI works in practice in different countries has thus far 
received little attention by researchers. This is confirmed by earlier literature 
reviews by Lidberg (2003: 37) and Snell (2004: 59-60). Further Terrill points out 
that ‘secrecy, openness and publicity are unusual concepts to research. They 
are not concepts frequently found in indexes, and are often present only 
between lines or evident form the way that activities and events do – or do not – 
occur (2000: 3).’ And Snell observes: 
There is an urgent need for academics, postgraduates, government officials and 
NGOs to develop comparative studies in this area which include, but extend 
beyond, singular case studies or collections of case studies. These studies will not 
only inform the policy development processes of countries yet to adopt FOI 
legislation but will also feed back into reforms of veteran jurisdictions like 
Sweden, Canada, Australia and the US (2004: 60). 
This project is an answer to this call and will be unique in three ways: 
1.  it is the first project to systematically track actual FOI requests on 
an internationally comparative basis 
2.  it is the first study to evaluate and take into account the 
protection and legal situation of media whistleblowers and the 
journalists they choose to work with 
3.  it lays the foundation for the first International Freedom of 
Information Index   61
Using a five-country sample (Sweden, Australia, US, South Africa and 
Thailand) the study will compare FOI regimes, the attitudes of the government 
administrators, and the experiences of journalists who use them. This chapter 
will review the relevant literature, discuss the research questions and identify 
and describe the methodologies used in designing the research instruments. 
Literature review 
The literature shows that while a number of comparisons of different 
FOI regimes have been made, these studies have focused on comparing the 
‘letters of the law’ rather than the practical outcome - what the FOI laws deliver 
in actual access to information. Coulthart, (1991), Lamble (2002a), Ricketson, 
(2002), Snell, (2004), Terrill,(2000) and Waters, (1999) among others, have 
from an Australian perspective, and in Snell’s and Lamble’s cases with 
international outlooks, covered a wealth of legal aspects and journalistic uses of 
FOI. However there are no studies tracking actual FOI requests (testing the law, 
if you like), and providing international comparisons on a practical level of how 
the different legislations deliver on their promises. The whistleblowing climate 
as part of the overall FOI regime is largely overlooked. Although shield laws for 
Australian journalists were the subject of a senate inquiry in Australia, 
researchers have not focused on their importance to the overall information 
climate (see chapter one). 
The Swedish literature is also focused on the legal framework of FOI. 
There is ample literature analyzing the laws and suggesting concrete journalistic 
uses of FOI. Writings by, among others, Olsson, (1992), Sefastsson, (1999), 
Hederén, (1988), Gustafsdotter, (2001) and Löwenberg, (1992) cover these   62
areas well. However, when it comes to testing what Swedish FOI delivers, there 
are no scientific studies available. The Swedish journalism union, Svenska 
Journalistförbundet, SJF, conducted two ‘openness tests’ of Swedish 
Government agencies in 1997 and 2000 (Svenska Journalistförbundet, 1997), 
and although they give an indication of a relatively wide general knowledge of 
FOI among Swedish public servants, they are of little use from a scholarly 
perspective. 
A search for relevant literature and relevant studies in the United States 
shows a picture similar to Sweden and Australia, although there seems to be 
more emphasis on the practical workings of FOI in the US literature covered by 
writers such as Davies and Splichal, (2000) and Rozell, (2002). However, the 
bulk of the studies are still concerned with legal issues exemplified by the works 
of Richelson, (2003), Bass and Hammit, (2002) and Siegal, (2002). There are 
no comparative international FOI studies done as far as this literature search 
has been able to detect.   
The other two countries of study, South Africa and Thailand, are relative 
newcomers to the FOI family. Their Acts came into effect in 2001 and 1997 
respectively (Banisar, 2004: 72, 80). For obvious reasons there is much less 
literature on FOI in these two countries. Snell points to one of the reasons: ‘the 
Thai academics have barely had time to realize that FOI legislation is now 
operational (Snell, 2004: 60)’, all the more reason to study these countries. The 
literature review found that Thailand is part of a study that compares the level of 
information access in eight Southeast Asian countries. The study uses 45 
categories of records, such as population census data, data concerning the   63
environment, local governments’ budgets, military expenditures, etc. The study 
ranks the eight nations based on the level of access. Thailand and the 
Philippines rank as the most transparent nations in Southeast Asia (Coronel, 
2001). No previous studies relating to use of FOI were found in South Africa. 
Research question 
The overarching research question for this project is: to what extent, if 
any, are the promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne 
out by the practice in the countries of study? The object is to determine 
whether there is a gap between the ‘promise’ of Freedom of Information 
legislation (that is, what the legislation has as its aims) and what it delivers in 
‘practice’ in the countries of study (ie. the level of public independent access to 
government-held information). A secondary aim of the project is to investigate 
whether it is possible to convert the data into an index format that would allow 
for an easy comparison between different FOI systems.  
In framing the research questions and finding an adequate study design 
both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were considered. There has 
been a longstanding debate amongst researchers about the comparative worth 
of qualitative and quantitative data. There are still social scientists that argue 
that the only real research that can be called scientific is the positivist approach 
based on natural science methods generating quantitative data. As a result, as 
Miles and Huberman explain: 
Qualitative researchers have complained that they are disparaged as The Other, 
losing out against the powerful, prestigious establishment that take quantitative 
methods for granted. Researchers are stereotyped as number crunchers or navel 
gazers (1994: 40).   64
The core of the conflict between the two research strands is summed 
up by the title Gherardi and Turner chose for their (1987) book: Real Men Don’t 
Collect Soft Data. However, the numbers of researchers using a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methods are growing as noted by among others 
Neuman, (2000), Yin, (2003), Miles and Huberman, (1994) and Denzin and 
Lincoln, (2003). 
All of the above authors argue strongly for the use of triangulation. 
Denzin and Lincoln whose book Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials 
has been labelled state of the art in the field of evaluating qualitative inquiry 
have this to say of triangulation: 
Triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation, but an alternative to 
validation. The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical 
materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as 
a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry 
(2003: 8). 
The design of this project utilises triangulation on two levels: 
•  Methodological triangulation applying three different methods 
towards the same overall research question. 
•  Data triangulation in collecting data that feeds into the overall 
research question. 
The study design comprises three sub-studies each with its own sub-set 
of research questions. The sub-studies are qualitative in nature with some 
quantitative elements. On the surface the survey study shares many properties 
with a quantitative study, but the bulk of the study poses qualitative questions, 
albeit with closed reply options. The aim of this method of data collection is to    
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turn the qualitative findings into numbers – the index. Turning qualitative data 
into numbers is nothing new and has become a standard technique used by 
many qualitative researchers. Miles et al point out that ‘we have to face the fact 
that numbers and words are both needed if we are to understand the world 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 40).’ This is well exemplified by the a number of 
software aids such as QSR NUD*IST that in the last decade have come to play 
an important role in analysing qualitative data. It is important to point out that 
the FOI Index is meant to provide an overview of the data and serve as an 
indication as to how well the FOI regime in question works in practice in 
providing independent access to information to the public. To appreciate the 
whole picture the Index rank needs to be complemented by the qualitative 
comments and analysis of the system. 
Countries of study 
From an early stage it was decided that the study needed to be 
comparative to create both breadth and depth of data. The countries of study 
needed to represent a spread based on a number of parameters: 
•  Longevity of FOI regime  
• Political  system 
•  Level of democratisation 
•  Level of economic prosperity 
A spread in relation to the above parameters was considered important 
as it was hypothesised that this would generate a spread in data.   66
As the ‘parents’ of the other FOI systems, Sweden and the US were 
included on the basis of maturity. They also represented mature representative 
democratic systems with high levels of economic prosperity. Australia is also a 
mature democracy with a strong economy, with a relatively old FOI system (the 
federal FOI Act was passed in 1982), but with a very shaky FOI track record 
(Waters, 1999). The country also represents a mix of the Westminster and 
federal political systems. South Africa was picked as a newcomer to the FOI 
family (the Official Information Act was passed in 2000) with a very interesting 
Act since it applies to the private sector. South Africa was also considered 
interesting since it is a young, emerging democracy with social issues and big 
divides in prosperity. Initially Indonesia was the preferred fifth country. It was 
hoped that it would pass its FOI Act in time to be included in the project; 
however, this was unfortunately not the case. Instead Thailand was picked as a 
replacement (the Official Information Act was passed in 1998). Thailand 
represents a country with lower levels of prosperity compared to the US, 
Sweden and Australia. It is a mature democracy with some issues relating to 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Thailand is also significant in that 
it is one of very few Asian countries that have FOI. 
Given the timeframe and financial resources of the project, five 
countries was considered a realistic maximum number given that there would 
be a total of 15 studies (three per country).  
The thought of investigating whether it was possible to create an FOI 
Index based on the data collected emerged early on and so had an influence on     67
the research design. It is therefore relevant to examine the index concept before 
the sub-studies are described in detail. 
The FOI Index 
The general purpose of an index is to provide an overview for large 
quantities of data that are usually complex in nature. There are different types of 
indexes, some built entirely on quantitative data such as crime and stock market 
indexes. However, in the last 10-15 years, a number of socio-economic indexes 
have risen to prominence. One defining property of these indexes is that they 
often combine quantitative and qualitative data. Neuman points out that an 
index is quite easy to create and at face value can seem to have great validity. 
He argues that the researcher therefore has a great responsibility to make sure 
that ‘every item in the index has face validity (2000: 177).’ In other words, the 
legitimacy of an index rests to a large extent on the methodology used to create 
it. Several indexes were examined to assist with developing a paradigm for this 
study and an analysis of the three most relevant ones is included below.  
The Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
Transparency International (TI) is a non-profit organisation based in 
Berlin, Germany. TI has published the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) since 
1995. The Index was originally designed by Dr Johann Graf Lambsdorff and his 
colleagues based at Göttingen University in Germany. In its mission statement 
TI defines the purpose of the organisation as: ‘to curb corruption by mobilising a 
global coalition to promote and strengthen international Integrity Systems 
(Transparency-International, 2003a)’. The bulk of TI’s funding comes from   68
public institutions and foundations around the globe. The private sector also 
contributes to TI (ibid). 
The CPI is described as a composite index that attempts to capture the 
perceptions of the level of corruption as perceived by analysts and expatriate 
business people (Transparency-International, 2003b). The index is based on 
selected answers drawn from a number of surveys. In all, 15 survey sources 
were included in the 2002 edition of the CPI. The surveys were implemented 
between 2000-2002 (implementing institution/company in brackets):  
State Capacity Survey (Columbia University)  
Asian Intelligence Issue (Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy) 
Institute for Management Development, IMD, 
Switzerland (World Competitiveness Yearbook) 
World Business Environment Survey (World Bank), 
Opacity Index (Pricewaterhouse Coopers) 
Country Risk Service and Country Forcast (Economist 
Intelligence Unit) 
Nations in Transit (Freedom House) 
Africa Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) 
Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) 
Corruption Survey (Gallup International on behalf of TI) 
(ibid: 4). 
The respondents were asked to rank how severe they perceived the 
corruption to be in a specific country. A typical question is like this one from the 
Asian Intelligence Issue survey: ‘How do you rate corruption in terms of its 
quality or contribution to the overall living/working environment? (ibid: 5)’ Each 
source/survey uses its own scaling system. To combine the results of the   69
surveys into one single measure per country (allocating a rank on a scale from 
1-10, where 1 is high rate of corruption) the designers of the CPI use a two-step 
approach. Step one uses the standard deviation method to standardize each 
source after which the average for each country is calculated (ibid: 5). This 
method was adequate for the first few years of ‘merging’ the different sources. 
However, Lambsdorff and his colleagues noted a tendency towards 
‘continuously smaller diversity of assessments (ibid)’. There were also instances 
where scores would be below 0  and above 10. To avoid this they concluded 
that the scores had to be stretched using the more complicated beta 
transformation standardization method available in most statistics softwares. 
This method made sure that the ranks stayed within the 10-point scale relative 
to each other. 
A number of the surveys cover the same countries. This overlap, 
argues Lambsdorff, allows for cross-referencing of the ranking. This is, 
according to Lambsdorff, the main strength of the methodology behind the CPI 
and allows for relatively high confidence intervals in the ranking of the individual 
countries (ibid: 2). 
Analysis 
As Lambsdorff points out ‘unbiased, hard data [regarding the extent of 
corruption in a country] continue to be difficult to obtain and usually raise 
problematic questions with respect to validity (ibid: 1).’ It could be argued that 
this is because of the intrinsic secrecy surrounding corruption. Put simply, 
corruption is hard (perhaps close to impossible) to measure in quantifiable 
terms. Hence, the CPI rests entirely (as the name suggests) on a number of   70
peoples’ perceptions of the extent of corruption. However, as Lambsdorff says, 
this may still be the most credible way of comparing corruption in different 
nations (ibid). Because no other measure of corruption exists the base data is 
the ranking provided by the respondents. This is a validity problem in itself. 
Another validity problem is the selection of the sample groups. The 
respondents are drawn from two groups: expatriate business people and 
analysts from the academic and corporate sector. None of the surveys include 
respondents drawn from citizens of a country or the public and political sector. 
This has been somewhat rectified by the recent publication of the Global 
Corruption Barometer, a pilot survey distributed to 40 838 citizens in 47 
countries measuring attitudes within each country towards corruption (Bosh, 
2003). 
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes 
The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) is an offspring of the Dow 
Jones Stock Market Index and was introduced in September 1999 with the aim 
to ‘provide objective benchmarks for the financial products that are linked to 
economic, environmental and social criteria (DJSI, 2003a)’. It is a commercial 
entity financed by the sale of licences, which allows licensees (mainly financial 
management companies) to use the index for benchmarking sustainable 
investment portfolios. Currently the indexes rank 10 per cent of the largest 2500 
companies globally and ‘aim to cover 20% of the total global market cap of each 
industry (ibid)’. When this author sought information about the cost of each 
licence the following response was received from the SAM-Group, a Swiss- 
based business company that collects and analyses the data for the index:   71
Thank you for your interest in the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes. Information 
about the license fees is something that we only provide directly to interested 
prospects - mainly, because it’s competitive information, but also because the price 
varies depending on the product (Barkawi, 2003). 
 
The DJSI covers three main areas in its data collection: economic 
performance (with emphasis on corporate governance), environmental impact 
and performance, and social performance. Each area is weighted roughly at a 
third each in calculating the figures for the end rank. The most important data 
collection instrument is an extensive questionnaire (DJSI, 2003c) to be filled out 
and signed by the company’s CEO or equivalent. The answers are then cross-
referenced with, among other sources, media reports and stakeholder reports. 
A major difference compared to the CPI is that the analysts rank the answers in 
the questionnaire according to a template. For example the criteria ‘corporate 
governance’ has the general weighting of .054. The specific question: How 
many members are on your Board of Directors? Carries the weight of .08. The 
answers are scored according to the following intervals: 
11-15 Board Members: 100 
6-10 Board Members: 75 
0-5 Board Members: 0 
Hence, if the company had 12 members of the Board the end value for 
this answer would be calculated thus: 
100 x 0. 08 x 0.054 = 0.432 (DJSI, 2003b: 8-14). 
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Analysis 
Apart from the method used to evaluate and calculate the rank the DJSI 
is quite similar to the CPI and shares the same validity problems arising from 
the fact that it too does not generate its own independent data. It relies on 
company management to provide accurate data in areas that are notoriously 
hard to verify and check. The DJSI also battles a general legitimacy problem in 
that it does not exclude companies producing chemicals, weapons and tobacco 
products; which can hardly be considered as meeting the basic definition of 
sustainability. The DJSI lists a number of arguments for including all sorts of 
companies in its index. One is that by including, for instance, highly polluting 
companies and picking the best of the worst ‘we recognize that some 
companies are more responsible in managing their impacts than others and are 
thereby leading their peers towards a more sustainable way of doing business 
(DJSI, 2003a).’ 
DJSI recognises that transparency is an important part of building up 
the legitimacy for the index and it is to their credit that the whole methodology 
and the questionnaire used are available on their web site (apart from the price 
of the licence). The validity of the index is heightened by the fact that the 
international audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers has confirmed that the 
sustainability evaluations are in line with the methodologies and applied 
appropriately by the SAM Group staff (DJSI, 2003d). Given the cloud hanging 
over international auditing firms in the wake of Arthur Anderson’s role in the 
Enron corporate fraud case in 2003, the question arises whether this really   73
strengthens the validity of the DJSI. Perhaps an audit by university-based 
independent researchers would be preferable. 
The Conflict Barometer 
The last socio-economic index analysed is the Conflict Barometer, 
created, compiled and published annually by the Heidelberg Institute on 
International Conflict (HIIK) at Heidelberg University in Germany. The HIIK is a 
non-profit registered organisation and ‘is dedicated to research, evolution, and 
documentation of inner- and interstate political conflicts (HIIK, 2003).’ This index 
has been included because it incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data 
(HIIK, 2002). A very elaborate coding system is used to track and describe the 
more than 301 conflicts contained in the database that is the core of the index.  
Analysis 
As with the other indexes described the bulk of the data is not 
independently generated, but relies on earlier studies and media coverage of 
conflicts (ibid: 2). The Barometer allocates a rank of between 1 and 4 to each 
conflict, where 1 is latent conflict and 4 is war. However, it is very unclear how 
the different ranks are calculated. The most important lesson learnt from the 
Conflict Barometer is that it is vital to clearly explain what methodology is used 
and how the rank is calculated. 
Of the indexes discussed the CPI has risen to prominence quickly. 
Since its start in 1995 it has emerged as one of the leading indicators in the 
social sciences, in spite of the inherent weaknesses already noted. The DJSI 
has more than 50 licensees (DJSI, 2005) and is often quoted as an authority in   74
ranking companies’ performance from a sustainability perspective, again 
despite much the same weaknesses as the CPI. The Conflict Barometer is less 
well-known, but shares the same core problem with the other indexes 
described: the lack of independent generation of quantitative and qualitative 
data. This indicates that there is a need for instruments and tools that can 
capture complex structures in society, such as corruption, corporate 
sustainability and political conflict, in a way that is more easily comprehended. 
In an increasingly globalised and complex world order, it also seems more 
relevant then ever to compare different countries in terms of their social 
structures, problems and solutions.  
This is very promising for the Freedom of Information Index. Like the 
indexes profiled above it will provide an overview and make it easier to 
understand and compare how information flows in different countries. The 
greatest strength of the Freedom of Information Index compared to the other 
indexes profiled is that it will have a practical component where the efficacy of 
FOI regimes will be independently put to the test. 
Sub-study 1: ‘the promise’ 
The three sub-studies addressed similar sets of questions and used 
similar evaluation templates. The first sub-study was the most straightforward of 
the three addressing the research question: What are the aims of the different 
legislations and what do they promise to deliver in terms of information 
access? 
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The evaluation template (appendix 3) aimed to identify the key 
elements of the legislation as well as the in-built instruments that can inhibit the 
publics’ independent access to information such as non-regulated processing 
fees, poor scope for appeals, or costly appeals processes. 
The method used in the ‘the promise’ is a very structured form of 
analysing what in qualitative research is termed ‘material culture’ (Hodder, 
2003: 155). Hodder distinguishes between records and documents, where 
records are more general in nature such as ‘marriages certificates, driving 
licenses and banking statements (ibid: 156).’ Documents are much more 
personal in nature and include diaries, letters, field notes etc. According to this 
classification, legislation fits under the heading ‘record’. 
Sub-study 2: ‘the spin’ 
The second sub-study addressed the research question: What are the 
attitudes towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among 
leading politicians and public servants?  Through the use of a questionnaire 
directed to the top politicians and public servants in each country of study it 
aimed to capture what ‘spin’ the administrators put on FOI that might impact on 
the practical implementation of the law. 
One of the most important questions in the survey was:  
Which of the following statements is closest to the attitude held by yourself and 
your staff? 
 
a)  the government hold information on behalf of the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the information requested as soon as possible 
b)  the government hold information on behalf of the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for an FOI applicant     76
c)  the government owns the information but increased openness and 
transparency is good   
d)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
e)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
and increased openness and transparency is not good 
The questions were formulated to be as similar as possible to those 
used in the other studies staying true to the idea of triangulating the data (see 
appendix 2). However while ‘the ‘promise’ and ‘spin’ studies were able to cover 
protection of journalistic sources, this aspect could not be included in ‘the 
practice’, since it was logistically difficult to recruit a source and could have put 
that person at risk.  
Sampling issues 
The potential sample population for ‘the spin’ was very large indeed. It 
consisted of all politically appointed staff and all public servants within the 
federal departments that make up the cabinet in each country of study. During 
the trial of the studies in Sweden the Swedish sample population was calculated 
to be 4 899 (4 729 public servants plus 170 political appointments such as 
ministers) (Falck, 2004). Clearly this was beyond the scope of the project.  
When surveying possible sampling methods, two were identified: 
random selection and what Neuman describes as ‘purposive or judgmental 
sampling This sampling is used when the group you want to sample can be 
categorized as ‘select members of a difficult to reach, specialised population 
(Neuman 2000, p.198).’ This method reduced the numbers in the sample group. 
The rationale followed was that FOI implementation and interpretation is 
handled at the political and public service management level in each 
department so a sample group consisting of the Minister and Deputy Minister,   77
or the equivalent, the Chief Public servant (head of department) and the FOI 
Officer or equivalent seemed logical. It was interesting to observe that all 
countries of study had a very similar number of departments in their cabinets, 
ranging between 15 and 19. It therefore made sense to aim for a similar number 
of questionnaires to allow for a true comparison of response rates. The total 
number of questionnaires sent to each sample group ranged from 65 to 68. 
In effect this meant that questionnaires went to all Ministers in the 
countries of study, including President George W. Bush, USA; Prime Minister 
John Howard, Australia; Prime Minister Göran Persson, Sweden; President 
Thabo Mbeki, South Africa and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand. 
The questionnaires were anonymous (with a voluntary ‘biographical details’ 
section), hence there is no record of whether President Bush and his colleagues 
in the other countries of study replied or not. 
Sub-study 3: ‘the practice’ 
It is easy to make a promise but much harder to keep it. This holds 
particularly true for FOI legislation, as this project will show. No matter what the 
law promises in theory, the real test is what it delivers in practice. The objective 
of the ‘the practice’ sub-study was to track freedom of information requests to 
answer the research question: In practice, does FOI supply journalists (and 
media organisations) with independent access to government-held 
information? 
In ‘the practice’ study three journalists in each country were recruited 
and each was asked to submit one FOI request to a relevant federal/national   78
government department. The processing of the requests was tracked via the 
‘paper trail’ generated by the contacts between the journalist and the 
department. When the request was granted or refused an evaluation of the 
process was done. The method used was a combination of selective 
observation and semi-structured interviews. 
Observational research can take a variety of forms. Angrosino and 
Perez trace this type of research to the early studies of societal systems by 
anthropological ethnographers in the late 19
th and early 20
th century. The 
‘classic’ definition of observational research lists three main variations: 
•  ‘The complete participant’. This method called for the researcher 
to immerse him/herself and take full part in a social setting. The 
researcher would take field notes of the experience and would 
later analyse the notes. Agrosino and Perez point out that this 
method was from the outset considered ‘a highly subjective 
stance whose scientific validity was suspect (2003: 113).’ 
•  ‘The participant-as-observer’. In this observational variation the 
researcher still participates, but attempts to be more withdrawn 
from the social setting he/she is observing. This shares the same 
validity problems as the first strand (ibid). 
•  ‘The observer-as-participant’. The researcher is further removed 
and only engages with the social setting when he/she has to 
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•  ‘The complete observer’. This is a theoretical construct. In this 
model the researcher is totally removed from the social setting 
and does not interact in any way with those that he/she 
observes, not even if they try to engage. This has its own validity 
problems since someone who does not interact even when 
invited will influence the course of events by not behaving as the 
group observed would expect (ibid). 
Agrosino and Perez describe the methodological compromise reached 
thus: 
Because of the difficulty of maintaining the purity of such a stance and because 
such research was sometimes conducted without the informed consent of the 
observed (an ethical lapse that is no longer tolerated by responsible social 
researchers), the observer-as-participant role was considered an acceptable 
compromise (ibid). 
This allowed the researcher to interact in a ‘casual and nondirective 
way’ with subjects (ibid). In present observation research, participation is 
considered less of a validity problem, as long as there is a well thought through 
research design (ibid: 114). Agrosino and Perez further list a number of 
principles, where the third one in particular applies to the collaborative nature of 
‘the practice’.  
Interaction is always a tentative process that involves the continuos testing by all 
participants of the conceptions they have of the roles of others. In other words, 
ethnographers and their collaborators do not step into fixed and fully defined 
positions, rather, their behaviours and expectations of each other are part of a 
dynamic process that continues to grow (this authors emphasis, ibid: 124). 
The observational method used in ‘the practice’ study is called 
‘selective observation’. This is the most systematic of the observational 
methods. Using this method the researcher ‘concentrates on the attributes of   80
different types of activities (eg. apart form the obvious differences in content, 
what makes instructing a class in language arts different from instructing a class 
in social studies) (Angrosino and Perez, 2003: 114).’ In ‘the practice’ the 
process of both the submission and the handling of a FOI request is observed. 
The observation is done by maintaining contact with the reporters selected to 
make the FOI requests during the period when the request is being processed 
by the department receiving it. Another important source of data for the 
observation part of the study was the ‘paper trail’, that is, the reporters’ 
correspondence with the department via mail, e-mail and phone conversations. 
In effect the real subject of this sub-study is the federal/national department 
receiving the request. Because of the different political systems in the countries 
of study it was decided that the point of comparison should be the overarching 
federal/national FOI regimes.  Sweden, for instance, has a single FOI system 
that applies to all levels of government, while Australia has a federal act as well 
as individual state (and territory) acts, each of which differ slightly.  For the 
purpose of this study only the federal/national acts were examined.   
The other data collection method used in ‘the practice’ was ‘semi-
structured’ interviewing. There are two main strands of scientific interviewing: 
‘structured’ and ‘un-structured’ (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 68-85). Structured 
interviewing is used mostly in quantitative studies where the interviewer does 
not engage with the interviewee (ibid).  Unstructured interviewing poses an 
open-ended question that requires the interviewer to engage to ask follow-up 
questions to clarify answers. The model used in the evaluation template for ‘the 
practice’ utilises both. The basis of the evaluation template (further described   81
below) is highly structured with closed reply options. This is to generate data 
that can be used to calculate the index. The aim is to replicate the interview with 
each interviewee. However, all questions in the evaluation template are 
followed by a set of open-ended probing questions in order to deepen the 
understanding of the process identified in the initial closed reply. 
The first step was to decide suitable parameters against which the 
different FOI regimes should be evaluated. As pointed out in chapter two, there 
are a few aims shared by all existing FOI regimes. They are: 
•  Allow individual citizens access to government held information 
on their person. This is often referred to as first party access and 
is seldom a controversial issue. It allows for corrections of faulty 
personal records. 
•  Increase transparency in the governing and bureaucratic 
processes to prevent corruption and maladministration. 
•  Increase citizens participation in the political process via 
independent access to quality information (for further details see 
chapter two) 
In these seemingly simple aims are embedded a plethora of very 
complex and detailed problems and conflicts which can impact positively or 
negatively on the final result, for example costs, turn-around times, appeal 
options, interpretation of legislation, public servants’ and politicians’ attitudes 
towards FOI, etc. To cover these variables an evaluation template consisting of   82
a number of questions was designed (appendix 1)
7. The data captured (the 
answers to the questions) is qualitative in nature and in order for it to be able to 
be converted into a format suited to the FOI index it would need to be 
‘translated’ into a numerical equivalent. The answer was to design the reply 
options based on the Likert Scale method (Anderson, 1990: 334). Each 
question has five reply alternatives. Alternative ‘a’ is always the most positive 
outcome from the ‘public access to information’ perspective and ‘e’ is always 
the most negative. This allows for a number of coding alternatives that will be 
further explored in chapter four. The questions posed in all sub-studies were as 
similar as possible allowing for both triangulation of data and method (Yin, 
2003: 98-99). This is one of the most important traits in constructing an index: 
‘Each part of the construct [the index] should be measured with at least one 
indicator. Of course, it is better to measure the parts of a construct with several 
indicators (Neuman, 2000: 177)’. Yin points out that a key issue for data 
triangulation is that there is a ‘convergence of evidence’, – that is – all data 
collected is analysed and interpreted towards the SAME set of research 
questions (2003: 100-01) This is done in terms of all studies addressing the 
overall research question via their sub-questions and the fact that the evaluation 
template, the analytical instrument, for each study is build on the same base set 
of evaluation parameters. 
The next issue was who would lodge the FOI requests. At the outset it 
was considered that the researcher would lodge the requests. The problem with 
this is that the receiving government agencies would know that the request was 
                                                 
7 Appendix one shows the final Australian version. The questions remained the same for each country, 
but reply alternatives such as processing costs etc. were customised for each country.   83
part of a study. This increased the risk of the agencies treating the request in a 
non-typical fashion. The solution to this problem was to recruit three journalists 
in each country as collaborators. Using reporters for the study killed two birds 
with one stone: firstly, journalists, from time to time, use FOI as a tool to 
scruitinise power (as defined in chapter two), secondly, this connects well with 
one of the theoretical pillars of the project, political accountability. The number 
of journalists needed for the study was considered at length. At one point a 
quantitative design was considered, however, recruiting a statistically viable 
number of journalists for the study was in the end considered unrealistic. 
Sampling issues 
After it was decided that triangulation was to play an important 
methodological role, three case studies
8 per country were deemed to be an 
adequate number to cross reference data and to feed data into the index. The 
next issue was how to find and recruit the journalists. As in the spin sub-study, 
‘purposive sampling’ (described above) was used. In several of the countries of 
study only journalists undertaking investigative projects make use of FOI as a 
tool to obtain information, hence the sampling had to be ‘purposive’. 
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ICIJ, is the 
international arm of the American based, non-profit, non-partisan organisation, 
Centre for Public Integrity, CFPI. Through quality journalism the centre aspires 
to ‘serve as an honest broker for information – and to inspire a better-informed 
                                                 
8 It could be argued the study design could also be described as ONE case study providing particular 
access to information across several national contexts. After some deliberation it was decided that the 
triangulation method was a more precise definition and provided a stronger case for generating data that 
could feed into the index. However, it is relevant to note that as with most studies of some breadth and 
depth, the method combines several research techniques.   84
citizenry to demand a higher level of accountability from its government and 
elected leaders (CFPI, 2005).’ The ICIJ has 92 members from 48 countries, all 
leading investigative reporters and editors. The ICIJ member biography list 
(CFPI, 2003) was picked as a method of identifying at least the first of the three 
journalists from each country of study. The initial thought was that the ICIJ list 
would guarantee the quality of the journalists recruited, however as we shall see 
in the data analysis chapters, ICIJ membership did not always guarantee an 
interest in and commitment to FOI. 
FOI topics 
In line with the ‘observational method’ described above, the role of the 
researcher in this project was as facilitator, coordinator, observer and 
interviewer. I endeavoured to make this as clear as possible to the journalists 
recruited to the project. One of the most important tasks was to make sure that 
the topics chosen for the FOI requests were as similar as possible to make for a 
true comparison between the countries of study. The journalists had to pick one 
topic each from the three available: 
1.  The Prime Minister’s/President’s travel/expense account for 
2002, 2003 or 2004. 
2.  A list of all weapons and munitions trade (import and/or export) 
or other relevant topic related to the defence force. 
3.  Refugee issues, such as: deaths/suicides in detention, number of 
entry refusals at border, etc.   85
The topics were intentionally kept quite general to allow for them to be 
adapted to suit the individual journalist and country. Although generating 
information for the reporter that could be used in a story was not an aim in itself, 
this was a very useful drawcard when recruiting journalists to the study. It was 
also necessary to allow for some variations between countries to draw up FOI 
requests that had a real chance of generating information. For instance: 
Australia has mandatory detention for refugees so one Australian journalist 
framed a request for reports on suicides and self harm in custody. Sweden does 
not have mandatory detention, but there are issues arising out of the common 
refugee policy formulated by the European Union. The Swedish request was 
based on these issues. 
Ethical considerations 
The research design was submitted to Murdoch University’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee for approval. The committee gave a positive 
response to two of the studies but raised several issues regarding ‘the practice’ 
sub-study. The main concern was the apparently ‘covert’ element arising from 
the fact that government agencies would not be informed that the request in 
question was not only from a journalist and media organisation, but was also 
part of a scientific study. The discussion that followed between the researcher 
and the committee was at times slightly frustrating, but in retrospect very useful 
in clarifying why the agencies could not know they were part of a study. As 
noted above identification of the researcher might corrupt the data by leading 
any agency that knew it was being evaluated to treat the FOI request in a non-  86
typical way. This point was made in a number of letters to the committee that in 
the end gave approval to the study. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined and described the methodologies used in the 
project. In a proposed multinational survey of FOI it will use a combination of 
‘selective observation’, ‘semi-structured interviewing’, ‘survey study’ and 
‘analysis of records’.  It has established that the study will generate qualitative 
data. The sub-studies can be summarised thus: 
•  ‘The promise’ will evaluate and analyse the aims and objectives 
of the FOI legislations in each country of study. 
•  ‘The spin’ will capture the attitudes of the administrators of FOI. 
•  ‘The practice’ will track the use of FOI via real-life requests. 
The chapter discussed the ethical considerations of the ‘covert’ part of 
‘the practice’ study and identified this sub-study as the core of the project. The 
chapter also described the theoretical foundations of constructing indexes. 
Triangulation (several points of data collection and observation) was identified 
as one of the most important traits of a reliable and valid index. 
The rationale for presenting the data as a Freedom of Information Index 
was explained and a number of socio-economic indexes were described and 
analysed. What sets this project apart from the analysed indexes is that ‘the 
practice’ study generates data independently of the stakeholders of Freedom of 
Information.   87
The draft research-design is now ready and it is time to trial it. This 
process is described in chapter four.   88
Chapter Four: Piloting the research design 
Introduction 
When the first draft of the sub-studies was finished the opportunity 
arose to pilot the methodology during a six-month stay in Sweden. The aims 
during the stay were to trial and finalise all three sub-studies and then to collect 
the Swedish data. This chapter will describe this process, the outcomes and 
what conclusions were drawn. 
Reliability and Validity 
A lot of thought and effort goes into designing research instruments. 
When the draft is done, all you want to do is implement them. But as 
Oppenheim points out much time and effort can be saved by pilot work: 
Pilot work may be costly, but it will actually save time and money in the end. 
Studies which have been inadequately piloted or not piloted at all, will find that a 
great deal of effort has been wasted on unintelligible questions, producing 
unquantifiable responses and uninterpretable results. Moreover, dozens of 
administrative matters concerned with sampling and fieldwork that ‘could not 
possibly go wrong’, will go wrong (1999: 64). 
Neuman concurs, observing that ‘reliability can be improved by using a 
pre-test or pilot a version of a measure first (2000: 166)’. He argues that pilot 
work can also strengthen the validity of the study. Validity is a tricky concept, 
that according to Neuman ‘is an overused term (2000: 167).’ By this he means 
that validity at times is understood to mean only ‘true’ or ‘correct’. There are 
many types of validity. This chapter is concerned with measurement validity. 
Neuman defines and discusses measurement validity thus: 
At its core, measurement validity refers to how well the conceptual and operational 
definitions mesh with each other. The better the fit, the greater measurement 
validity. Validity is more difficult to achieve than reliability. We cannot have 
absolute confidence about validity, but some measures are more valid than others.   89
The reason we can never achieve absolute validity is that constructs are abstract 
ideas, whereas indicators refer to concrete observation. This is the gap between our 
mental pictures about the world and the specific things we do at particular times 
and places (ibid). 
In other words: do the research instruments generate data that is 
relevant to answering the research questions? Do the instruments work as a 
bridge between the construct and the data? 
Piloting ‘the promise’ 
Trialing ‘the promise’ sub-study in Sweden was an interesting exercise 
in that the Swedish FOI legislation is arguably the hardest one to grasp. The 
reason for this is that it extends through three different Acts (further described in 
chapters two and six). ‘The promise’ was a fairly straightforward sub-study, 
largely because it does not involve other human participants and collaborators. 
No major issues surfaced during the pilot of the evaluation template and the 
draft was finalised and the data captured. The only real potential challenge that 
emerged concerned finding the aims and objectives of the FOI regime. In the 
Swedish case the pre-legislation work and committee reports had to be located. 
If this were to be the case in the other countries of study, finding the data might 
take some time. 
Piloting ‘the spin’ 
The main issue for the ‘the spin’ was defining the sample group and its 
size. The survey population would include all public servants and political 
appointments in the 11 Swedish ministries/departments on the national level. As 
pointed out in chapter three the total survey population was 4066. Using the 
‘judgemental or purposive’ sampling method described in chapter three the   90
following positions in each department were included in the sample group: the 
Minister, the Deputy Minister (if there was no deputy, the chief political advisor), 
the public servant head of department and the chief information officer. In other 
words, the two top political and public servant appointments from each 
department (67 respondents in total). 
Questionnaire feedback 
‘The spin’ questionnaire was trialed on 15 public servants and 
politicians based at a regional agency responsible for implementing and 
overseeing national government policy. There were no major issues with the 
questions as such; however an overall interpretation issue surfaced. I could tell 
from the responses that some of the respondents were somewhat confused as 
to whether the questionnaire sought their professional attitudes and opinions on 
FOI or their personal opinions. In a debriefing meeting with the head public 
servant this was discussed at length. After the meeting the cover letter of the 
questionnaire was changed to its final form where it is made clear that ‘if your 
opinion does not correspond with the current FOI rules and regulations – let 
your opinion be the answer’ (appendix 2). The rationale for this was that there is 
considerable room for interpretation in all FOI laws. The opinions and attitudes 
towards FOI held by individual public servants and politicians will inevitably 
influence their interpretation of how to implement FOI in practice. Several 
questions were also amended to more clearly reflect this data capture aim. In 
retrospect, this feedback was the single most important result of the pilot work   91
and led to significantly increased reliability in ‘the spin’ research instrument, 
illustrating the importance of pilot work
9. 
Distribution process 
The survey was sent by ordinary mail to the Swedish respondents and 
within two weeks 21 responses had been received, bringing the response rate 
to 31%, a good response rate considering that this was a qualitative study
10. 
The general quality of replies was very satisfying. No complaints or comments 
were received as to whether questions were unclear or hard to answer. After 
two weeks I e-mailed a reminder to those respondents whose direct e-mail I 
could obtain. The e-mail included an electronic version of the survey. This had 
no effect, no electronic reply was received and no further snail-mail responses 
were triggered by the e-mail reminder. Because of the high public profile of half 
of the sample group (national Ministers), it proved very difficult to obtain direct 
e-mail addresses. An e-mail was sent to the Prime Minister’s Information 
Department asking whether they could forward e-mails to the Ministers, there 
was no confirmation that this was done. Four Ministers and chief political 
advisors replied that they do not reply to surveys as a policy. A reply was sent 
asking for an exception from the policy since this was an international 
                                                 
9 The Swedish questionnaire was translated into Swedish. The rationale was that although Swedes in 
general have good comand of English, it is not the official language. As the author is a native Swedish 
speaker it was seen as an oportunity to encourage more responses. As the other countries, apart from 
Thailand, use English as one of their official languages, it was not deemed that the translation of the 
Swedish questionnaire unfairly favoured Sweden in terms of the response rate. As we shall see in the Thai 
study the English language questionniare did not seem to work to its disadvantage judging from the 
response rate. The translation methodology drew from expereinces in an earlier similar study. Great care 
was taken to ensure that the Swedish translation of the questionnaire conveyed the same meaning as the 
English original (Lidberg, 2003: 46-47). 
10 Since ‘the spin’ is not a statistical quantitative study as such, the response rate has no bearing on the 
end result. Rather, it is argued that each reply is a ‘case’ in itself with the attitudes held by the respondent 
having an impact on the FOI policies in his/her department. However, on initial evaluation of the 
responses, the question arose whether the response rate could be an indication as to how important the 
respondents found FOI issues. In effect; did they find FOI important enough to reply? The response rate 
will be further discussed in chapter eleven.   92
comparative study with very clear bearing on fundamental democratic issues. 
There were no further replies from the Ministers concerned. 
‘The spin’: conclusions  
The aims of ‘the spin’ survey in Sweden were achieved. The e-mail 
reminder did not trigger any further responses, suggesting that ordinary mail 
seems be the preferred distribution method. Based on the quality of replies, ‘the 
spin’ instrument could be regarded as workable and ready to implement in the 
other countries of study. 
Piloting ‘the practice’ 
Because of the time needed to recruit journalists and lodge the FOI 
requests, it was believed that ‘the practice’ sub-study would take longest to trial 
and implement. Therefore it was a pleasant surprise that the Swedish 
recruitment process was quite quick. 
Recruitment of journalists 
From the outset of the project considerable time was spent discussing 
the recruitment process of the journalist collaborators needed for ‘the practice’ 
sub-study. The initial contact was most likely to be via e-mail. However, it was 
hypothesised that it would be essential to build trust between the researcher 
and the collaborators for ‘the practice’ to work well. At the trial stage, variations 
of this process were tested and some very interesting observations were made, 
discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. 
The first step was to contact the Swedish member of the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ICIJ to discuss a list of other Swedish   93
journalists to contact (the rationale for using the ICIJ as a starting point is 
discussed in chapter three). The initial contact was via e-mail. The journalist 
responded within a day and a meeting was setup in Stockholm, the capital of 
Sweden, where his publication is based. The journalist embraced the study, 
describing it as worthwhile. Together we drew up a list of in all six possible 
names. After some discussion we decided that it was preferable to try to recruit 
journalists who were currently assigned reporter duties rather than editors. This 
excluded him, as he had been working for the last two years as a news editor. 
At the outset the criteria for reporters to qualify for the study was quite 
ambitious: 
•  One each from the print, radio and television media 
•  Minimum one female 
•  Minimum five years experience with investigative projects 
The rationale for the first criterion was to cover all media formats. It 
could be argued that a journalist is someone who seeks, evaluates and 
compiles information, regardless of the media outlet. Nonetheless it was 
considered worthwhile to attempt to achieve a spread to include the slightly 
different journalistic methods used in the various media formats. Another reason 
to include all three media formats was that at least one reporter should be 
recruited from a public broadcasting organisation, such as the Swedish 
Broadcasting Corporation, to cover both commercial and public service media. 
The second criterion was to as far as possible reflect the gender spread in the 
industry. The number of female journalists is rapidly growing and it would be an   94
unfair representation not to include females in the sub-study. The rationale for 
the last criterion was to ensure the quality of the FOI applications. It was argued 
that if the recruited reporter was experienced in investigative work, it was likely 
he/she had lodged FOI applications before. However, as we shall see later in 
the data presentation chapters (six to ten), it became more important for the 
quality of the sub-study that the reporters were passionate about FOI issues 
rather than experienced in investigative journalism 
The first two invitations were e-mailed the day after the initial meeting 
and got an immediate positive response. The Swedish print and TV journalists 
were recruited within three days from the first e-mail. The radio reporter caused 
some grief. The first person approached was not available as he was stationed 
in New York for the next two years. The second declined as he was not 
presently an active investigative journalist. The third attempt paid off and also 
generated the female reporter the study required. The whole recruitment 
process took two weeks. In retrospect it was very quick compared to what was 
to come in the other countries of study. 
Initially the intention was to meet all three reporters in face-to-face 
meetings. This was considered important for the trust-building process between 
researcher and collaborator. As it turned out only the print and TV reporter 
participated in face-to-face meetings (the print reporter will from now on be 
referred to as reporter A, the TV journalist, Reporter B and the radio journalist, 
reporter C). The reason for this was at the time mainly logistical. Reporters A 
and B were based in Stockholm while reporter C was based on the other side of 
the country, in Gothenburg. After some consideration it was deemed a good test   95
and point of comparison to manage Reporter C remotely to see whether this 
had any impact on the study. There were in all two face-to-face meetings with A 
and B. In the initial meeting the sub-study was explained, the researcher’s role 
outlined and discussed, and the FOI topics assigned. The second meeting was 
the evaluation interview. With Reporter C this was done via e-mail and phone 
conversations. There were also a number of e-mail contacts with A and B 
before the lodgement of the requests. 
The conclusions reached from the recruitment and management 
process of the Swedish practice sub-study were that the process was fairly 
quick and easy and that all reporters contacted and invited responded quickly 
and positively. It was also clear that there was little difference in managing the 
sub-study remotely via e-mail and phone compared to face-to-face meetings. 
The only difference noted was that reporters A and B were faster in lodging their 
FOI requests. The most important face-to-face meeting was the one with the 
Swedish ICIJ member which proved to be an excellent way to access the 
Swedish investigative reporter community. This suggested that the ICIJ method 
of recruiting could be fruitful in the other countries of study as well. 
Feedback on ‘the practice’ evaluation template 
The draft template was reviewed by the Swedish ICIJ member who 
suggested some minor changes. It was more a matter of clarifying some 
questions rather than matters of substance. The recruited Swedish reporters 
were also asked to provide feedback on the template before the evaluation 
interview. They had no comments. Lastly the draft template was reviewed by a   96
fellow Swedish journalism academic. She provided some feedback, but in 
essence the draft became the final version. 
Evaluation interviews 
The Swedish evaluation interviews confirmed that the combination of 
closed reply options followed by a number of probing questions worked well in 
capturing relevant information. They showed that there was significant data and 
information to be gained by the follow up questions, hence the recording of the 
interviews was crucial. From a data point of view there was no difference 
between doing the interview via phone, as was the case with Reporter C, or 
face-to-face as with Reporters A and B. However, from a management and 
feedback point of view, it was much nicer and more trust-building for future 
collaborations to have the face-to-face meetings. Still, the important point 
confirmed was that it was possible to run the sub-study remotely. 
‘The practice’: conclusions 
The aims for ‘the practice’ sub-study had been achieved: feedback on 
the draft and finalising of the sub-study, trial of the recruitment process and 
implementation and data collection. The positive experience collaborating with 
the Swedish ICIJ member indicated that this recruitment avenue to find the 
reporters for ‘the practice’ was very promising. It was a relief to find that there 
was no difference in the quality of the data captured whether the reporters were 
managed via face-to-face meetings  or via e-mail and phone. It was very likely 
that the reporters recruited in the other countries of study would have to be 
managed remotely because of budget and time constraints limiting the capacity 
for on the ground field work.   97
The Index 
To finish off the trial of the three sub-studies a first coding of the data 
was done. This initial coding used a scale that ranged from –2 to +2 (‘a’ 
responses received +2 and ‘e’ responses  –2, please see appendix 1, 2 and 3 to 
view the research instruments). The coding seemed to work well, but it needed 
points of comparison from the other countries of study before the final coding 
method could be determined. In this first attempt at calculating an index rank for 
Sweden the index scale ranged from 0-15 to accommodate all three sub-
studies. Incremental scales based on the max score for each sub-study were 
then constructed. For example: using the –2 to +2 coding the max score for ‘the 
promise’ was 32. This gave a points scale of: 0-5:  
0: 0-5 
1: 6-10 
2: 11-15 
3: 16-20 
4: 21-25 
5: 26-32 
Sweden scored 29 in the promise, hence got the scale score 5 for ‘the 
promise’. The other studies were coded and translated the same way. This 
calculation method showed that a final index score could be calculated and 
Sweden ended up getting 11.8 out of 15. However, the method had number of 
in-built problems. One was that translating the total score for a study into an 
incremental score increased the margin for error (as illustrated by the above 
scale where the increments are not consistent). The 0-15 index scale was not 
satisfactory. The calculation method went through another six drafts before   98
settling on the final version with an index scale presenting the score in 
percentage form. This calculation method and presentation is much more exact 
and is described in detail in chapter eleven. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the pilot run of the sub-studies. The aims of 
the pilot were to generate feedback on the drafts of the sub-studies via trials, 
finalise the sub-study instruments and capture the Swedish data for the project. 
All aims were achieved, including the creation of a first rudimentary model of 
calculating the FOI Index. This model showed that it was possible to calculate 
an index score, but the method needed improvement. 
The single most important change generated by feedback to the pilot 
was the amendments to ‘the spin’ survey. These made the questionnaire much 
clearer and resulted in the capturing of high quality data. 
The pilot further showed that using an ICIJ member as a starting point 
for recruiting the journalists for ‘the practice’ provided a valuable introduction 
into a country’s investigative journalist community. 
The fact that remote management did not impact on the quality of the 
data collected was also reassuring. There would be no opportunity for face-to-
face meetings between myself and the recruited journalists in the other 
countries of study. 
Overall, the pilot of the sub-studies provided invaluable feedback and 
experiences for the rest of the project. All three sub-studies were now finalised 
and could be implemented in the other countries of study. 
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This chapter concludes part I of this thesis. Part II will present the data 
for each country leading up to the final description and calculation of the 
International Freedom of Information Index.  100
 
 
Part II Data Presentation, Analysis and the FOI 
Index 
In this section chapters six to ten present the data collected in each 
country of study.  The chapters follow a similar format, starting with the political 
profile of the country, followed by an overview of the evolution of its FOI, and 
finally the presentation and analysis of the data. 
The countries in this study represent variants of the political system 
defined as representative liberal democracy.  There are consequently some 
features common to all and to avoid needless repetition in subsequent chapters 
these commonalities will be dealt with in chapter five. 
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Chapter Five: Overview of political systems 
Introduction 
The types of political systems which exist in the countries of study do 
influence the FOI legislation and how it is interpreted. For example: Australia’s 
federal system means that the federal FOI Act applies only to federal 
departments and agencies. State-based agencies fall under the various state 
FOI Acts. So, an FOI user needs to know whether the information he/she seeks 
falls under the state or federal jurisdiction in order to ascertain which Act will 
apply. By way of contrast, Sweden’s political system consists of a national   102
parliament and local governments; hence its FOI regime applies to all levels of 
government. 
Comparative politics 
Comparative politics as a research area has a long history, but there 
was a resurgence of interest in it after World War II when researchers sought 
explanations for the last two major conflicts in Europe by analysing and 
comparing the different political systems (Lane and Ersson, 1999: 1-3). The 
number of studies in the field is substantial and the available literature quite 
formidable.  
Comparative politics covers all existing political systems but since all 
countries in the present study can be categorised as representative liberal 
democracies we can confine ourselves to two systems characteristic of liberal 
democracy: the unitary system and the federal system.   
The discipline of Comparative politics employs a large number of 
criteria when comparing different systems, such as economic system, judicial 
system, social welfare, party system, political participation etc (Needler, 1991: 
x-xiii). Again, not all these criteria are relevant to this project. The points of 
comparison used here will relate to two of the three branches of government: 
the legislative/decision-making structure and the political executive. These two 
have a direct influence on the structure and processes of FOI, whereas the third 
branch, the judiciary, has only indirect input into the initial implementation stage 
of FOI. 
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The Decision-making/legislative systems 
The Unitary system 
The great majority of contemporary nation-states employ unitary 
systems for their legislative/decision making structure. In a unitary system there 
are two major levels of government: the central/national and the regional/local. 
There are no states with individual legislatures as in federal systems. Because 
the legislative power in unitary systems rests with the national assembly, it is 
easy to jump to the conclusion that the regional/local political bodies are 
powerless. This is not true. Hague and Harrop define the typical roles of local 
government in a unitary system thus: 
1.  control over policy implementation 
2.  responsibility for the direct provision of public services such as health, 
education and welfare; 
3.  some revenue-rasing power; 
4.  a local electoral mandate  
Against this must be set the resources of the centre: 
1.  control over legislation, including the right to abolish or more realistically 
to modify local government; 
2.  provision of most local authority finance; 
3.  setting administrative standards for service provision; 
4.  popular expectations that the national government should solve problems 
(1987: 176) 
It should be pointed out that, as with most definitions of complex 
concepts, the above is a generalisation and most countries that follow the 
unitary system have adapted it to suit their individual circumstances. There are 
two broad sub groupings under the unitary system: the Westminster (or   104
majoritarian) type and the consensus type. Lipjhart (as cited in Lane and 
Ersson) has defined the two types as follows: 
Westminster type  Consensus type 
One party and bare-majority 
cabinets 
Executive power-sharing 
Fusion of power and cabinet 
dominance 
Separation of powers, formal and 
informal 
Assymetric bicameralism  Balance bicameralism and 
territorial representation 
Two-party system  Multi-party system 
One-dimensional party system  Multi-dimensional party system 
Plurality system of election Proportional  representation 
Unitary and centralized territorial 
government 
Territorial and non-territorial 
federalism and decentralization 
Unwritten constitution and 
parliamentary sovereignty 
Written constitution and minority 
veto 
 
(Lane and Ersson, 1999: 158) 
The Westminster system originated in the United Kingdom and this 
nation-state is still the clearest example of the system in practice. However, it is 
quite widespread both in its pure form and in variations. For example the 
Australian system uses a combination of the Westminster and the federal   105
systems (see chapter seven). Sweden is a very clear-cut example of a 
consensus-type unitary system (see chapter six).  
The Federal system 
The federal system has more levels of government than the unitary, 
most commonly three: the federal (central) government, the 
state/province/regional governments and the local governments. In theory the 
federal and state levels are supposed to have the same amount of decision-
making power.  Wheare (cited in Hague and Harrop) has defined the federal 
principle thus: 
The method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are 
each, within a sphere, coordinate [that is, equally important] and independent 
(Hague and Harrop, 1987: 170). 
Hague and Harrop observe that this definition of federalism is a purist 
one and point out that ‘in all federal systems, one level of government (typically 
the central) tends to predominate; were this not so, stalemate would result 
(ibid).’ The local government level is much weaker in the federal system with 
many of the powers it has under the unitary system residing with the state 
governments under the federal model. 
In a federal system a written constitution is essential in order to clarify 
how the decision-making powers will be divided up between the federal and 
state levels. Hague and Harrop define the federal and state tasks: 
The central government will be responsible for external relations – defence, foreign 
affairs and immigration – and for some common domestic functions such as the 
currency. Provincial governments will be given responsibility for other domestic 
policies such as education or housing (ibid).   106
Federal states have always been in the minority
11. At present there are 
about twenty (the number fluctuates since some evolving democracies are 
somewhat hard to define). On the other hand, some of the geographically 
largest and most economically influential states employ a federal system. As 
with the unitary system federalism has evolved into a number of variant forms. 
The United States represents one model. Another version of federalism is found 
in some former British colonies such as Australia, Canada and India. A number 
of Latin American countries adopted a version of the US system, the clearest 
and most enduring example being Brazil. There is also a European strand of 
federalism to be found in Austria, Germany and Switzerland (ibid p. 171-172). A 
more detailed description of the US system is given in chapter eight. 
The Political Executive 
Moving on from the legislative systems, the second point of comparison 
in this overview of political systems concerns the executive branch of 
government and how the executive power is organised. All political systems that 
meet the basic criteria for a working democracy (i.e. limited powers with respect 
to the citizenry and ‘whose leadership derives directly or indirectly from popular 
elections (Needler, 1991: 113)’), fall within two major types in relation to how 
they appoint and organise the political executive: parliamentary and 
presidential. The presidential model is typically connected to the federal system 
                                                 
11 There is a third system within the framework of liberal democracy and that is the confederate system. 
In this a number of sovereign nation-states form a federation to deal with matters of common interest. 
However, these federations lack their own decision-making power since each member nation needs to 
ratify each decision. (Rutger Lindahl, ed., Utländska Politiska System (Lund, Sweden: 
Universitetsförlaget Dialogos, 1988) 14. The most prominent example is the European Union ( EU). 
While the EU has in recent times been moving towards a federated Europe with a new common  
constitution, at the time of writing, the constitution has been rejected in referenda in both France and the 
Netherlands, bringing the process to a standstill.    107
and the parliamentary to the unitary system. The most important difference 
between the two models is that ‘in the parliamentary system the executive is 
elected by, or is otherwise responsible to, the legislature [ie. parliament], while 
in the presidential system the chief executive is elected independent of the 
legislature (ibid)’ and hence not responsible to the legislature. 
The Parliamentary Executive 
Most of the world’s nation-states operate politically within the framework 
of some kind of constitution or constitutional instrument or legislation that 
provides them with a more solid base than, for instance, common law on its 
own. The constitution sets out the ground rules for how the country’s political 
system is to operate, who has what powers, and how these powers are checked 
and balanced. Interestingly the United Kingdom, with one of the oldest 
parliamentary traditions in the world, has no written constitution; instead a form 
of constitutional practice has evolved over several hundred years. Needler 
defines the parliamentary system as one in which ‘[executive and legislative] 
powers are fused (1991: 116).’ The logic is that, 
‘the party or coalition of parties that controls a majority of seats in the assembly 
forms government and introduces the great bulk of legislative projects. If any 
significant legislative initiatives are defeated by the assembly, this signifies that the 
heretofore dominant party or coalition has lost its majority and should therefore be 
replaced (ibid). 
Hence, there is a very clear connection between the chief executive and 
the legislative assembly in the parliamentary model. 
The Presidential Executive 
If the fusion of powers is the defining property for the parliamentary 
system, the opposite is true for the presidential model; here separation of   108
powers is the most important property. The political powers are divided between 
the legislature, the executive and the judicial branch of government. The 
rationale behind this model is that there is some ‘jealous hostility or at least 
rivalry…between executive and legislature, so that each will act to prevent any 
abuse of power by the other (ibid).’ In this model the president is elected by 
popular vote separately from the members of the legislature. In practice this 
means that if the legislation prepared by his cabinet and put before the 
legislature is turned down, the president will serve his/her term out in any case. 
The only a way a president can be removed is by losing the following election or 
if he/she has engaged in criminal behaviour. In the latter case the legislature 
then typically has the option to censure the president. One of the most famous 
examples concerns former US president Richard M. Nixon who decided to step 
down from the US presidency in the wake of the Watergate affair just as the 
Congress was preparing to move an impeachment that was very likely to 
succeed.  
The Parliamentary/Presidential Hybrid 
There is a hybrid version that combines the parliamentary and 
presidential models. However, this hybrid is quite rare. Only a handful of 
countries have tried it and a number of them have abandoned it. The most 
famous example was the German Weimar republic (1919-1933) that ended with 
Adolf Hitler gaining power in the lead up to the World War II. France and 
Finland are two current examples of the parliamentary/presidential hybrid. The 
most serious problem with the model is the inbuilt conflict that can be triggered 
when the head of the executive, the president, and the head of cabinet, usually   109
a Prime Minister, are elected on different mandates. This is what brought down 
the Weimar Republic and almost caused the downfall of the French Fifth 
Republic (Needler, 1991: 127-30). 
The Political Systems Model 
The counties of study in this project are: Australia, Sweden, the US, 
South Africa and Thailand. A more detailed and individual political profile of 
each country will be given in the data presentation chapters six to ten. However, 
it may be useful to situate the countries in a model using the above points of 
comparisons as measures. Figure 1 provides an overview. 
Figure 1 Overview Political systems 
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Figure 1 clearly illustrates that the countries of study in this project 
cover three of the four theoretically possible combinations. 
Conclusion 
When reviewing the literature on comparative politics for this chapter 
one recurring theme related to the problem of auditing the political system. Most 
writers commented on the difficulties this posed, cogently summarised by 
Needler: 
It seems hardly exaggerated to say that in the general panorama of democratic 
societies, what have been called the auditing and control functions are not 
performed with the appropriate vigour, or performed at all, so that abuses of power 
by government are quite common. Thus the first objective of any institutional 
reform should be the devising of mechanisms and the structuring of incentives so 
that the auditing functions are not neutralized by political influences, bartered away 
for reasons of career advancement, or allowed to wither because of bureaucratic 
inertia (1991: 118-19). 
Lindahl takes this a step further when he points out that when 
comparing different political systems you need to go beyond the formal 
structures and also evaluate the general level of knowledge among citizens of 
the how the political system works. Even more important from the viewpoint of 
this project, Lindahl also points out that the access to knowledge and 
information is vital for a well functioning political system. Lindahl refers to 
several studies done in liberal democracies that indicate that the general level 
of knowledge about the political system is low and that there is a feeling of 
‘alienation’ between the citizens and the representatives of the system (1988: 
24-25). 
Needler’s and Lindahl’s observations together provide another strong 
argument for a well functioning FOI regime which can indirectly fulfil an ‘auditing 
Comment [JL1]:  Gail, I didn’t 
move this part to chapt one. I 
think it works well as a reminder 
as to why this project is important 
and it fits well with the rest of this 
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function’ (as discussed in chapter one) and give access to the information 
needed to increase political knowledge among the public. It could also be 
argued that the media in its fourth estate role can be viewed as an independent 
auditor of how the political system is run. 
Having situated the countries of study in the political landscape it is now 
time to present and analyse the data captured by this project.   112
Chapter Six: Sweden 
Introduction 
This is the first of a series of chapters which will present and analyse 
the data captured to evaluate the different FOI regimes. It therefore may be 
worth recapitulating here the main aims of this project.  
The overarching research question is: to what extent, if any, are the 
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? This question is examined via three sub-
studies focusing in turn on the FOI legislation (‘the promise’), the 
administration of FOI (‘the spin’) and the use of the system (‘the practice’). 
The qualitative data will subsequently be translated into a quantitative 
representation of the scores for each sub-study, for inclusion eventually into the 
FOI Index in chapter eleven. 
Sweden will be dealt with first and we will begin by setting the country 
into its political context. 
Political Profile 
In situating Sweden politically, it may be useful to recall figure 1 from 
the previous chapter:   113
 
Figure 1 Overview Political systems 
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current king or queen. As in most liberal democracies, the royal head of state 
has no real political power. At the national level Sweden has a uni-cameral 
assembly which operates in a similar fashion to those of other liberal democratic 
systems. However, as Lane and Ersson note, what makes Sweden stand out ‘is 
a high degree of institutional autonomy underlining power dispersal to various 
levels of government’ as opposed to the Westminster model that has ‘a low 
degree of institutional autonomy, emphasizing the sovereignty of parliament 
(1999: 189).’ 
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Sweden has a unitary system with an executive appointed by 
parliament. The current Prime Minister is Göran Persson. His party, 
Socialdemokraterna (the Socialdemocrats), was the dominant party in Sweden 
for much of the 20
th century. Its constituency has now shrunk to about 30 per 
cent, which puts it on a par with the largest conservative party, Moderata 
Samlingspartiet. Sweden has a multiparty system and Persson has headed a 
left/green coalition during the last two terms. The two coalition partners are 
Miljöpartiet (the Greens) and the reformed communist party, Vänsterpartiet. 
The Swedish system is well-known for its unitary nature and what Lane 
and Ersson have termed ‘its ideology of local government (1999: 180)’. The 
extent and depth of this ideology is well illustrated by the fact that local 
governments in Sweden have the right to levy taxes to handle their affairs and 
services. The lion’s share of tax paid by Swedish citizens goes to the local 
government where they reside. This does not mean that the national 
government has a totally hands off approach to local government. As Lane and 
Ersson note, ‘Local governments are provided with autonomy as a matter of 
principle, but the discretion of these bodies is restricted by national government 
directives, financial initiatives as well as legal rulings restricting degrees of 
freedom in local government autonomy (ibid).’ 
While Swedish local government has great economic independence 
from its national counterpart, the local government assemblies have very limited 
legislative powers. They have the right to enact some local statutes such as 
regulating traffic, but the law is largely made by the national assembly and 
applies to all levels of the system. The relevance of this for the Swedish FOI   115
regime is that a citizen or journalist using FOI to seek information deals with one 
national law, as opposed to potentially multiple laws in a federal system. 
The local government system has gone through a number of reforms. 
These are well summarised by Lane and Ersson: 
During the 1970s the local government system expanded at a rapid rate as both the 
municipalities and the county councils became more and more responsible for the 
provision of public services in the Swedish welfare state. To strengthen the 
capacity of the municipalities to engage in service production comprehensive 
amalgamation was resorted to first in 1952 and then in 1969 and 1974. The 
reduction in the number of municipalities was quite substantial, from roughly 2000 
to about 285. These reforms and the concomitant expansion of the activities of the 
various local governments resulted in local government units being transformed 
into large-scale formal organisations with heavy bureaucracies, big budgets and a 
large number of employees (1999: 181). 
There are at present 23 county councils handling the large costs and 
complex nature of running the public health system. The importance of these 
councils grew in parallel to the emergence of increased independence of the 
municipalities. 
To sum up: Sweden has two major levels of government (national and 
local government), employs a multiparty system and gives great autonomy to 
local government that has the right to levy tax. Given the strong political powers 
of local government, it is often pointed out by Swedish journalists that the most 
relevant journalism to the readers/viewers/listeners is local investigative 
journalism described by the phrase: ‘dig where you stand’ (literally translated 
from Swedish). 
Evolution of FOI in Sweden 
The history and evolution of FOI in Sweden was comprehensively 
covered in chapter two. However, a few points under this heading require closer   116
examination here. Because the first FOI-related legislation was enacted in 1766 
in Sweden it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the media in general and 
individual journalists in particular have been using FOI to acquire government-
held information for hundreds of years. This is not the case. As shown in earlier 
research by this author it was not until the 1960s that journalists started using 
FOI in a more systematic way as a tool for political accountability. It was at that 
time that each government agency had to be ‘broken in’, ie. made aware of and 
educated in the workings of FOI (Lidberg, 2003: 57-69). Quite often part of the 
‘breaking in’ process of an agency included taking appeals to the administrative 
courts when FOI applications were refused. 
Like all liberal democracies, Sweden has been affected by the 
increased secrecy of governments in the wake of the ‘war on terror’. As pointed 
out in chapter two the tool at the government’s disposal to control the flow of 
information is the Secrecy Act. This Act can be changed by the government of 
the day, and weakens the strong constitutional standing of the Swedish FOI 
laws. The Swedish Union of Journalists, SJF, is very active in monitoring the 
health of the FOI regime and in the most recent report points out that between 
1992-2002, 74 out of 194 changes to the Secrecy Act increased secrecy, while 
only two increased openness (SJF, 2003: 2). The report will be discussed 
further below in the presentation of the ‘the practice’ sub-study. 
Interestingly in the last five years a debate has emerged in Sweden with 
some FOI observers questioning if the far-reaching access regime may in fact 
be counterproductive. Their reasoning is that public servants and politicians are 
aware that as soon as a document is archived in their department, in the vast   117
majority of cases it is covered by the FOI system and can be acquired by the 
public. This, they reason, has made civil servants more reluctant to document 
for instance, the policy-making process and hence has decreased overall 
transparency. They cite the example of the European Commission in 2002. 
Concerns emerged that the Commission had engaged in both illegal and highly 
unethical behaviour. An inquiry was ordered and the veil of secrecy of the 
Commission was lifted. The inquiry found it easy to document the 
maladministration using the comprehensive documentation and its report forced 
the members of the Commission to resign. However, this level of documentation 
is not currently available in the Swedish system because of the reasons stated 
above. So, the far-reaching Swedish FOI system has the paradoxical effect of 
producing less documentation and hence fewer accountability options (Lindell, 
2003: 12-14). It should be pointed out that these views are held only by a 
minority of Swedish FOI observers and that they are regarded as quite 
controversial. 
One overarching problem with tracking the operations of the Swedish 
FOI system is that no formalised reporting or auditing system exists. In the other 
countries in the present study each government agency covered by FOI and/or 
the attorney general’s department is obliged to publish annual FOI reports 
stating how many requests were made, how many were granted or refused, etc. 
This provides a valuable tool for tracking the performance of FOI in practice. 
The only FOI statistics that exist in Sweden concern the number of FOI appeals 
taken to the administrative courts. This is not comprehensive and the   118
information would require a lot of work to collate compared to a formal FOI 
reporting system. 
 
Data presentation and analysis 
‘The promise’: Sweden 
The research question for ‘the promise’ was: what are the aims of the 
Swedish FOI legislation and what does it promise to deliver in terms of 
information access? 
To answer the research question a number of key parameters were 
identified. As pointed out in chapter three, where the overall methodology is 
described in detail, these parameters were formulated as questions and kept as 
similar as possible in all three sub-studies (‘the promise’ evaluation template 
can be viewed in full in appendix 3).  
There are two parts to the evaluation template. Part one covers access 
to documents, part two maps protection of journalistic sources. As noted in 
chapter three considerable confusion exists around the general topic of 
‘whistleblowing’. This study is concerned with the media whistleblower only and 
the level of protection, if any, the system offers to the whistleblower who 
decides to work with a journalist to make public his/her grievances. However, 
before the data is presented, the aims and objectives of the Swedish FOI 
regime need to be pinned down. 
Aims and objectives of the legislation 
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The main legislative instrument for the Swedish FOI system can be 
found in the Constitution
12. The Swedish Constitution consists of four 
‘Grundlagar’ (Fundamental laws). Three of these laws cover Freedom of 
Information: Regeringformen - ‘The Instrument of Government’ (IG), 
Tryckfrihetsförordningen - ‘Freedom of Print and Publication’ (FPP) and 
Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen - ‘Freedom of Speech’ (FS). The limitations and 
exceptions to FOI are regulated in the ‘Secrecy Act’ which is not a Fundamental 
law. 
The basis for the Swedish FOI regime can be found in the first 
paragraph of the Instrument of Government (IG): 
All public power in Sweden emanates from the people. The Swedish popular 
government is built on the right to freely form opinions and on the universal and 
equal right to the vote. This is guaranteed by a representative and parliamentary 
system and through the independence of local government (Sveriges Grundlagar 
Och Riksdagsordningen, 2003: Sec 1, 1§). 
 
The IG has an inbuilt Bill of Rights that has this to say about freedom of 
speech and FOI: 
freedom of speech: the freedom to verbally, in print or visually or in any other way 
express and share information and express thoughts, opinions and feelings 
freedom of information: the freedom to access and receive information and to 
access the opinions of others (Sveriges Grundlagar och Riksdagsordningen, 2003: 
Sec 2, § 1). 
 
 
                                                 
12 The word Constution is not used as such in Swedish, however the Fundamental laws effectively have 
the same function as a Constitution. So, for the purpose of this study, the Fundamental laws will be 
referred to as the Swedish Constitution. The Fundamental Laws have the same legal standing as a 
Constitution in that they can only be changed by two different sessions of parliament, separated by an 
election. All translations from the Swedish Constitution are done by the author.   120
The Bill of Rights also covers: the right to organise meetings, the right 
to demonstrate, and the right to practice any religion. The first paragraph ends 
by referring to FPP and FS for further details regarding freedom of publication 
and speech. 
Section 2 of FPP covers access to government-held information. 
Paragraph 1 states: ‘To promote free debate and diversity in knowledge and 
opinion, all Swedish citizens shall have the right to access public information 
(Sveriges Grundlagar Och Riksdagsordningen, 2003).’ The general rule is that 
all government-held information is to be regarded as public and hence 
accessible to anyone who requests it, including for instance foreign journalists. 
No departments or agencies are exempt, however some restrictions apply, for 
example in relation to national security, business confidentiality and protection 
of privacy for individuals.  
This is all the FPP has to say about the Swedish FOI regime. One 
reason for this very sparse aims/objectives statement in the Acts could be that 
the first Swedish version of FOI was made part of the constitution in 1766 and 
that there has been ample time for traditions, precedents and interpretations to 
evolve. However, when combined with what is set out in the ‘bill of rights’ 
section above with the evaluation of the Act below the aims become clear: all 
government-held information should be public. Only in exceptional 
circumstances should government-held information not be released. This 
principle is underscored by the fact that no government agency or department is 
exempt from FOI, not even the intelligence organisations. 
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It is important to understand that FOI in Sweden covers much more 
than just access to documents and media whistleblower protection. The 
Swedish overarching name for its FOI system is ‘Offentlighetsprincipen’. This 
translates literally as ‘The Public Principle’. This principle permeates all levels of 
society. As Sefastsson puts it: 
Offentlighetsprincipen, does not give the agencies the right to choose to act in an 
open and transparent fashion. Instead, the right rests with the public who can 
choose whether they want access. The agencies have no choice (1999: 11) (this 
author’s translation) 
The driving thought behind this is that openness and transparency will 
make public administration more effective and prevent corruption and misuse of 
power. To find the legislature’s aims and objectives that underpin the Swedish 
FOI system, one has to turn to the government ‘proposition’ (bill) that was 
introduced before the last revision of FOI: 
How public agencies and departments are run and managed are of concern for all 
citizens. Hence, in a society ruled by the people it is inevitable that agencies supply 
and release wide-ranging information about their operations…This means that 
public administration lies open for citizens and the media to access information 
whenever they want and independent of the information policies of the agencies 
(ibid, author’s translation and emphasis). 
The importance of the explicit mention of ‘independent access’ and the 
inclusion of the reference to ‘the media’ cannot be emphasized enough. It is not 
unusual for references to freedom of opinion, expression, speech and even 
access to government-held information to be included in a nation’s constitution. 
However, Sweden is unique in including in its constitution two very 
comprehensive separate laws covering Freedom of Information and Speech 
and media whistleblower protection. The acts also explicitly outlaw censorship 
in any form and provide very strong protection for public servants who ‘leak’ and   122
‘whistleblow’ by providing information to the media. This right even extends to 
some information that is classified as secret by the Secrecy Act (Sveriges 
Grundlagar Och Riksdagsordningen, 2003: 47-49). However, the Secrecy Act 
has the potential to be used as a ‘backdoor escape’ for any government of the 
day that might want to restrict access. All that is needed to amend the Secrecy 
Act is a decision by the government. 
In sum, Sweden advocates an open information system based on the 
principle that government information should be available to the public and only 
withheld in exceptional circumstances. 
‘The promise’: score and summary of findings 
As outlined in chapter three the five-point coding scale used to rate the 
replies in the ‘promise’ evaluation ranged from ’a’ at the top end, representing 
legislation catering for a very high level of independent access to public 
information to ‘e’ at the bottom end describing legislation that is weak and never 
really intending to deliver independent access. The coding process is illustrated 
in the following example, using the first question in the Swedish ‘promise’ 
evaluation: 
1) Does the Act stipulate a fee when lodging a FOI request? 
    
a)  No    4   
b)  SEK 50-100    3 
c)  SEK 101-150    2 
d)  SEK 151-200    1 
e)  SEK 201-250    0 
 
Notes: Hence the score for this question is 4.
13 
                                                 
13 Because of the different currencies, the evaluation templates had to be altered slightly to fit each 
country of study. See appendix 1-3.    123
The maximum possible score for ‘the promise’ was 68, describing a 
very far-reaching FOI regime including to a full or partial extent the private 
sector and providing substantial legal protection of media whistleblowers 
(journalistic sources). The Swedish ‘promise’ score was 63 out of 68, indicating 
a very high legislative ambition. 
The areas covered by the evaluation template included: cost, 
turnaround time, the appeal process and protection of sources. Table 1 shows a 
selection of key questions, scores and this author’s comments. The costs for 
using FOI has been converted back to A$. 
Table 1 ‘the promise’ Sweden 
Question/parameter evaluated  Score  Comment 
Part I Access to documents    
2) Does the Act allow the 
agencies to charge processing 
fees? 
4 out of 4  Clear guidelines. The agency can  
charge only for copies of the 
information. 
The Ombudsman has ruled that 
no agency may charge for the 
retrieval, collation and 
processing of the information. 
The latest set fees for copies are: 
General rule: first nine 
photocopies free. A$10 for the 
10th copy and 20 cents for all 
following copies. A$120 for 
video copy, A$25 for audio copy. 
If you bring your own 
photocopier the copying is free 
and there is effectively no 
processing fee.(Sveriges 
Grundlagar Och 
Riksdagsordningen, 2003: FPP 
Sec 2 ) and (Sefastsson, 1999: 
34-45) 
 
4) How long does the Act give 
the agency to make a decision 
4/4  FPP stipulates that a request for 
copies of information should be   124
on the request? 
 
handled ’as soon as possible.’ A 
number of cases have over the 
last 40 years been considered by 
the Ombudsman and 
Administrative courts. The 
interpretation of ‘as soon as 
possible’ is that the public 
servant should do it immediately 
in the case of a limited request 
and within a day or two if it is a 
larger request. The request 
should have priority over other 
tasks at hand (ibid). 
 
6) Does the Act require 
agencies to keep a running diary 
over current and archived 
documents? 
 
4/4  Yes – and the diary is public and 
often the starting point in 
locating documents of interest 
(Sveriges Grundlagar och 
Riksdagsordningen, 2003: Sec 
2). 
8) Are any federal/national 
agencies exempt from the Act? 
 
4/4  No agencies are exempt. Exempt 
matter is regulated by the 
Secrecy Act and mainly applies 
to matters of national security or 
information relating to other 
states, the nation’s central fiscal 
policies, agencies’ inspections, 
ongoing crime investigations and 
privacy of individuals (Bohlin, 
2004: 97-146). 
 
10) Does the Act allow for legal 
costs being covered by the 
state? 
 
4/4  Yes, in most cases. It has become 
common practice that the appeals 
of FOI requests are viewed as a 
public interest matter and that 
legal costs should not stop the 
case from being heard 
(Domstolsverket, 2005).
14 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of the 
constitution? 
 
4/4  Yes. The Act(s) can only be 
changed by two different 
sessions of parliament separated 
by an election. However, the 
government of the day can make 
changes to the Secrecy Act that 
regulates exempt matter. 
12) Does the Act apply to the 
private sector? 
2/4  It applies to government agencies 
that have adopted a ‘corporate 
                                                 
14 ‘Domstolsverket’ is a national agency that overses and regualtes the Swedish courtsystem.   125
  structure’, but it does not apply 
to the private sector in general 
(Bohlin, 2004: 97) and 
(Sefastsson, 1999: 139-48). 
Part II Protection of 
journalistic sources 
 
  Journalistic sources in this 
respect are also known as media 
‘whistleblowers’ and it is the 
level of legal protection, if any, 
that is evaluated 
1) What level of protection of 
journalistic sources exists? 
 
4/4  The source has full legal 
protection, meaning that a 
journalist has the option to 
guarantee source confidentiality 
and anonymity (Sveriges 
Grundlagar Och 
Riksdagsordningen, 2003: FPP 
Sec 1 ) and (Sefastsson, 1999: 
111-17). 
 
2) When can journalists be 
forced to reveal their sources?  
 
4/4  Only in very few cases can a 
journalist be forced to reveal 
their sources. These are in court 
cases involving treason and 
national security. It is very rare 
for a journalist to be put under 
official pressure to reveal 
sources. It would be seen as 
interfering with freedom of the 
press and the ‘principle of 
openness’ (see chapter two for 
further details) (Sveriges 
Grundlagar Och 
Riksdagsordningen, 2003: FPP 
Sec 7) and (Sefastsson, 1999: 
121-26). 
 
3) Are journalists in any way 
bound not to reveal their 
sources? 
 
4/4  Yes – they risk a criminal charge 
and substantial fine (more than 
AUS$1000) if they reveal their 
source to anyone – including 
colleagues and editor. The law 
also allows for a maximum 
prison term of a year for 
disclosing a source. However, it 
has become common practice 
that the reporter is allowed to 
disclose the source to one 
colleague, usually the editor, for 
support in editorial decisions   126
(Sveriges Grundlagar Och 
Riksdagsordningen, 2003: FPP  
Sec 3) and (Sefastsson, 1999: 
117-19). 
4) Are colleagues and managers 
(eg the Minister and chief public 
servant) of a government agency 
in any way prevented from 
investigating the source of a 
’leak’ to the press? 
 
4/4  Yes – they risk a criminal charge 
and substantial fine (more than 
AUS$1000) if they make any 
inquires (Sveriges Grundlagar 
Och Riksdagsordningen, 2003: 
FPP Sec 3) and (Sefastsson, 
1999: 119-20). 
5) If legal protection of 
journalistic sources exists – is 
the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
4/4  Yes – and the Act(s) can only be 
changed by two different 
sessions of parliament. For 
further detail, see above under 
‘aims and objectives’. 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the promise’ 
At first glance the legislation appears quite vague. Formulations like ‘as 
soon as possible’ in regards to decision-making time do appear to leave the 
way open for abuse by government agencies. The fact that there is little abuse 
goes to the core of one of the three main strengths of the Swedish FOI regime: 
the interpretation of the law through the years has specified what ‘as soon as 
possible’ means: hours and days rather than weeks. Swedish FOI is backed up 
by a very progressive ombudsman and court system that over the decades in 
most appeals have ordered agencies to reverse decisions where they have 
refused to release documents. 
The second area of strength is that the legislation makes it clear that 
agencies may not charge for retrieving and collating information. As we shall 
see, this is one of the main problem areas in other FOI regimes.   127
The third area of strength is the very potent legal protection of 
journalistic sources. The fact that a source can be granted confidentiality by a 
journalist clearly enhances the overall flow of information. As we shall see, no 
other country in this study offers a level of protection that comes even close. 
Having said that, it should be pointed out that in the last ten years there has 
been ongoing concern in Sweden that public servants are increasingly reluctant 
to utilise this opportunity (SJF, 2003: 5). Nevertheless, the option does exist. 
How does this analysis answer the research question for ‘the promise’: 
what are the aims of the Swedish FOI legislation and what does it promise 
to deliver in terms of information access? 
‘The promise’ sub-study has confirmed that in Sweden, in the words of 
the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen), the FOI regime ‘…means that public 
administration lies open for citizens and the media to access information 
whenever they want and independent of the information policies of the agencies 
(this author’s translation) (Sefastsson, 1999: 1)’. In practice this means that all 
information held by government agencies should be viewed as public and 
handed over to whoever requests it as quickly as possible and at a minimum 
cost with no questions asked. This is indeed a big promise. The high score in 
the Swedish ‘promise’ sub-study, 63 out of 68, indicates that the legislation 
holds true to the promise of its aims and objectives. The qualitative analysis of 
the laws further bears this out. However, to promise is easy, to deliver is hard. 
This is where those charged with administrating the legislation come in.   128
‘The spin’: Sweden 
The research question for ‘the spin’ sub-study was: what are the 
attitudes towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among 
leading politicians and public servants? 
The ‘spin’ was in essence a survey study built around the same set of 
parameters and questions as the other two sub-studies. Please see chapter 
three and appendix two for more details and the full questionnaire. 
 ‘The spin’: score and summary of findings 
The same coding technique used in ‘the promise’ was employed in ‘the 
spin’. The three-part questionnaire covered (1) general attitudes towards FOI 
and its functions, (2) access to documents and (3) protection of sources. The 
maximum possible score for ‘the spin’ was 76. For the Swedish ‘spin’ 67 
questionnaires were sent out and 21 responses were received within two weeks 
giving a response rate of 31%.
15 The response rate will be further discussed in 
chapter eleven. 
The score for ‘the spin’ was calculated by adding up the total score for 
each survey and then dividing it by the total number of replies producing an 
average score: the higher the score the more positive the attitudes towards FOI 
and protection of journalistic sources. In the Swedish case the total score was 
1362/21 = 65/76 = 85%. 
                                                 
15 The questionnaire allowed the respondent to remain anonymous to attract more responses. To enter 
which department and what position the respondend held was voluntary.   129
‘The spin’ posed 19 questions in three sections to capture the attitudes 
towards FOI. Table 2 provides an overview of the pivotal questions (the table 
does not include all questions and replies). 
Table 2: Swedish replies to ‘the spin’ 
 
Question Score  Comment 
Part I General attitudes FOI    
Questions 1-4 covering the 
importance of FOI for democracy. 
‘Strongly agree’ in all but 5 
replies that had ‘agree’ 
Fairly predictable, but still 
important data indicating 
positive general attitudes towards 
FOI 
6. FOI should be extended further to 
partly cover the corporate sector 
when public interests are at stake. 
 
Responses much more varied 
covering the whole spectrum of 
reply alternatives. Score: 47 out 
of 84
16 or 56% 
Clearly this is still a 
controversial issue in Sweden. 
The score shows that there is a 
slim majority support among the 
respondents for extending 
Swedish FOI further to cover the 
private sector. 
Part II Access to 
government held records 
  
2) In your view, what length of time 
is reasonable before your 
department makes a decision on the 
request? 
 
73 out of 84 – 87%. Close to all 
respondents have chosen the two 
top alternatives 1-10 and 11-20 
days. 
 
This was a bit of a trick question. 
As pointed out in the cover letter 
the survey was primarily 
concerned with the attitudes of 
the respondents. 
If they found the law too 
demanding, they had the option 
to voice this, but the respondents 
are clearly happy to serve. This 
indicates that there is a strong 
will to facilitate FOI requests in 
Sweden 
3) If your department needs to 
charge a processing fee, which of 
the costs below do you find 
reasonable? 
 
79 out of 84 – 94%  The respondents strongly back 
the existing free system. 
They hold the attitude that 
processing fees should be as low 
as possible and really only be 
fees for copying, in most cases 
under $100. 
7) Which of the following statements 
is closest to the attitude held by 
yourself and your staff? 
 
a)  the government hold 
information on behalf of 
the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the 
information requested as 
75 out of 84 – 89%  This is the single most important 
question in ‘the spin’. It cuts to 
the core of how FOI is 
interpreted, regardless of what 
the law says. All but 3 of the 
Swedish respondents picked 
reply alternatives a or b. This 
clearly shows that Swedish 
public servants and politicians 
                                                 
16 84 was the maximum score on any one question: 21 replies x 4=84   130
soon as possible 
b)  the government hold 
information on behalf of 
the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an 
‘information facilitator’ for 
an FOI applicant   
c)  the government owns the 
information but increased 
openness and 
transparency is good
  
d)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access 
e)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access and 
increased openness and 
transparency is not good 
 
take the view that the 
government does not own the 
information. The importance of 
this mindset cannot be 
overemphasised. The complete 
table in chapter 11 containing all 
countries of study is very telling. 
8) In your view, which statement 
most adequately describes the 
‘fourth estate’ role that some media 
and reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
a)  It is a vital part of the 
political accountability 
process and delegated to 
the media by the citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of the 
political accountability 
process, but exists on a 
mandate invented by the 
media itself 
c)  It does not have any 
particular influence on the 
political accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention by the 
media to justify its 
existence 
e)  It is a threat to the political 
accountability process 
because of the 
incompetence of most 
journalists 
 
67 out of 84 – 80%. Majority of 
respondents picked alternative b. 
A very interesting outcome. 
Although it indicates awareness 
of the fourth estate’s role and 
sympathy for it, it is clear that 
most of the respondents see it as 
being instigated by the media 
rather than evolving out of a 
mutual understanding between 
the public and the media. 
9) In your view, which is the most 
important function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool for 
political accountability 
b)  To increase transparency 
of the governing process 
to prevent 
maladministration and 
corruption 
c)  To increase the public’s 
63 out 84 – 75%  The coding in this question is 
based on the accountability 
function of FOI. The score is not 
really all that relevant, when 
looking at this parameter in 
isolation. What is more 
important is what reply 
alternative was the most common 
one. In the Swedish ‘spin’ it was 
overwhelmingly b – 62%.   131
participation in the political 
process 
d)  To allow citizens a means 
to check what personal 
data agencies hold and to 
correct errors 
e)  FOI is an unnecessary law 
that fills no particular 
function 
Part III Protection of Journalistic 
sources 
  
1) What is your view of legal 
protection of journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made stronger 
and include the corporate 
sector when public 
interests are at stake 
b)  It should be made stronger 
in the public sector to 
encourage public servants 
to make public 
maladministration 
c)  It should stay the way it is 
d)  It should be weakened - 
problems within a 
department are best 
handled internally 
e)  It should be abolished in 
Sweden. Journalists in 
general cannot not be 
trusted with this level of 
confidence 
 
56 out of 84 – 67%  Most respondents picked reply c. 
Hence, they seem happy with the 
current system. 
2) With public access to documents, 
is there a need for legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  Yes – it complements the 
access to document 
regime and strengthens 
the overall flow of public 
information 
b)  Yes – it encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it could 
probably be replaced by a 
re-worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat to good 
public administration 
e)  No – journalists and the 
media would abuse this 
privilege and it should not 
be implemented in 
Australia 
 
80 out of 84 – 95%  A resounding round of praise for 
protecting sources. 81% picked 
reply a, the rest picked b.    132
3) What are your initial feelings 
towards a public servant who leaks 
information to the media to disclose 
maladministration? 
  
a)  Generally it is the right 
thing to do and it should be 
encouraged 
b)  The first option should 
always be solving it within 
the department – if that 
does not work, then a leak 
could be the right thing to 
do 
c)  It must be the very last 
option when all other 
options have been 
exhausted 
d)  A leak is never an option – 
problems should be 
addressed internally within 
the department 
e)  A public servant that leaks 
information to the media 
betrays his colleagues and 
employer 
 
61 out of 84 – 73%  So, a bit more hesitant when it 
comes to the crunch. Protection 
of sources is good in theory, but 
perhaps not always so good in 
practice….. 
4) In some countries you break the 
law if you investigate who leaked 
information to the media. Which of 
the following statements 
corresponds best with your views on 
this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most important 
part of the source 
protection. Without the 
legal protection it would be 
a ‘paper tiger’ 
b)  Journalistic sources should 
have legal protection, but 
exemptions when it is 
allowed to investigate a 
leak should exist 
c)  Legal protection for 
journalistic sources as a 
principle is good, but the 
exemptions for when 
journalists can be forced to 
reveal their sources should 
be far-reaching 
d)  Journalistic sources do not 
need legal protection – 
protection by ethical 
guidelines for department 
managers is enough 
e)  Journalists are not credible 
and accountable enough 
to be granted the privilege 
78 out of 84 – 93%  Confirms and strengthens the 
earlier replies in this section.   133
of legal protection of their 
sources 
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the spin’ 
As discussed in chapter three at the core of ‘the spin’ was the issue of 
who owns the information held by the government. Does government hold the 
information on behalf of the people and facilitate access, or does the 
government own the information in its own right? Question seven in part two of 
the questionnaire attempted to capture these attitudes (see table 2). The reason 
for the importance of this question connects back to one of the theoretical 
foundations for this thesis: that FOI is an essential tool to ensure political 
accountability. The point made in chapter one was that it is very hard, indeed 
close to impossible, to hold someone accountable if you do not have the 
necessary information. If the entity that is to be held accountable also controls 
the information process and holds the view that it owns the information and will 
grant access at its pleasure, there can be no, or very limited, accountability. 
According to the replies to question seven in part I (see table 2), the top 
Swedish politicians and public servants seem to view themselves as keepers of 
information on behalf of the people. It is of the utmost importance for the flow of 
information that the managers sitting at the top of the political process take this 
view since they determine the culture of the organisation. 
Overall it seems that the respondents to the Swedish ‘spin’ survey are 
quite content with the existing FOI regime. They even seem to sympathise with 
the notion of the fourth estate and its use of FOI.   134
The very strong support for journalistic source protection was quite 
unforeseen. As we shall see, this part of the questionnaire attracted very 
different replies in the other countries of study.  
So what answer does the data suggest for the research question for 
‘the spin’ sub-study: what are the attitudes towards FOI and protection of 
journalistic sources among leading politicians and public servants? The 
overall response for Sweden must be; very positive. Leading Swedish 
politicians and public servants seem to be at ease with the existing FOI regime 
and strongly support even the more controversial features such as the very far-
reaching protection of journalistic sources. The only question that provoked a 
wide spread in responses was if Swedish FOI should be extended to cover the 
private sector. 
‘The Practice’: Sweden 
In simple terms, ‘the promise’ sub-study evaluated the theoretical 
ground on which the FOI system rests, while’ the spin’ sub-study relates to the 
interpretation of FOI, the official version peddled by the highest political and 
bureaucratic leadership in the country (even though ‘the spin’ also attempted to 
capture what they really think, not only the official version). With a score of 63 
out of 68 for ‘the promise’ and 65 out of 76 for ‘the spin’ it could be said that in 
Sweden the FOI promise is very far-reaching indeed, and this is reinforced by 
government attitudes towards FOI. In other words: ‘the promise’ says to the 
public, ‘all government-held information is public, come and get it!’ ‘The spin’ 
says, ‘absolutely! And we are here to help you find the information.’ Could the   135
FOI regime possibly be that good? That is what the last sub-study, ‘the practice’ 
was designed to find out. 
The research question for ‘the practice’ sub-study was: in practice, 
does FOI supply journalists (and media organisations) with independent 
access to government held information? It was vital that the research tool 
was ‘invisible’ to the subject being studied, ie. government 
agencies/departments. The methodology used and the ethical issues it raised 
are described and discussed in the overall methodology in chapter three.  
Recruitment of reporters 
Recruitment of the Swedish reporters for ‘the practice’ went entirely 
according to plan. I made contact with the Swedish member of the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ICIJ. He thought the project was 
worthwhile and agreed to a meeting. He brought up the point that he had been 
the night editor at his paper for the last five years and that the project would 
probably be better of with journalists currently on reporter duties. I agreed and 
together we assembled a list of six possible names. The Swedish recruitment 
process is described in detail in chapter four. The end result was that one 
female and two male investigative reporters were recruited. One worked for the 
biggest Swedish daily newspaper, one was a reporter/producer for an 
investigative program on public service television and the third reporter worked 
for the equivalent show in public service radio. All three had extensive 
investigative reporting experience, in all three cases more than ten years. They 
will be referred to as Reporter A, B and C.   136
‘The practice’ score 
The parameters in the evaluation template for ‘the practice’ were as 
similar as possible to the other two sub-studies (for details see appendix one). 
As noted in chapter three, the single major difference between ‘the practice’ and 
the other two sub-studies concerns the protection of journalistic sources. 
Because of the complexities involved in using a source in the study, ‘the 
practice’ evaluates the access to the document regime only. 
 ‘The practice’ cases 
The qualitative data was derived from the replies to the questions in the 
evaluation template (see appendix one) and interviews with the journalists 
concerned.  
Case 1: The PM’s expenses 
The request was sent via e-mail. The full request read: 
Swedish Public Television logo 
To the Prime Minister’s Office 
Request for copy of public documents 
I would like a copy of public documents relevant to the following: 
All invoices or other expenditure documents describing or connected to the Prime 
Minister’s travels and expenditure for representing Sweden in his official capacity 
during 2003. 
If any of the documents fall under the secrecy act, I ask that you delete that 
information and let me have a copy of the rest. 
Yours sincerely 
Journalist A (author’s translation) 
The request was sent on Wednesday February 18, 2004. Two days 
later February 20, Reporter A got a phone call from the Prime Minister’s office   137
telling him that the documents had been retrieved, in total 600 pages. He was 
informed that there was a copying fee of A$ 0.20 per copy, in total A$ 108. He 
agreed to pay and received the copies via ordinary mail at the beginning of the 
following week. A sample of copies obtained via the request: 
o  Invoice from the ‘Security Police’, SÄPO, for bodyguard and 
protection for the PM on a trip to Brazil: $29 551 
o  Two credit card invoices connected to cards held by two of the 
PM’s closest staff: $5063 (these invoices were quite frequent and 
do probably deserve further investigation) 
o  Various domestic travels, costs for flights and bodyguard 
protection: $3340 
 
The maximum score for ‘the practice’ evaluation template was 68. The 
score in case one was 49.  
‘The practice’ summary of findings case 1 
Table 3 gives an overview of the replies to the core questions in the 
evaluation template incorporating some of Reporter A’s own comments. 
Table 3 ‘the practice’ Sweden case 1 
Question Score  Comments 
3) Did the agency’s reply quote a 
processing fee? 
No, 4 out of 4  A fee of $108 was charged to 
make copies of the 600 
documents. But no 
processing fee to retrieve and 
collate the information was 
charged. This is not allowed 
according to the Swedish 
FOI.   138
5) How much time elapsed from 
the agency’s confirmation of the 
receipt of the request to the 
grant/refusal of the request? 
4/4  Two days. ‘A public servant 
from the PM’s office phoned 
me and said that the 
documents were ready. Even 
though it’s not unusual to get 
quick decisions, this was 
unusually swift considering 
the size of the information 
requested. I suspect this is not 
an uncommon request and 
that they had routines in 
place to collate the 
information. If I hadn’t heard 
anything within a week, I 
would have become 
suspicious (Interview: 4, 
2004).’ 
6) What was the agencies 
decision? 
4/4  Request granted in full with 
no processing costs.  
8) Compared to the information 
‘served’ to newsrooms by the 
government’s press secretaries 
and public relations officers, how 
does the information acquired 
rank in terms of usefulness for 
holding the government 
accountable? 
4/4  ‘The quality of information is 
much higher compared to the 
‘sanitised’ version. It’s richer 
in detail and I get information 
that would otherwise not 
make it into the public arena. 
Without FOI I can’t do my 
job (ibid).’ 
13) Which of the following 
statements best sums up the 
attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during 
the course of the request?   
  
a)  the government holds 
information on behalf of 
the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the 
information requested as 
soon as possible. 
b)  the government holds 
information on behalf of 
the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an 
‘information facilitator’ for 
you. 
c)  the government owns the 
information but I abide by 
its values of openness 
and transparency in 
4/4  ‘It’s alternative (a) without a 
doubt. I base this on my 
phone conversation with the 
public servant. She did not 
complain although I sought a 
lot of information. I also base 
it on the speed that the 
request was dealt with (ibid).’    139
relation to the public 
access to information. 
d)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access so I 
act conservatively rather 
than proactively in 
relation to public access. 
e)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access and 
my role is to guard 
information as opposed 
to dispensing it. 
 
14) What do you perceive the end 
product to be? 
2/4  ‘Further research. This is a 
good start, but looking at the 
documents I suspect there is 
more documentation 
regarding the PM’s expenses 
in other government 
departments. I base this on 
the fact that there are not 
enough invoices for travels 
abroad. But a story can 
certainly be based on the 
information obtained in this 
request (ibid).’ 
 
Two things about the first case are worth noting. First, the very short 
turnaround time, which journalist A puts down to the fact that the PM’s office 
probably had received a similar request before, and so had routines in place to 
deal with the request. Second, there was nothing in the information released 
that indicated maladministration or corruption. However, the information 
provides a very solid basis for further research into the overall costs and 
workings of the PM’s office. Reporter A is a reporter for an investigative TV 
program that specialises in what they call ‘explanatory journalism’ where they 
attempt to make visible and explain complicated societal structures such as how   140
the European Union works in practice. Without the Swedish FOI such 
journalism would be very hard to perform.  
Case 2: Refused entry for aliens 
The initial idea was to lodge an FOI request with the immigration 
department for statistics on the numbers of refugees who were refused entry at 
the border and the reasons for these decisions. However, since Sweden joined 
the European Union in 1995, very few refugees physically make it to Sweden. 
Instead they tend to get processed by another EU member, with the result that 
Sweden currently processes very few refugees at its borders. Nevertheless 
people are still being stopped at Swedish borders and denied entry for various 
other reasons. In his background research, before the request was lodged, 
Reporter B accessed articles written by colleagues regarding a perceived 
increase in theft crimes supposedly committed by visitors from the Baltic States. 
This information was based on statistics from a police district on the south east 
coast of Sweden. One strategy that had been employed was to utilise a section 
of Swedish migration law that allowed for refused entry at the border if the 
person seeking entry fell under the broad category of ‘särskilda omständigheter’ 
(extraordinary circumstances). According to the police this strategy had been 
very successful. Reporter B wanted to find out if a similar policy had been 
adopted at the border controls in the Stockholm district as well. Reporter B also 
wanted to know the nationalities of those refused entry and the reasons. His 
preliminary research showed that the border police in Stockholm could be 
FOIed directly. His FOI request read: 
(The logo of the newspaper)   141
(name of police officer handling FOI requests) 
March 30, 2004 
 
Request for information 
I request information regarding the number of refused entries at the border 
crossings at the airports Arlanda and Bromma and at the ferry quays City, 
Kappellskär and Nynäshamn. I would like the information for the month of January 
2004 itemised as to place, nationality and reason for the refused entry decision. 
Furthermore, I request copies of all refused entry decisions during week 4 executed 
at the City ferry quay. If you determine that some of the information cannot be 
released due to exemptions in the Secrecy Act, I accept this and would like copies 
of the decisions with names deleted. 
 
Regards 
Journalist B (author’s translation) 
 
As in case one the public servant handling the request (in this instance 
a police officer) made phone contact with Reporter B to confirm that he still 
wanted the information, although some of it would be deleted to protect the 
identity of the people seeking entry to Sweden. The day after the phone call the 
reply letter from the officer arrived. The letter claimed that the police department 
had received the request April 5. The department’s reply letter was dated April 
7, total processing and decision time: two days. The letter further states that the 
information requested can be released with the exception of the names and 
date of birth of the people seeking entry. The letter ends with an instruction on 
how to appeal the police department’s decision. 
The information released consisted of 11 documents. The department 
could have charged a copying fee for the last two copies according to the 
Swedish FOI act, but clearly decided not to. The released information confirmed   142
the journalist’s suspicions regarding country of origin. The computer printout for 
the month of January showed that 64 out of the total 96 entry refusals were 
persons from one of the Baltic States; Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. So, 67 per 
cent of people denied entry to Sweden in the Stockholm police district were 
from the Baltic States. The national origin of the rest is a mix of predominantly 
eastern European nations with some from Middle Eastern states. The computer 
printout also showed that the vast majority of refused entries were based on the 
above mentioned section of the Migration Act. One of the printouts even had a 
pie chart breakdown of grounds for refused entry. The rest of the documents 
were copies of the actual protocols written at the time of interviewing the person 
requesting entry. The protocols were complete apart from the name and date of 
birth of the person seeking entry.  
The score for case two was 52 out the maximum score 68.  
‘The practice’ summary of findings case two 
Table four shows a summary of Reporter B’s replies to the evaluation 
questions. 
Table 4 ‘the practice’ Sweden case 2 
Question Score  Comments 
3) Did the agency’s reply quote a 
processing fee? 
4 out of 4  No processing and no fee for 
photocopying, even though 
the department had the right 
to charge. ‘I have found that 
if you have a limited number 
of copies, the departments 
quite often do not bother to 
charge (Interview: 5, 2004).’ 
5) How much time elapsed from 
the agency’s confirmation of the 
receipt of the request to the 
grant/refusal of the request? 
4/4  Two days. ‘This was quite 
quick. I usually give it up to 
ten days, then I follow up 
with a phone call or other 
communication (ibid)’   143
6) What was the agencies 
decision? 
4/4  Request granted in full, no 
processing or other fees. 
8) Compared to the information 
‘served’ to newsrooms by the 
government’s press secretaries 
and public relations officers, how 
does the information acquired 
rank in terms of usefulness for 
holding the government 
accountable? 
4/4  The information obtained via 
FOI is of much higher quality 
compared to the ‘spin’ 
version. ‘This information is 
unique and would not be in 
the public arena, were it not 
for FOI (ibid).’ 
13) Which of the following 
statements best sums up the 
attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during 
the course of the request?   
  
a)  the government holds 
information on behalf of 
the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the 
information requested as 
soon as possible. 
b)  the government holds 
information on behalf of 
the people but it is not 
my role to serve as an 
‘information facilitator’ for 
you. 
c)  the government owns the 
information but I abide by 
its values of openness 
and transparency in 
relation to the public 
access to information. 
d)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access so I 
act conservatively rather 
than proactively in 
relation to public access. 
e)  the government owns the 
information and decides 
who will have access and 
my role is to guard 
information as opposed 
to dispensing it. 
 
4/4  ‘Based on my phone 
conversation with the police 
officer it is clearly alternative 
(a) (ibid).’ 
14) What do you perceive the end 
product to be? 
3/4  ‘The information released is 
very promising from a   144
journalistic perspective. I 
would say that 1-3 articles on 
the topic is a possibility. 
Some more research is 
needed. I would FOI again 
and extend the time frame 
and also include the other 
major border crossings into 
Sweden. The question would 
be: how has the EU 
expansion changed and 
influenced the background 
and reasons for people 
seeking entry to Sweden? 
(ibid).’ 
 
Again (as in case one) what stands out in case two is the very short 
turnaround time: two days. Case two could be labelled a successful ‘fishing 
expedition’. Reporter B suspected that a new and harsher immigration policy 
was being implemented at Swedish borders and the statistics he received 
proved him right on that point. The information also indicated that there was 
more information to be obtained from other border crossings. For a half day of 
preliminary research and a couple of hours formulating the request, the 
outcome is quite phenomenal: information highly relevant to the readers and 
possibly three articles. Shortly after partaking in the study Reporter B took up a 
position as editor and did not write the articles. However, at the time of writing, 
he is considering repeating the request and comparing the results with the 
information from 2004 to see if the EU enlargement has had an effect on 
immigration to Sweden. 
Case 3: Weapons export 
The third case is by far the most complex and interesting of the 
Swedish FOI requests. Weapons export has been a very controversial topic   145
ever since Sweden’s reinvention of itself as a neutral and largely pacifistic 
nation. The image of Sweden as an international arbiter of peace is at present 
almost 200 years old. The last armed conflict that Sweden took official part in, 
as a fighting party, was in 1809. It has always been hard, if not impossible, to 
reconcile Sweden’s image as a peace dove with its track record as an 
international supplier of armaments from its strong and thriving domestic 
weapons industry. There are plenty of examples throughout contemporary 
history when the ‘dove image’ has clashed with the ‘hawk’ reality of Sweden’s 
weapons exports. The most recent one and the one that forced far-reaching 
changes to Swedish weapons export law was the Bofors bribe case during the 
mid-1980s. The case involved alleged bribes by cannon manufacturer Bofors to 
Indian defence officials to secure multi-million dollar contracts in supplying the 
Indian army with howitzers (Zaremba, 2006). Since then the control of Swedish 
weapons export trade is rigorous, at least that is the official version. 
Journalist C’s preliminary research showed that Inspektionen för 
Strategiska Produkter or ISP (the Commission for Regulation of Strategic 
Products), reports annually to Parliament on the extent of Swedish weapons 
export. The report is also published on the Swedish Foreign Department’s 
website. The report itemises country of destination, number of granted export 
permits, types of weapons and the financial sums of sales for each country. 
Swedish weapons exports are worth a lot of money. In 2001: $43.10 billion (the 
first sale to South Africa of the Swedish designed and built fighter plane JAS 
accounted for the bulk of that year’s sales), 2002: $1.06 billion and 2003: $5,44 
billion (Swedish Government, 2003). Since the sales were itemised stating   146
country of sale, some specification of materiel sold and the sums for each 
country, it could be argued that the information sought was already in the public 
domain. But, as Reporter C noted in the diary she kept during the case ‘if you 
can get someone to believe that everything is already public, no more questions 
will be asked’ (author’s translation).  
Reporter C noted that the sales to the US and the United Kingdom rose 
significantly during 2003. Sweden has a long-standing practice to not sell 
weapons to countries at war 
17(Skiljedomsföreningen, 2005: 7). Hence it would 
be very interesting to see if any weapons were sold and/or delivered to the US 
and the UK during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, the initial request put to 
ISP read: 
TELEFAX 
May 3 2004 
Att: xxxx (public servant at ISP) 
Fax: ISP’s fax number 
Request of copy of public documents 
I hereby request a copy of the public documents listing Swedish export of weapons 
(guns, cannons, munitions, vehicles, spare parts etc.) to the US during the period 
October 1 2001 to December 31 2001 and a copy of the documents listing sales and 
exports of weapons (guns, cannons, munitions, vehicles, spare parts etc.) to the US 
and the United Kingdom during the period March 1 2003 to May 31 2003. 
Exemptions under the Secrecy Act 
This information is requested under the Freedom of Information Act. Should you 
find that some of the information is exempt under the Secrecy Act, I request that 
you delete that information and that you release the rest of the documents. I request 
an appeal instruction for each piece of information that is deleted. 
Cost 
                                                 
17 Svenska Freds och Skiljedomsforeningen is a long standing Swedish non-governement organisation 
that lobbies Swedish Government not to sell weapons to nations at war.    147
I wish to have the requested information delivered as economically as possible. I 
prefer to receive the information via e-mail xxx, but ordinary mail is also perfectly 
acceptable. I am prepared to pay the fees as stipulated in the schedule of fees. I 
would like to be contacted if the fee exceeds $100. 
Speed of process 
I assume that you will expedite this request according to the FOI Act §2:13 and 
according to the principles laid down by the ombudsman regarding speed of 
process. I look forward to receiving a reply from you as soon as possible. 
Best Regards 
Reporter C (author’s translation) 
Nine days later May 12, after a reminder via fax the same day, ISP 
replied via e-mail that they received the fax May 3. They apologised for the 
delay and explained that retrieving and collating the information takes time, 
since there were more than 200 items. The next day, May 13, Reporter C 
received the decision from ISP. In the letter ISP said that it granted C’s request 
in part. Attached were a number of copies of earlier FOI request of similar 
nature, but none of the information that Reporter C had requested. ISP had 
decided that releasing the requested information would harm Sweden’s 
relations with other states and infringe on business confidentiality. ISP referred 
to a number of paragraphs in the Secrecy Act. The e-mail did however confirm 
that 200 ‘items’ were indeed delivered to the UK and the US during the periods 
specified in the request. This fact was already publicly known and had been 
discussed at the time of the two wars. What was not known was exactly what 
sort of weapons were indeed delivered. 
Reporter C decided that the reasons given for refusal of her request 
were weak and decided to appeal to the administrative court; Kammarrätten. In 
the appeal Reporter C argued:   148
a)  The requested information is of very high public interest 
b)  The total sum for the 2001 and 2003 export is already public. If 
the name of the individual export companies are deleted, it is 
hard to understand why the export for the specified periods 
cannot be released. 
c)  The Swedish Public Radio charter prevents journalist C from 
publishing name of individuals without careful consideration. This 
protects the privacy of individual companies (this author’s 
translation). 
On November 11, 2004, Kammarätten ruled in favour of ISP. The court 
agreed with ISP’s interpretation of the Secrecy Act (Inspektionen För 
Strategiska Produkters Beslut 13 Maj, 2004). 
On 23 November, 2004, Reporer C decided to lodge a second FOI 
request with ISP where she asked the agency to create a new document based 
on the information she requested. Based on the Swedish FOI Act, Reporter C 
assumed that this new document would automatically become public. ISP’s 
decision took three weeks and arrived via mail to Reporter C December 2, 
2004. ISP again maintained that part of C’s request were already granted and 
referred to the annual reports published on the web. ISP dismissed C’s request 
based on the same parts of the Secrecy Act as in the original request. 
After consulting experienced colleagues Reporter C lodged a third 
request with ISP in January 26, 2005. Her core argument this time was that the 
Swedish Secrecy Act was changed when Sweden entered the European Union   149
in 1995. This change to the Act made it clear that some disturbance in relations 
to foreign states was acceptable and the public interest of access to documents 
can, in some instances, overrule the need for secrecy. 
On February 2, 2005, ISP dismissed Reporter C’s last request outright 
on the same grounds cited in the first two decisions. ISP did not in its decision 
take into account the changes to the Secrecy Act cited by Reporter C. 
Reporter C lodged a second appeal with Kammarätten in Stockholm 
February 7, 2005. In its decision the court again found in favour of ISP on the 
same grounds as in its first decision. 
In May, 2005, Reporter C appealed Kammarrätten’s ruling to the 
highest administrative court in Sweden, Regeringsrätten. The court decided not 
to hear the case based on precedents set in previous cases. In sum: Reporter C 
took the case from initial FOI request, via two further requests and two court 
appeals to the highest court in the country within the space of two years. The 
cost for this was two days’ effective working time and one consultation with the 
in-house lawyers. 
The case assessed is the initial request. The score was 39 out of 68. 
‘The practice’ summary of findings case 3 
Table five summarises Reporter C’s most important responses. 
 
Table 5 ‘the practice’ Sweden case 3 
Question Score  Comments 
3) Did the agency’s reply quote a 
processing fee? 
n/a n/a 
5) How much time elapsed from  4/4  ‘Ten days. It took them   150
the agency’s confirmation of the 
receipt of the request to the 
grant/refusal of the request? 
unusually long to confirm the 
receipt of the request. Overall 
ten days is probably normal for 
this request (Interview:6, 
2004).’ 
6) What was the agencies 
decision? 
0/4 Request  refused 
‘They said it was partially 
granted and referred to what is 
in their annual report, but I got 
none of the information I asked 
for (ibid).’ 
8) Compared to the information 
‘served’ to newsrooms by the 
government’s press secretaries 
and public relations officers, how 
does the information acquired 
rank in terms of usefulness for 
holding the government 
accountable? 
n/a n/a 
13/33) Which of the following 
statements best sums up the 
attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during 
the course of the request?18  
  
a)  the government 
holds 
information on 
behalf of the 
people and I 
should 
endeavour to 
deliver the 
information 
requested as 
soon as 
possible. 
b)  the government 
holds 
information on 
behalf of the 
people but it is 
not my role to 
serve as an 
‘information 
facilitator’ for 
3/4 Alterative  (b) 
‘Based on my 
correspondence with the 
public servants at the 
agency. They were 
helpful but not facilitating 
(ibid).’ 
                                                 
18 When a request was partially granted or refused, the evaluation and interview moved to another part of 
the evaluation template. For details, see appendix 1.   151
you. 
c)  the government 
owns the 
information but 
I abide by its 
values of 
openness and 
transparency in 
relation to the 
public access 
to information. 
d)  the government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who 
will have 
access so I act 
conservatively 
rather than 
proactively in 
relation to 
public access. 
e)  the government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who 
will have 
access and my 
role is to guard 
information as 
opposed to 
dispensing it. 
 
14/35) What do you perceive the 
end product to be? 
0/4  ‘I can’t do a story now, I need 
the information first. If I get the 
documents I can easily see a 
minimum of three stories: the 
financial, the legal/ethical 
aspect and the political 
dimension (ibid).’ 
 
28) Are you satisfied with the 
agency’s reasons for the refusal? 
0/4  ‘No, I’m not happy with their 
reasons. Using the ‘relationship 
between states’ section of the 
secrecy act is an easy way out 
(ibid).’ 
 
29) In your experience – what do 
estimate the cost to be if you 
4/4 None   152
were to appeal? 
30) In your experience – how do 
you judge your chances of 
winning the appeal? 
1/4  ‘Poor. Although I think I have 
good grounds for an appeal, 
convincing the court to over 
rule the ‘relationship between 
states’ argument will be hard 
(ibid).’ 
 
 
It should be pointed out from the outset that in case three both Reporter 
C and I were aware that we were pushing the boundaries of Swedish FOI. As 
C’s initial research showed, part of the information asked for was already 
publicly available. That being said, the information requested would have 
contributed to the ongoing debate about Sweden’s weapons export. This raises 
the inevitable question as to whether it was precisely this that ISP wanted to 
avoid by not releasing the information. Another reason the request was 
designed to push the boundaries of Swedish FOI was that FOI is supposed to 
deliver not only benign information, but controversial information as well. More 
often than not, it is the controversial information that is needed to ensure 
genuine political accountability. 
On the negative side: the requested information was not released. ISP 
was slow off the mark in confirming they had received the request. The claim 
that the request was partly granted when no information was released was an 
outright lie. 
On the positive side: the decision was made reasonably quickly. The 
appeals process was cost-free. This in itself is noteworthy - as we shall see, the 
appeals process in other FOI systems is anything but free.   153
Discussion and analysis: ‘the practice’ 
The maximum score for the ‘practice’ was 68. The scores for the three 
Swedish ‘practice’ cases were: 52, 49 and 39, in total 140. This was divided by 
3 to arrive at the average ‘practice’ score for Sweden of 47 out of 68 or as a 
percentage 69. ‘The practice’ score means little until it is seen in relation to the 
other countries of study. However, the score complemented by the qualitative 
findings supplied by the interviews indicates that the Swedish FOI regime is 
working quite well. The extremely quick turnaround times (case one: three days, 
case two: two days and case three: ten days), the low cost of acquiring the 
information and the fact that information was obtained in two of the cases, 
shows that Sweden’s FOI regime does deliver. In one case the information 
obtained could have lead to an article. In the second case more research was 
needed. However, the Swedish journalists agreed that the quality of information 
that can be acquired using FOI is quite high. 
As mentioned above, the Swedish Journalism Union, SJF, are very 
active in monitoring the health of the Swedish FOI regime. In 1997 and 2000 
they conducted an ‘openness test’ consisting of a number of requests put to a 
variety of Swedish government agencies on local and regional level. The results 
from the tests are fairly consistent with the findings in ‘the practice’. In the SJF 
tests in 2000 50-70% of the agencies passed (SJF, 2003: 3-5). 
However, SJF points to worrying trends in the Swedish FOI system. 
One is the increased number of exemptions to FOI under the amended   
Secrecy Act discussed above. Another negative trend is the decline of 
information supplied by media whistleblowers, in spite of the legal protection   154
that exists for public servants who supply information to the media. SJF sees 
the increased number of privatised former government agencies as one 
possible reason (SJF, 2000: 19). 
Overall analysis: Sweden 
Having presented the data in each study, let us look at how the data 
connects to the overall research questions: to what extent, if any, are the 
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? To answer this an overview of the three 
sub-studies is needed.  
Table 6 Swedish scores 
  ‘the promise’  ‘the spin’  ‘the practice’ 
Score  63 out of 68  65 out of 76  47 out of 68 
Score in %  92.6%  85.5%  69.1% 
 
Looking at the high ‘promise’ and ‘spin’ scores, which together define 
the theoretical potential of the Swedish FOI, Sweden could be expected to have 
an open system with most government-held information available immediately 
on request. The legislation is very far-reaching with a lot of legal clout to back its 
major aims. The attitudes towards FOI among leading politicians and public 
servants appear to support this system. However, the promises are not quite 
borne out by the practical workings of Swedish FOI. If FOI was truly delivering 
what it promised the score for ‘the practice’ study would have been closer to 80 
per cent. So, there is a gap. How significant this gap is will not become evident 
until Sweden’s performance is compared with those of the other countries of 
study. However, the data gathered so far suggests that we are looking at a 
strong system based on the following findings:   155
o  The extremely short turnaround time for requests (2, days, 3 
days and 10 days in the three requests respectively) 
o  The very low cost for processing the requests 
o  The non-existent cost to take case three to the highest court of 
appeal 
o  The very far-reaching legal protection of journalistic sources as 
described by ‘the promise’ and ‘spin’ sub-studies 
o  Most important: the attitude towards ownership of government 
held information which correlates through all three sub-studies. 
‘The promise’ makes it clear that the public servant must process 
an FOI request immediately. In ‘the spin’ the highest scoring 
reply alternatives from public servants and politicians for this 
question were:  
the government hold information on behalf of the people and I should endeavour to 
deliver the information requested as soon as possible  
and  
the government hold information on behalf of the people but it is not my role to 
serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for an FOI applicant   
The score for this question was 75 out of a maximum of 84. This means 
that 89 per cent of the politicians and public servants who responded subscribe 
to the above views on information ownership. The importance of this cannot be 
over-emphasised. This means that there is an attitude among government in 
Sweden that it is acceptable to release information, indeed that it is even a right 
of the public to access the information held by the department.   156
This is probably owing to a number of factors: a potent legal framework, 
a long FOI tradition, and very active users in the form of journalists who have in 
a way trained public servants practically in how the FOI regime works. 
So, the reply to the overall research question is that: there is a gap 
between the promise and practice of Swedish FOI, but it is not a very big one. 
However, from the citizens’ and journalists’ perspective this is of course not 
good enough. There should be no gap at all. The promise should be borne out 
by the practice. Otherwise, why promise? 
‘The promise’ evaluation showed a very far-reaching legislative FOI 
system demanding speedy processing of FOI requests and promising wide-
ranging access at very limited cost. This sub-study also found that the legal 
protection of journalistic sources in the public service is very potent. It gives 
journalists a similar protection in relation to confidentiality as applies to doctors, 
lawyers and priests. The journalist can be forced to reveal his/her sources only 
in a very limited number of legal proceedings. The legislation prohibits any 
investigation into a journalistic source, by for instance the ministerial or public 
service head of a department.  
‘The spin’ captured attitudes towards FOI among leading politicians and 
public servants in Sweden. It clearly showed the administrators of FOI are very 
positive towards the FOI regime and view themselves as keepers of 
government information on behalf of the public. The sub-study also detected 
very positive attitudes towards legal protection of journalistic sources.   157
The first two sub-studies combined to promise a public information 
system where virtually everything is available on demand, straight away. In 
quantitative terms ‘the promise’ scored 92 per cent and ‘the spin’ 85 per cent. 
This promise was not upheld by the last sub-study. Two of the three 
FOI requests in ‘the practice’ delivered the requested information. The third 
case delivered some peripheral information but was substantially refused. It 
should be pointed out that to appeal the refusal to the highest administrative 
court, Reporter C had no expenses, apart from her own working time. ‘The 
practice’ scored 69 per cent. 
Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter can be summarised thus: 
‘The promise’ uncovered very ambitious aims and objectives for the 
Swedish FOI regime. These aims were backed by a similarly ambitious 
legislation. 
‘The spin’ found that the administrators of Swedish FOI are 
enthusiastic about FOI and that they see themselves as information facilitators 
rather than gatekeepers – at least officially. 
In ‘the practice’ two of the users of FOI got access to the information 
they requested, the third user was denied access. 
So, it can be concluded that the very far-reaching promise of the 
Swedish FOI system is not quite born out by the practice. The following   158
chapters will show how Sweden compares in relation to the other countries of 
study.    159
 
Chapter Seven: Australia 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will present and analyse the data captured to evaluate the 
Australian FOI regime. Following the template of the preceding chapter each 
sub-study will be examined separately. It will become clear that the federal 
Australian FOI regime falls far short of delivering on its legislative promises. 
However to put the data into context it is first necessary to politically 
profile Australia based on the overview presented in chapter five and to 
examine the evolution its federal FOI system. 
Political Profile 
When putting the Australian political system into context, in comparison 
with the other countries of study, it may be useful to recall figure 1 first 
presented in chapter five.   160
Figure 1 Overview Political systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia is a constitutional monarchy with the current King or Queen of 
the United Kingdom as the formal head of state. In reality the UK Head of State 
has very little to do with Australia as the Head of State role is delegated to a 
Governor General formally appointed by the Queen on recommendation from 
the Prime Minister. 
The Australian political system is described by some as the 
‘Washminster’ system (Galligan, 1993: 208). This is a telling description as in its 
origins the Australian system combines the traditions of Westminster-style 
responsible government with the separation of powers found in the US federal 
system. 
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At the end of the 19
th century the heretofore self-governing states of 
Australia decided to join together as a federation, agreed on a federal 
constitution and added an additional level of government to those at state and 
local levels: the federal. The Australian Commonwealth Constitution Act came 
into effect in 1900 and defines the different roles of the sates and the 
Commonwealth.  
A key feature in the Westminster
19 system is ‘responsible government’, 
a concept that has been adopted by most parliamentary systems. According to 
Galligan: 
…parliamentary responsible government has the Executive based primarily in the 
popular or lower House to which it is accountable on a day-to-day basis. Hence 
there is a fairly direct line of accountability from the people who elect the Members 
of Parliament to the Executive which holds office subject to the confidence of the 
popular House of Parliament – at least according to the classic theory (1993: 203). 
However, Emy and Hughes observe that the Australian constitution is 
vague on exactly how responsible government is to be achieved in Australia. 
…the Australian Constitution, by not taking explicit account of the conventions of 
the British system, leaves it unclear as to precisely how responsible government 
was meant to work in Australia. Convention delegates were colonial 
parliamentarians who were sufficiently familiar with the system of responsible 
government, and they saw no need to spell out its details in the Constitution. It 
should not be forgotten that five of the six Australian colonies had been self-
governing for forty years by the time of Federation, and this experience was 
undoubtedly important in shaping the Australian Constitution (1991: 265). 
Apart from ‘responsible government’ and the Head of State, several 
other traits were borrowed from the Westminster system, such as calling the 
Head of the Executive Prime Minister. One very important concept that was not 
inspired by the ‘mother country’ was the notion and content of a political 
                                                 
19 The term ‘Westminster’ derives from ‘an area of central London, including many of the institutions of 
the UK central government. The Palace of Westminster is the site of the Houses of Parliament; 
comprising the House of Commons and House of Lords’ Alistair McMillan, ed., Oxford Concise 
Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 572.   162
constitution. This idea came from the other main influence on the Australian 
political system, the United States. 
Emy and Hughes observe that the Australian founders probably thought 
they were taking the best part of both systems to come up with a third uniquely 
Australian one. The Australian Constitution is very different to the American 
version: 
The US founding fathers worked to draw up a Constitution which guaranteed the 
rights of citizens as well as restricting the power of government. The Australian 
Constitution only divides powers between the Commonwealth and the states and 
makes no reference to individual rights or liberties. Instead of being a 
comprehensive document like the American, it includes only the very minimum 
necessary for dividing powers between the two levels of government (1991: 266). 
The fact that the Australian founders decided not to include a Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution has been the topic of much debate in Australia. Emy 
and Hughes point out that the Australian hybrid constitution has a built-in 
tension centred on the citizens’ rights issue (ibid). Emy and Hughes and several 
other authors and constitutional observers see the solution as the future 
incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Others, such as Galligan, are 
less categorical on the need for an Australian Bill of Rights. According to his 
analysis  the Constitution has been underestimated in its ability to protect 
citizens’ rights (1993: 208) and  the current debate focuses too much on a Bill of 
Rights delivering a complete solution. There is of course nothing that says that 
you cannot have both a system of responsible government and a Bill of Rights. 
Sweden is one example where both exist. 
Emy and Hughes offer a possible explanation as to why a Bill of Rights 
was not included. They point out that at the time of federation five of the six   163
Australian colonies had been self-governing for forty years without a Bill of 
Rights. This may have had an impact on the way the Australian Constitution 
was formulated (1991: 265). 
There is a third level of Australian government: local government. 
Compared to unitary systems such as, for instance, Sweden’s, where local 
governments are at least on a par with the national government in terms of 
relevance to the daily lives of citizens, local governments in Australia are 
relatively invisible. The reason for this is of course that the power is one step up 
at state level. 
The Australian states have considerable freedom to govern themselves. 
They can make laws; they have control over their own finances and can impose 
certain taxes such as stamp duties and royalties from mining companies 
operating in the states. However, the Constitution makes it clear that the power 
to impose income tax rests with the Commonwealth (Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act, 1900: Chapter 5). This is important because it 
indicates the balance of power between central government and the periphery. 
Yes, the states can legislate, but they cannot raise the bulk of the revenue. 
In sum, Australia has three levels of government: federal (the 
Commonwealth), state and local government. The real political power resides at 
the federal and state levels. States can pass laws but have only limited powers 
to generate revenue through taxes. The Australian system combines facets of 
both the Westminster and the US federal systems (a hybrid sometimes referred 
to as the ‘Washminster’ system).   164
Evolution of FOI in Australia 
Australia is no newcomer to the international FOI family. The federal 
government introduced the first FOI legislation in the country in 1982. The lead-
up to the introduction was a long and rocky one. As pointed out in chapter two 
Australia opposed the international FOI initiative led by the US via the United 
Nations. As Terrill observes, Australia’s position shifted slowly during the late 
1960s to one of reluctant interest. At the same time the interpretation of 
‘freedom of information’ became equal to ‘access to documents’ in Australia 
(2000: 88). 
Although the Australian FOI is inspired by and in parts largely built 
around the US version, the enactment of the US Freedom of Information Act in 
1967 hardly registered in Australia (ibid, p. 89). It would take until 1972 and a 
visit by the American consumer advocate Ralph Nader to put FOI on the 
political agenda. Nader was interviewed on current affairs TV and agitated 
strongly for an Australian version of FOI. His arguments were backed by 
Australian academic Jim Spigelman in his book Secrecy, Political Censorship in 
Australia (Spigelman, 1972). The book added fuel to the debate sparked by 
proponents of FOI within the Labor party and in November 1972 the ALP 
committed itself to introducing FOI in a policy speech: 
A Labor government will introduce a Freedom of Information Act along the lines 
of the United States legislation. This Act will make mandatory the publication of 
certain kinds of information and establish the general principle that everything 
must be released unless it falls within certain clearly defined exemptions. Every 
Australian citizen will have a statutory right to take legal action to challenge the 
withholding of public information by the government or its agencies (cited in 
Terrill, 2000: 92).   165
It would take another ten years for the legislation to be prepared and 
drafted. The time frame indicates that the public service and some politicians 
approached FOI with some trepidation and even fear. Terrill takes the analysis 
a step further: ‘politicians lost control of the debate. The agenda was being 
steered by the bureaucracy to the extent that even the release of an innocuous 
report could develop into a strong test case (2000: 98-99).’ His analysis is 
underscored by the Labor Prime Minister who had promised to give Australia its 
FOI. Gough Whitlam’s own account of his government mentions FOI in just one 
line: ‘The Government devoted many hours of discussion to freedom of 
information legislation but not sufficient to overcome the resistance of its most 
senior and respected public service advisors (ibid)’. This is not an ideal situation 
when your goal is to increase transparency to achieve greater political 
accountability. 
Terrill’s most striking finding on the history of FOI in Australia is the fact 
that much of the material including minutes and discussions in the 
interdepartmental committee appointed to prepare the legislation are labelled 
‘confidential’ and are in effect secret. So, here we have the paradoxical situation 
whereby researchers even today cannot gain access to the discussions leading 
up to what was touted as increased openness in federal governance in Australia 
(2000: 101). In the minutes that Terrill was allowed to access he found that the 
Department of Defence took the view that ‘there was a wide variety of 
documents relating to the defence of the country that could never be released to 
the public (ibid).’ Terrill comments: ‘what sorts of decision, one wonders, could   166
never be made public – a decision to incinerate Darwin if Australia was invaded 
from the north; grisly experiments on Australian citizens? (ibid).’ 
Australia’s FOI history would have ended with the dismissal of the 
Whitlam government had the Liberal Party not done a backflip on the issue. In a 
policy speech in December 1975 the incoming Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, 
endorsed the idea of FOI (ibid, p. 109). During the Fraser reign other 
committees mulled over the various aspects of FOI. Two of the most powerful 
arguments against were: the cost of administering the Act; and FOI’s 
incompatibility with the Westminster concept of ministerial responsibility. 
Although potent at the time, the first argument fell on its face. The 
Australian Electoral Commission had predicted it would receive 100 000 
requests in the first year. It did not receive one single request during the first 
seven months, then a few trickled in. The Department of Social Security also 
predicted a similar number of requests.  In fact it received 1177 in the first year 
of operation (ibid, p. 117). In the first year the numbers were similar in other 
departments and agencies. 
The second argument concerning the potential threat to ministerial 
responsibility is of a more complex nature. The core of the argument is that the 
Westminster system relies heavily on cabinet solidarity. If an extensive FOI 
made public the discussions and debates held in cabinet meetings, it would 
harm the system. Fears were also raised that public servants’ advice to 
Ministers would be less frank if it were accessible under FOI (Lamble, 2002a: 
123). 
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To address these various concerns the matter was referred to the 
Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs. The Committee 
reported in November 1979 and the report became a standard reference text. 
On the Westminster system and FOI issue the report concluded: 
A great deal of the talk about the Westminster system and how it would be altered 
by Freedom of Information legislation has been obscure and misleading. To a great 
extent the term “Westminster system” has been used as a smoke-screen behind 
which, and with which to cover up existing practices of unnecessary secrecy (cited 
in Terrill, 2000: 113). 
Terrill observes that;  
Despite these charges, the Senate Committee took the concerns about the 
Westminster system seriously, and was generous in its exemptions covering 
Cabinet and advice to Ministers (ibid). 
The debate has continued and recently some FOI watchers, such as 
Snell and James, have observed that instead of modifying FOI, it is perhaps the 
Westminster system itself that ‘needs to evolve to accommodate FOI (2002: 
40).’ 
There was considerable excitement among the possible users of FOI at 
the time of its introduction in 1982. The excitement soon turned to 
disappointment. Considering the hard birth of FOI in Australia, it is hardly 
surprising. Terrill defines the core problem well: 
…it is difficult to see why departments would ever accept the routine release of 
information when this could be against their interests. More seriously, as in recent 
years the focus on government has shifted from expanding citizens’ rights to 
achieving policy and program outcomes, FOI has increasingly been viewed as an 
impediment to governing (2000: 119). 
After only a few years it became clear that the Act delivered acceptable 
access to requests for individual and personal information, which in itself is an 
achievement. However, the so-called ‘third party requests’ from, for instance   168
media organisations, were not doing well. Against this background the 
Australian Law Reform Commission was in 1994 charged with conducting a 
review of the federal FOI Act. This review will be discussed later in this chapter. 
After the passage of the Federal Act the Australian States and 
Territories passed their own Acts, some with slight variations, but at their core 
similar to the Federal Act. The final Act to be passed was the Northern Territory 
legislation in 2003. 
It is important to keep in mind that the Australian Act covers documents 
only as opposed to for instance Sweden, the US and New Zealand, where the 
laws also cover information. This is an important distinction as information 
extends beyond documents and includes, for instance, the knowledge held by 
public servants. Also at the federal level no protection at all exists for media 
whistleblowers. Indeed, the opposite is true. According to Section 70 in the 
Crimes Act: 
A person who, being a Commonwealth officer, publishes or communicates, except 
to some person to whom he is authorised to publish or communicate it, any fact or 
document which comes to his knowledge, or into his possession, by virtue of his 
office, and which it is his duty not to disclose, shall be guilty of an offence (cited in 
Terrill, 2000: 245). 
The penalty for such disclosure is up to two years imprisonment, not the 
sort of regime that would encourage public servants to take on such a role.   169
 
Data presentation and analysis 
‘The promise’: Australia 
Aims and objectives of the legislation 
The main means of legislation is the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(This evaluation is based on the latest available reprint, March 1 2004, with 
amendments up to Act No 148, 2003). There are other Acts relevant to the 
overall openness regime like the Public Service Act. Regulation 34 of this Act 
prohibits ‘unauthorised disclosure of information (Terrill, 2000: 37)’. This clause 
is further backed by section 70 of the Crimes Act which in effect makes it a 
crime for a public servant to disclose information to, for instance, the media 
without having clearance from an ‘authority’ (ibid). Hence, it is clear from the 
outset that instead of encouraging public servants to release information (any 
information, benign or controversial, verbal or documents), the Australian 
system is set up to punish those who do. While the Public Service Act does not 
have direct bearing on what is being evaluated in the ‘promise’ template, it is 
worth keeping it in mind. 
Main Aims/Objects of FOI legislation: 
 (1) ‘The object of this Act is to extend as far as possible the right of the Australian 
community to access to information in the possession of the Government of the 
Commonwealth by: 
a)  making available to the public information about the operations of 
departments and public authorities and, in particular, ensuring that rules 
and practices affecting members of the public in their dealings with 
departments and public authorities are readily available to persons affected 
by those rules and practices; and   170
b)  creating a general right of access to information in documentary form in 
the possession of ministers, departments and public authorities, limited 
only by the exceptions and exemptions necessary for the protection of 
essential public interests and the private and business affairs of persons in 
respect of whom information is collected and held by departments and 
public authorities; and 
c)  creating a right to bring about the amendment of records containing 
personal information that is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or 
misleading. 
(2) It is the intention of the Parliament that the provisions of this Act shall be 
interpreted so as to further the object set out in subsection (1) and that any 
discretions conferred by this Act shall be exercised as far as possible so as to 
facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of 
information (Freedom of Information Act, 1982: Part I) 
 
The objects of the Act are very much in line with FOI Acts conceived in 
other countries. The most important pointer towards the implementation and 
interpretation of the Act comes in the last part of section (2):  ‘shall be exercised 
as far as possible so as to facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest 
reasonable cost, the disclosure of information (ibid).’ (author’s emphasis). So 
the keywords that will be kept in mind for the evaluation of the Act and 
Australia’s whole FOI regime are facilitation, promotion of the Act and prompt 
handling of requests, at the lowest reasonable cost. 
‘The promise’: score and summary of findings 
The methodology for calculating the score has been detailed in chapter 
three. The maximum possible score for ‘the promise’ was 68, describing a very 
far-reaching FOI regime including to a full or partial extent the private sector and 
providing substantial legal protection of media whistleblowers (journalistic 
sources). The Australian ‘promise’ score was 14 out of 68, indicating a very low 
legislative ambition.   171
The areas covered by the evaluation template included: cost, 
turnaround time, the appeal process and protection of sources. Table 7 shows a 
selection of key questions, scores and comments. Unless otherwise indicated 
the references in the table refer to the Australian federal FOI Act. 
Table 7 Australia ‘the promise’ 
Question/parameter 
evaluated 
Score Comment 
Part I Access to documents    
2) Does the Act allow the 
agencies to charge processing 
fees? 
1 out of 4  Very unclear guidelines on 
the level of charges which 
could be considered 
reasonable. Sec 29 (5)  
states: ‘Without limiting 
the matters the agency or 
Minister may take into 
account in determining 
whether or not to reduce or 
not to impose the charge, 
the agency or Minister 
must take into account: 
(b) whether the giving of 
access to the document in 
question is in the general 
public interest or in the 
interest of a substantial 
section of the public’ 
So, a fairly strong wording. 
The problem is proving the 
‘public interest’. The Act 
also gives plenty of room 
for interpretation. 
4) How long does the Act give 
the agency to make a decision 
on the request? 
 
0 out of 4  Sec 15 (5) and (6) p. 22-23 
Clearly sets out the 
maximum decision time as 
30 working days. However, 
it also provides for 
additional time, provided 
the agency communicates 
this to the requestor. 
6) Does the Act require 
agencies to keep a running 
diary over current and 
archived documents? 
 
0 out of 4  This is one of the biggest 
problems with the 
Australian Act from a 
user’s perspective. Without 
some sort of diary with a   172
heading system, it is 
virtually impossible to 
know what sort of 
documents the agency 
holds. In, for instance 
Sweden, the diary is public 
and by reading the 
headings of the documents 
held, you get a fair idea 
whether it would be 
interesting from a 
journalistic point of view to 
request the full document. 
8) Are any federal/national 
agencies exempt from the 
Act? 
 
0 out of 4  In total 12 federal agencies 
are exempt. In some FOI 
regimes (like Sweden, 
South Africa and to some 
extent the US) the 
legislator has chosen not to 
exempt any agencies. 
Symbolically this is very 
important. It indicates that 
the legislator sees openness 
as all- encompassing, 
including the secret 
intelligence agencies. In 
these regimes exemptions 
are based on evaluating 
every request on its merits. 
The Australian Act has 
blanket exemptions for 12 
agencies and two schedules 
listing exempt content, 
making secrecy the rule, 
rather than the exception. 
(Schedule 2, parts I, II and 
III). 
10) Does the Act allow for 
legal costs being covered by 
the state? 
 
1 out of 4  Based on a win in court by 
the applicant and/or the 
public interest the 
Attorney-General may, 
based on a recommendation 
from the court, decide to 
cover the costs for an 
applicant (Sec 66 (1), (2) 
and (3)) 
 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of 
the constitution? 
0 out of 4  No, and the incumbent 
government can change the   173
  Act. 
12) Does the Act apply to the 
private sector? 
 
0 out of 4  No. The Act does not apply 
to government agencies 
that are privatised. 
Part II Protection of 
journalistic sources 
  
1) What level of protection of 
journalistic sources exists? 
 
0 out of 4  At the federal level no 
protection exists for media 
whistleblowers. Attempts 
have been made at state 
level, but no Act gives 
legal protection to 
journalistic sources 
(Martin, 2004: 122-23) 
2) When can journalists be 
forced to reveal their source?  
 
2 out of 4  In any court case 
(Australia, 1994: ix) 
3) Are journalists in any way 
bound not to reveal their 
source? 
 
1 out of 4  They are not legally bound, 
but ethical practice is to not 
reveal sources. 
4) Are colleagues and 
managers (eg the Minister and 
chief public servant) of a 
government agency in any 
way prevented from 
investigating the source of a 
’leak’ to the press? 
 
0 out of 4  No, an Australian Head of 
Department may 
investigate a journalistic 
source at his/her leisure. 
Restricting the right of 
investigation into 
journalistic sources is the 
last piece in the jigsaw in 
protecting and encouraging 
public servants to use the 
media to make, for 
example, maladministration 
public. 
5) If legal protection of 
journalistic sources exists – is 
the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
0 out of 4  No Act exists. 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the promise’ 
There is one pivotal issue in Australian FOI that table 7 does not cover, 
namely the very weak legal powers of the first legal appeal option, the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Most importantly the tribunal has no   174
right to try and change departmental and Ministerial decisions regarding exempt 
matter: ‘…the Tribunal does not have power to decide that access to the 
document, so far as it contains exempt matter, is to be granted (Freedom of 
Information Act, 1982: Sec 58 (2)).’ Furthermore the tribunal cannot terminate a 
conclusive certificate issued by a Minister. A conclusive certificate can 
effectively exempt any document from disclosure on the grounds of its potential 
to harm the relationship between the Commonwealth and other states. A 
Minister may also issue a conclusive certificate preventing the release of a 
document if the Minister believes that it is not in the public interest to make the 
document public (Ibid, sec 33A (1) and (2). 
The conclusive certificate is in practice virtually impossible to revoke. 
The Act states: ‘…the powers of the Tribunal do not extend to reviewing the 
decision to give the certificate (ibid, sec 58 (3)).’ To date the best illustration of 
the weak appeal options and astronomical costs for driving an appeal within the 
Australian FOI system is the McKinnon vs Treasury case involving a conclusive 
certificate. This case will be further discussed in the analysis of ‘the practice’ 
below. 
Overall Table 7 clearly indicates that the Australian FOI Act leaves 
plenty of room for the agencies to interpret the legislation to their advantage. 
They are allowed to charge processing fees with no guarantee what information 
will be released. They are given 30 plus 30 working days to process a request 
and the appeal options for refused requests are limited and expensive. So, let 
us apply these findings to the research question for ‘the promise’: what are the 
aims of the Australian FOI legislation and what does it promise to deliver   175
in terms of information access? As pointed out above ‘the promise’ found the 
core aims and objectives to be: to facilitate and promote, promptly and at the 
lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information. After evaluating the body 
of the Act, it is clear that it is poorly equipped to meet these aims. The very low 
score, 14, and the qualitative analysis unequivocally illustrate this. Indeed, the 
Act in itself is so poorly equipped to deliver on its aims and objectives that it 
could be argued that it is in conflict with its own aims. 
‘The spin’: Australia 
The research question for ‘the spin’ was: what are the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among leading 
politicians and public servants? 
The spin was in essence a survey study built around the same set of 
parameters and questions as the other two sub-studies. Please see appendix 
two for full details on the questionnaire. 
Timing 
The timing of the survey was a challenge in this part of the study. The 
issue was the election cycle. Sending out the questionnaire in the middle of an 
election campaign or at the end of the term of an incumbent government or at 
the start of a newly elected government all posed potential problems for the 
result of ‘the spin’. When the Australian ‘spin’ was finalised indications were that 
Australia was on the verge of an election campaign
20. The distribution process 
was speeded up and ‘the spin’ questionnaires reached the respondents four 
                                                 
20 In the Australian system, the federal election date is not fixed and the incumbent government can call 
the elction at its discretion within certain time parameters before the formal end of its three year term.   176
weeks before the election was called. Therefore it can be safely assumed that 
the election campaign did not impact on the response rate or the results of the 
survey. 
‘The spin’: score and summary of findings 
The same coding technique used in ‘the promise’ was employed in ‘the 
spin’. The three-part questionnaire covered general attitudes towards FOI and 
its functions, access to documents, and protection of sources. The maximum 
score for ‘the spin’ was: 76. In total 68 questionnaires were sent, 5 responses 
were received within three weeks giving a response rate of 7 per cent. Since 
‘the spin’ is not a statistical quantitative study as such, the response rate has no 
bearing on the end result. Rather, it is argued that each reply is a ‘case’ in itself 
with the attitudes held by the respondent having an impact on the FOI policies 
in his/her department. However, the number of responses can be taken as an 
indicator of how important FOI is as such to the leaders of each country of 
study. The Australian response rate of 7 per cent provides an interesting 
contrast to the Swedish rate of 31 per cent. The response rates will be further 
discussed in chapter eleven. 
The score for ‘the spin’ was calculated by adding up the total score for 
each survey and then dividing it by the total number of replies producing an 
average score, the higher the score indicating the more positive the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources. In the Australian case the 
total score was 246/5, which gave the average score of 49 out of 76.    177
 ‘The spin’ posed 19 questions in three sections to capture the attitudes 
towards FOI. Table 8 provides an overview of the pivotal questions. 
 Table 8 ‘the spin’ Australia 
Question Score  Comment 
Part I General attitudes FOI    
Questions 1-4  ‘Strongly agree’ and 
‘agree’ in all responses 
apart from one. 
The data indicates positive 
general attitudes towards 
FOI 
6. FOI should be 
extended further to partly 
cover the corporate 
sector when public 
interests are at stake. 
 
Responses varied covering 
the whole spectrum of 
reply alternatives. Score: 
10 out of 20 or 50%. 
The score shows that there 
is not majority support 
among the respondents for 
extending Australian FOI 
further to cover the private 
sector. 
Part II Access to government 
held records 
  
2) In your view, what 
length of time is 
reasonable before your 
department makes a 
decision on the request? 
 
8 out of 20 – 40%  This was a bit of a trick 
question. As pointed out in 
the cover letter the survey 
was primarily concerned 
with the attitudes of the 
respondents. 
If they found the law too 
demanding, they had the 
option to voice this. Two of 
the respondents thought 
that 40 days rather than 30 
days was a more adequate 
processing time.  
The low score indicates 
that the respondents do not 
necessarily see themselves 
as facilitators of quick and 
easy information access. 
3) If your department 
needs to charge a 
processing fee, which of 
the costs below do you 
find reasonable? 
 
11 out of 20 – 55%  Replies varied from reply 
alternative a) $0-99 to e) 
more than $400. However, 
according to the score, 
most respondents seem to 
favour a ‘low-cost-as-
possible’ policy. This is, as 
we shall see in ‘the   178
practice’ not borne out in 
reality. 
7) Which of the following 
statements is closest to 
the attitude held by 
yourself and your staff? 
 
 
a) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people and I 
should endeavour 
to deliver the 
information 
requested as 
soon as possible 
b) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people but it is not 
my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for an 
FOI applicant 
c) the  government 
owns the 
information but 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
good  
d) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access 
e) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access and 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
not good 
 
11 out of 20 – 55%  This is the single most 
important question in ‘the 
spin’. It cuts to the core of 
how FOI is interpreted, 
regardless of what the law 
says.  
This is a clear example of 
why the qualitative analysis 
is needed to complement 
the quantitative measure. 
The score 55% can be 
interpreted as an acceptable 
score, a slim majority, but 
still a majority. However, if 
you look at the individual 
responses you note that 
only ONE of the Australian 
respondents picked a). The 
other four picked c) and d). 
This indicates that a 
majority of respondents 
hold the attitude that the 
government owns the 
information, not the public. 
This is a crucial difference 
to, for instance, the 
Swedish score where all 
but 3 of the Swedish 
respondents picked reply 
alternatives a or b. This 
clearly shows that Swedish 
public servants and 
politicians take the view 
that the government does 
not own the information. 
The importance of this 
mindset cannot be 
overemphasised. The 
complete table in chapter 
11 containing all countries 
of study is very telling. 
8) In your view, which 
statement most 
16 out of 20 – 80%. 
Majority of respondents 
A very interesting outcome. 
Although it indicates   179
adequately describes the 
‘fourth estate’ role that 
some media and 
reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
 
a)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process and 
delegated to the 
media by the 
citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process, but 
exists on a 
mandate invented 
by the media itself 
c)  It does not have 
any particular 
influence on the 
political 
accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention 
by the media to 
justify its 
existence 
e)  It is a threat to the 
political 
accountability 
process because 
of the 
incompetence of 
most journalists 
picked alternative b.  awareness of the fourth 
estate role and sympathy 
for it, it is clear that most of 
the respondents see it as an 
invention by media and not 
a mutual understanding 
between the public and the 
media. 
9) In your view, which is 
the most important 
function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool 
for political 
accountability 
b) To  increase 
transparency of 
the governing 
process to 
prevent 
10 out 20 – 50%  The coding in this question 
is based on the 
accountability function of 
FOI. The score is not really 
all that relevant, when 
looking at this parameter in 
isolation. What is more 
important is what reply 
alternative was the most 
common one. 
In the Australian ‘spin’ the 
replies covered the whole   180
maladministration 
and corruption 
c) To  increase  the 
public’s 
participation in the 
political process 
d)  To allow citizens a 
means to check 
what personal 
data agencies 
hold and to 
correct errors 
e)  FOI is an 
unnecessary law 
that fills no 
particular function 
range a-e. This indicates a 
non-homogeneous view of 
what function FOI fills, if 
any at all. 
Part III Protection of 
Journalistic sources 
  
1) What is your view of 
legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made 
stronger and 
include the 
corporate sector 
when public 
interests are at 
stake 
b)  It should be made 
stronger in the 
public sector to 
encourage public 
servants to make 
public 
maladministration 
c)  It should stay the 
way it is 
d)  It should not be 
implemented in 
Australia – 
problems within a 
department are 
best handled 
internally 
e)  It should not be 
implemented in 
Australia. 
Journalists in 
9 out of 20 – 45%  The responses are on the 
negative side c, d and e, 
indicating a hostile attitude 
towards legal protection of 
sources.   181
general cannot 
not be trusted with 
this level of 
confidence 
 
2) With public access to 
documents, is there a 
need for legal protection 
of journalistic sources? 
 
a) Yes  –  it 
complements the 
access to 
document regime 
and strengthens 
the overall flow of 
public information 
b) Yes  –  it 
encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the 
document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat 
to good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists 
and the media 
would abuse this 
privilege and it 
should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
10 out of 20 – 50%  Confirms the response in 
question 1. Very hesitant 
reception of legal 
protection of media 
whistleblowers. 
 
This can be compared with 
Sweden where the replies 
to this question were a 
resounding round of praise 
for protecting sources. 81% 
picked reply a, the rest 
picked b.  
3) What are your initial 
feelings towards a public 
servant who leaks 
information to the media 
to disclose 
maladministration? 
  
a) Yes  –  it 
complements the 
access to 
7 out of 20 – 35%  Even more hesitant when it 
comes to the crunch. This 
score clearly shows where 
loyalty sits – with the 
department and not with 
the public.   182
document regime 
and strengthens 
the overall flow of 
public information 
b) Yes  –  it 
encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the 
document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat 
to good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists 
and the media 
would abuse this 
privilege and it 
should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
 
4) In some countries you 
break the law if you 
investigate who leaked 
information to the media. 
Which of the following 
statements corresponds 
best with your views on 
this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most 
important part of 
the source 
protection. 
Without the legal 
protection it would 
be a ‘paper tiger’ 
b) Journalistic 
sources should 
have legal 
protection, but 
exemptions when 
it is allowed to 
11 out of 20 – 55%  The score is in line with the 
overall hesitant response 
among the Australian 
respondents towards legal 
protection of journalistic 
sources.   183
investigate a leak 
should exist 
c) Legal  protection 
for journalistic 
sources as a 
principle is good, 
but the 
exemptions for 
when journalists 
can be forced to 
reveal their 
sources should be 
far-reaching 
d) Journalistic 
sources do not 
need legal 
protection – 
protection by 
ethical guidelines 
for department 
managers is 
enough 
e) Journalists  are  not 
credible and 
accountable 
enough to be 
granted the 
privilege of legal 
protection of their 
sources 
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the spin’ 
In sum ‘the spin’ data for Australia displays a wide range in attitudes. 
Part I shows a positive general attitude towards FOI. However, when asked 
more detailed questions in part II the picture changes dramatically ranging from 
very hesitant to mainly negative attitudes towards FOI. Part III, protection of 
journalistic sources, displays outright hostile attitudes from the leading 
politicians and public servants. Interestingly it seems that the main grievance 
was that the respondents did not trust the media to handle the privilege of being   184
granted legal protection of their sources. There seems to be a fear that the 
Australian media would abuse this privilege. This attitude is echoed in some of 
the main recommendations in a 1994 Senate report into shield laws for 
journalists: 
The Committee considers that before journalists can be given any consideration for 
special treatment, they have to gain the confidence of the public that such special 
treatment is deserved and will not be abused. The public needs to have confidence 
that the media is fulfilling its important role in a responsible manner (Australia, 
1994: xxi). 
The Senate report and this attitude in general does not seem to be 
backed by any hard evidence, rather it seems to be a self-perpetuated view that 
is aired from time to time. In countries with far-reaching shield laws for 
journalists, such as Sweden, the issue of abuse of this privilege does not seem 
to be an area of debate. But, clearly it is a strongly-held view among the public 
administration in Australia. 
There were a few additional comments at the end of two of the 
questionnaire responses. One of them brings up an interesting point: 
There is a tension that exists between meeting the objectives of the FOI Act, and 
making the correct preferable decision in relation to access to documents, to 
meeting the needs and expectations of our political masters. 
FOI is a political process – regardless of the political party 
This is an interesting study. The tension between “chiefs” (decision makers) and 
the “Indians” is not addressed here, and applies not just to FOI, but public 
administration as well. 
The ‘tension’ mentioned would indeed be an interesting future area of 
study. 
As discussed in chapter three, at the core of ‘the spin’ was the issue of 
who owns the information held by the government. Does government hold the   185
information on behalf of the people and facilitate access, or does the 
government own the information in its own right? Question 7 in part II of the 
questionnaire attempted to capture these attitudes (see table 8). The reason for 
the importance of this question connects back to two of the theoretical pillars for 
FOI: political representation and accountability. In Australia’s case the top 
politicians and public servants seem to view themselves as gatekeepers of 
government-held information, rather than facilitators of information access. 
Since these attitudes are held by the political and bureaucratic leadership, it can 
be concluded that they are likely to permeate throughout their organisations. 
 ‘The practice’: Australia 
Looking at the Australian results so far (14 out of 68 for ‘the promise’ 
and 49 out of 76 for ‘the spin’) it could be said that the FOI promise is not very 
far-reaching. However, according to the attitudes displayed in ‘the spin’, the 
politicians and public servants appear more willing to give access to information 
than the legislation allows. The overall message to the public from ‘the promise’ 
study can be summarised as: ‘the aim is that all government-held information 
should be public, but there are many exceptions to this rule for your own good. 
This legislation is on the government’s side, not yours, again for your own 
good!.’ Meanwhile ‘the spin’ says: ‘FOI as a general idea is OK, but it is not for 
Australia. We cannot govern if we have to let the public know what we know all 
the time.’ Is it really this bad in Australia? That is what the last sub-study, ‘the 
practice’ was designed to find out.   186
Recruitment of reporters 
Recruitment of the Australian reporters for ‘the practice’ went according 
to plan. I made contact with one of the Australian members of the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ICIJ (Reporter D). He thought the 
project was worthwhile and agreed to join it. We discussed other possible 
journalists to recruit and he pointed me towards the second recruit (Reporter E). 
The third reporter took some time to locate. Since the first two were male, I 
wanted a female, preferably from the public broadcaster the ABC to contrast 
with the commercial media. I contacted three female ABC reporters via e-mail 
who did not respond. In total it took a month to find and recruit the last reporter 
(Reporter F). 
Reporter D is an experienced investigative reporter who has run 
international investigative projects. He works for one of the major Australian 
newspapers. Reporter E is also an experienced investigative reporter with a 
well-respected commercial current affairs TV program who has been very active 
in the debate regarding journalistic use of FOI. Reporter F works for ABC Radio 
National and has extensive investigative reporting experience. Gender 
distribution: two males, one female. When they had agreed to join the project 
via e-mail, I scheduled a phone conversation with each of them where I 
described ‘the practice’ in detail. I was particularly concerned with making my 
role as a facilitator and then observer clear, and to point out that the 
departments/agencies must not be made aware that the FOI request is part of a 
research project. We also discussed the ethical considerations. The final point 
of discussion was the topics of the FOI requests. Overall the Australian   187
recruitment process went very smoothly. The entire Australian ‘practice’ sub-
study was run remotely via e-mail and phone. There appeared to be no 
disadvantage in this method compared to the face-to-face meetings used in the 
Swedish ‘practice’ study. 
‘The practice’: score and summary of findings 
The maximum score for the ‘practice’ study was 68. The scores for the 
three Australian ‘practice’ cases were: 27, 12 and 0, in total 39. This was 
divided by 3 to arrive at the average ‘practice’ score for Australia of 13 (13/68= 
19%). 
Case 1: The PM’s expenses 
The original FOI request was sent via mail to the FOI Officer in the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. It read in full: 
Name of FOI Officer 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, address 
Journalist D, name of paper and address 
Dear First name of FOI Officer 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, I seek documents that detail the Prime 
Minister’s official overseas travel expenses from July 2003 to the end of June this 
year [2004]. 
I also request details of the expense of those in the official party – such as staff, 
advisers, security officials and members of the Prime Minister’s family, including 
his wife – who accompanied the Prime Minister on his overseas trips. 
To clarify, I am seeking costs and expenses for all members of the official party on 
each overseas trip undertaken in the nominated time frame. The documents may 
include all spending items, such as travel expenses, hotels, meals, drinks and other 
expenses. 
The form of access I prefer are photocopies of the documents or access to them. If 
you decide that any of the documents I have requested are technically exempt, I 
urge you to use your discretionary power and release the documents in the public 
interest as the object of the Freedom of Information Act requires. I enclose   188
herewith an application fee for $30 as outlined and look forward to 
acknowledgement of my request and a decision as soon as possible, at least 30 days 
from receipt or this letter. 
I would appreciate that if any part of my request is refused you exercise your 
discretion and waive such exemptions. If there is material over which you are not 
prepared to waive an exemption, please delete the material you believe to be 
exempt and release the remainder to me. 
Please transfer this request to any further agency if you think that agency would 
have in their possession any relevant documents. 
As I am a journalist acting in my professional capacity and as disclosure of the 
information I seek would be in the public interest, I ask that any fees be waived in 
full. 
I would appreciate that if any part of my request is refused in your response you 
advice as follows: 
1.  Clearly identify and describe each document to which you are claiming an 
exemption.  
2.  Identify which particular section of the Freedom of Information Act provides 
an exemption.  
3.  Provide full reasons for the exemption.  
4.  Please advice me of my rights of appeal. If you would like to discuss this 
request more fully, I can be reached on xxxxxxx 
Yours faithfully 
Reporter D 
August 24, 2004 
Two days later, August 26, Reporter D received a letter confirming 
receipt of the request. On September 17, three weeks later, Reporter D 
received the department’s decision to charge $921.50 for ‘search & retrieval, 
decision-making and photocopy fee’. The letter further states that the decision 
maker at the department has determined that the public interest argument put 
forward by Reporter D for waiving any fees and charges does not apply. The 
reason being that: 
Under current reporting arrangements, information about overseas travel by the 
Prime Minister, including summary information on costs, is tabled biannually in   189
Parliament. Mr [Name of Decision maker] considers that the degree to which 
release of further information would be in the public interest is not necessarily 
clear. In particular, Mr [Name of Decision maker] notes that a number of 
individuals will need to be consulted about possible release of information about 
them, in accordance with the requirements of the FOI Act. He considers that there 
is a possibility that some of the information you have sought would be exempt 
from release under the FOI Act, for example, information disclosure of which 
would involve unreasonable disclosure of personal information, and therefore 
release of all the information you have sought may not necessarily be in the public 
interest (Extract from letter to Reporter D from Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet). 
Attached to the letter was an instruction sheet dealing with how to ask 
for an internal review of the decision to charge a fee. The application fee for the 
review was $40 and as the name implies the review is conducted internally by 
the department which originally decided to impose the fee. Other avenues of 
appeal include a complaint to the Ombudsman and an appeal to Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal. In an interesting twist the rights of review attachment ends 
with the statement: 
You are entitled under the Freedom of Information Act to seek access to 
documents concerning decisions made in respect of your request, including the 
decisions to impose a fee and/or charge. A request would be treated as a 
completely new request. If you wish to do so, you should apply in writing to the 
FOI Co-ordinator at the address given above and should send a fee of $30. You 
may seek remission of the fee, either before or at the same time or afterwards, for 
the same reasons described above. A processing charge may be imposed on the 
request (Extract from letter to Reporter D from Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet). 
So, if you want access to the documents, for instance correspondence 
between the FOI officer and the decision maker regarding your request, you 
have to lodge a new request and pay a new fee and possibly processing 
charges. As predicted by the data captured by ‘the promise’ and ‘the spin’ 
studies, the law and the public servants are not exactly facilitating the provision 
of information.   190
Reporter D decided to lodge an application on September 23 2004 for 
an internal review of the fee decision with the PM’s department. He pointed out 
that he sought the review because of the public interest in how public money is 
spent. He argued that this fact should be enough to waive the $921.45 fee. 
Reporter D also observed that he had pursued the document tabled bi-annually 
in parliament referred to by the decision maker. 
I discovered it provided only lump sum information for Ministers and several 
opposition representatives – nothing like the detail I requested. In my view – and I 
have been in the public accountability game for three decades – lump sum 
aggregates do not meet the test of public accountability. Nor does the provided 
information inform as to the numbers of staff involved in the trips, nor any 
breakdown of how the money was spent. 
In the letter Reporter D agreed to temper his request regarding security 
staff. He also pointed out that he is not seeking personal information and that 
allocating a full working week to contact the people involved seems excessive. 
A week later, on October 1, Reporter D received confirmation that the PM’s 
department has received his application. 
27 days later Reporter D received the result of the review. The decision- 
maker (not the same person as in the first decision) upheld the initial decision 
on much the same grounds. The travel expenses were already tabled in 
Parliament and any further details must be considered to contain personal 
information and cannot be disclosed. Based on this the decision maker 
concludes that since the information sought is personal it cannot be in the public 
interest; hence the fee cannot be waived on that ground. 
The decision-maker did reveal some information in her review of the 
costs. She points out that consultation with 24 individuals regarding release of   191
information is needed and that it concerns 11 overseas trips during 2003-04. 
The charges are described by the table below: 
Table 9 Australia ‘practice’ case 1 
Task  Rate  Initial  On review   Charge 
Search and retrieval 
Decision-making 
Photocopies 
$15 per hour 
$20 per hour 
0.10 per page 
7.5 
40 
90 
11 hours 
25.5 
45 
$165 
$510 
$4.50 
Total       $679.50 
So, for the fee of $40 Reporter D managed to take $242 off the initial 
processing fee. However, having read the reasoning of the decision maker 
regarding what information is in the ‘public interest’, you have to ask yourself, 
what is in the public interest if the itemised spending of public money by elected 
representatives is not considered to be in the public interest? 
Reporter D is further advised on his options. 
1.  He can agree to pay the $679.50, however, there is no guarantee what 
quality information he may receive. It may the 45 blank pages. 
2.  He can appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Filing fee: 
$606. 
3.  He can withdraw his request   192
After discussing the case with his editor, Reporter D decided to 
withdraw since the indication in the correspondence from the PM’s department 
was that even if they paid the fee they would get very little information released 
in the end. As we shall see later appealing to the AAT is both time-consuming 
and very costly. Total processing time for this request came to: two months and 
three days. This can be compared to, for instance, two of the Swedish cases 
that had a turnaround time of four days. 
On January 5, D received a final letter from the PM’s department 
pointing out that the 60 day period within he could seek a review with the AAT 
has expired and the department now ‘therefore deemed your request to have 
been withdrawn.’ 
Since Reporter D did not pursue the request it could be argued that the 
PM’s department never officially refused the request. However, from a user’s 
point of view the high processing fee effectively stopped the request process. 
As we shall see in the second Australian case, this is a tactic quite often used 
by Australian federal agencies to fend off requests. Hence, for the purpose of 
evaluating this request it will be regarded as refused, since this was the 
technical outcome. 
‘The practice’ summary of findings case 1 
The maximum score for ‘the practice’ evaluation template was 68. The 
score in the first Australian case was 27. Table 9b provides overview and 
qualitative analysis of key questions incorporating Reporter D’s own comments:   193
 
Table 9b Australian ‘practice’ case 1 
 
Question  Score Comments 
3) Did the agency’s reply 
quote a processing fee?  0 out of 4 
‘The original processing 
fee was 921 dollars and 50 
cents. I thought the fee was 
excessive. I’ve dealt with 
the Victorian Act, which 
usually don’t quote such 
high processing fees. This 
fee was higher than 
expected. 40 hours of 
decision making time, I 
thought that was 
extraordinary. The reasons 
I thought this was that it 
was only 11 trips in total 
and it could not have been 
that much information to 
collate and that many 
people to contact 
(Interview: 7, 2005).’ 
5) How much time elapsed 
from the agency’s confirmation 
of the receipt of the request to 
the grant/refusal of the 
request? 
2 out of 4 
‘The response time was 
quite fast, they complied to 
the act. In most of my 
experience with the 
Victorian Act, the agencies 
broke the time frame and 
nothing seems to happen 
when a department breaks 
the statutory limitations 
(ibid).’ 
In total it took 22 days for the 
department to respond to D’s 
original request. Clearly 
Australian journalists have a 
very different perception of 
processing speed compared to 
their Swedish colleagues, as 
illustrated by the data 
presented in chapter five.   194
 
6) What was the agencies 
decision?  0 out of 4  Application not granted 
8) Compared to the 
information ‘served’ to 
newsrooms by the 
government’s press 
secretaries and public 
relations officers, how does 
the information acquired rank 
in terms of usefulness for 
holding the government 
accountable? 
N/a   
13/33) Which of the following 
statements best sums up the 
attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during 
the course of the request?21  
  
a)  the government holds 
information on behalf 
of the people and I 
should endeavour to 
deliver the information 
requested as soon as 
possible. 
b)  the government holds 
information on behalf 
of the people but it is 
not my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for you. 
c)  the government owns 
the information but I 
abide by its values of 
openness and 
transparency in 
relation to the public 
access to information. 
d)  the government owns 
the information and 
Reply d) 1 out of 4 
‘The FOI officer’s initial 
response was that the 
request was quite straight 
forward. After looking into 
it she seemed to change her 
mind. When it came to the 
ownership of information, 
she carried out others 
orders. She didn’t come 
across being proactive and 
she acted conservatively 
(ibid).’ 
                                                 
21 When a request was partially granted or refused, the evaluation and interview moved to another part of 
the evaluation template. For details, see appendix 1. 
   195
decides who will have 
access so I act 
conservatively rather 
than proactively in 
relation to public 
access. 
e)  the government owns 
the information and 
decides who will have 
access and my role is 
to guard information 
as opposed to 
dispensing it. 
 
14/35) What do you perceive 
the end product to be?  2 out of 4 
‘I could possibly write one 
story about the knockback, 
but it would be rather 
boring and sparse (ibid). 
 
Overall Reporter D was surprised that he had so much trouble getting 
information that he regarded as non-controversial. In this case the FOI process 
did work according to the Act and the department adhered to the statutes. The 
most important observation in this case is the fact that it generated no 
information. It is quite understandable that the requestor would not want to pay 
for what in the end may just be blank pages (as in the McKinnon vs Treasury 
case discussed below). Reporter D and his editor decided not to appeal the 
internal review decision to the AAT since they judged their chances of winning 
as very slim. Looking at ‘the promise’ evaluation of the Act and the powers 
given to the AAT by the Act, this was probably a wise decision.  
The department’s reasoning around what information is in the public 
interest and what is not is very weak. What can be more in the public interest 
than how the PM spends public money? The fact that the department’s   196
arguments are supported by the Act indicates that the Act is inadequate. If the 
Act cannot facilitate the release of comparatively benign information, what will 
happen when the information requested is more controversial? This was the 
case with Reporter E in the second Australian FOI request. 
Case 2: Training of foreign military personnel 
After discussing the FOI topic with Reporter E we decided that the 
import and export of weapons and military materiel was not a particularly 
controversial topic in Australia and of little interest for his news organisation. 
Reporter E pointed out that he would be very keen to re-lodge a request from 
1997. At that time there was considerable discussion about the fact that the 
Australian defence force had held joint military exercises with the Indonesian 
Kopassus special forces. There had been many allegations laid against 
members of the Kopassus regarding human rights violations in the former 
Indonesian region of East Timor. As a result of Australia’s support for East 
Timor’s move towards independence, the joint exercise and training program 
with the Indonesian military was suspended. Now, a few years later, Reporter E 
was keen to see in total how many Indonesian and other foreign military 
personnel Australia had trained, if they were Kopassus, if it was possible to get 
their names to cross reference with Amnesty International reports containing 
names of known violators of human rights, and if the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) had re-started its military exercises and training program with Indonesia.   
Reporter E was inspired by FOI requests in the United States in the mid 
1990s that asked for similar information. The initiative came from an 
organisation called School of the Americas Watch (SOA Watch). SOA Watch   197
was founded in 1990. Following a massacre of six Jesuit priests, their co-worker 
and her teenage daughter on November 16, 1989 in El Salvador after which ‘A 
US Congressional Task Force reported that those responsible were trained at 
the U.S Army School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia (SOA, 2005).’ 
After very humble beginnings in 1990, SOA Watch started to get results using 
the federal FOI Act to declassify and release the training manuals used at the 
SOA. Several media organisations lodged FOI requests and on January 24, 
1997 two CIA training manuals were released in response to a 1994 FOI 
request by the Baltimore Sun. The manuals contained numerous passages 
providing instructions on the use of torture, extortion and ‘neutralizing’. The 
release of the manuals was a major embarrassment to the US authorities (ibid). 
Several other requests were directed at obtaining the name and country of 
origin of trainees at the SOA. Some were successful (ibid). The SOA Watch’s 
successful use of FOI and its subsequent campaign led to the closure of SOA in 
December 2000, though it reopened under a new name (The Western 
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC) in January 2001 
(ibid). Most of the information that was requested had been stored in US military 
databases. Reporter E suspected that a similar database existed in Australia 
and was maintained by the ADF. 
 Reporter E’s original request was received and acknowledged by 
Department of Defence (DoD), October 22, 2004. The request sought: 
…a copy on computer disk of all information retained by the Department of 
Defence on computer, detailing any foreign military personnel ever trained in 
Australia or outside Australia. This request includes the Defence Cooperation 
Database, including detail of ADF or other establishments where training took 
place, attendee’s home country; full names of attendees, their rank and the military 
unit they represented.   198
The request listed the 61 army, navy, airforce and central military 
training facilities in Australia that could have hosted the training. The request 
further pointed out that on February 27, 1997, the then Deputy Defence 
Secretary Hugh White told a Senate Estimates hearing that no foreign 
government had asked for secrecy regarding the training of their military 
personnel in Australia. In his request Reporter E also observed that the bulk of 
information on the list had already been assembled in reply to a question by 
then Senator Dee Margetts. 
After further research, Reporter E amended his request on November 
18 to include a database entitled ‘Defence Corporation Activity Management 
System and other databases managed by the School of Management, 
Technology and Training’. 
In a phone conversation with the FOI Officer at DoD on November 29, 
Reporter E said he did not want to limit his request to a time period, but advised 
that he wanted access to the entire database. 
DoD’s first reply was dated December 7, well within the 30 working 
days timeframe as set out by the Act. The letter pointed out that much of the 
information sought would be exempt under subsections 4 (1) and 33 (1) relating 
to the release of personal information (ie. names of the personnel trained) and 
the security, defence and international relations of the Commonwealth. Hence, 
DoD was saying that there were significant grounds for exemptions and that in 
practice the request may end up delivering a lot of blank pages.   199
DoD referred the request to the different parts of ADF in order to 
establish a fee for processing the request. 
Search and retrieval time: 150 hours @ $15 per hour:  $2250 
Decision-Making  time:      $  440 
Other  costs:       $      2 
TOTAL        $2692  (Excerpt  from 
letter to Reporter E from Department of Defence) 
It would require $2692 to process a request which potentially may 
deliver very little information. 
Reporter E decided to challenge the fee in a letter dated February 14, 
2005 (DoD had extended Reporter E’s response time due to an overseas 
assignment). Reporter E build his argument on the public interest clause in the 
FOI Act:
22 
I submit that the Department should either waive or significantly reduce the charge 
under the provisions of S29(5)(b) of the FOI Act, in that  “the giving of access to 
the document in question is in the general public interest or in the interest of a 
substantial section of the public.” 
Defence’s role in training overseas military forces comprises a substantial part of 
the taxpayer funded Defence budget.    The public’s right to review the utility and 
effectiveness of Defence Department expenditure, especially by responsible media 
organisations, is an important and essential part of any democracy.   This is a 
substantial public interest reason for allowing waiver of your processing charge. 
Also, there would be considerable public interest in our programme being granted 
access to this information because our report intends to analyse the utility of such a 
training programme – in particular the compliance of individual Australian-trained 
foreign troops with international human rights obligations to which Australia is a 
signatory.   There is a strong public interest in seeing Australia allow full 
accountability for the enforcement of those international obligations – since 
Australia has demanded the same from other countries in its own diplomatic 
position internationally. 
I believe also that historical precedent illustrates that Defence’s own estimates of 
the processing charges can be substantially incorrect. 
                                                 
22 Reporter E’s letter is reproduced in full as it illustrates well the carefully constructed argument of the 
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As [Program X] explained in its initial FOI request, this application is almost 
identical to a previous request made to Defence which met with a formal refusal in 
1998.   It is instructive to review the costs charged when we made this original 
request in late 1997 for much the same information held on the Defence 
Cooperation Database.   In that earlier application, Defence initially asserted, in a 
letter dated 23 February 1998, that Search and Retrieval time would take 30 hours 
at $15 per hour and that decision-making time would take 10 hours at $20 per hour.    
They also charged another $650 for ‘Computing’. 
In a subsequent letter dated 14 April 1998 the initial costing was revised 
dramatically downwards to a total of $290.  This comprised 8 hours for Search and 
Retrieval time at $15 an hour and 8.5 hours at $20 an hour for decision-making.    
The computing fee appeared to have been dropped. 
This means that in 1997 the estimated cost of processing our request was 
overstated by Defence by 450%.      
In your most recent communication, we are now told that Search and Retrieval 
time will take 150 hours at $15 per hour and Decision-making time will take 22 
hours at $20 per hour – a total of some $2692. 
It would appear that one major difference between our original 1997 request and 
this most recent request is the advice you noted from the Department that the 
Defence Cooperation Activity Management System (DCAMS) database is not 
structured to easily provide the information in the format we have requested.   I do 
not understand how any modern database system could require one hour for 
processing each of the 94 entries to provide them to us in a format under the terms 
of the FOI Act.      
Why is it not a simple matter of interrogating the database for the names of all 
personnel listed on that database and limiting that inquiry to the fields that fall 
within our original request?   And why is it that the DCAMS database is now 
apparently more difficult to extract data from that in 1997? 
I do not see how, in light of the fact that computing database technologies have 
significantly improved since 1997, the cost of processing our request should be 
now more than 900% greater than the figure quoted for a nearly identical request in 
1997.    Computer efficiencies have surely made it easier to isolate and extract 
information off publicly funded databases than ever before. 
I anticipate that one argument which might be used to deter our application being 
found to be in the public interest is an argument that such an application might in 
some way breach the Privacy Act.    But it is very important to note that, as in our 
original 1997 request, we are not asking for information on overseas trained 
soldiers that has not already been made available to the Parliament.    
To help you with your deliberations on the possible application of the Privacy Act, 
I emphasise that we are happy to confine the information sought in our application 
strictly to the full names of such overseas military personnel, their rank, source 
country, their unit and the Australian institution through which they obtained such 
training, and the nature of such training.     We are not seeking information, which 
could betray operational matters or jeopardise Australia’s security.   201
To further assist you on the question of whether the release of such names would 
be barred under the Privacy Act, I note that the Department has previously 
accepted that was not the case.       In answers to Questions on Notice No 944 of 24 
February 1997, the names of PNG, Thai, Fijian and Malaysian military personnel 
serving in Australia were listed.    
To assist you in your deliberations, I would note assurances given to Senate 
Estimates by then Deputy Secretary, Strategy and Intelligence, Mr Hugh White, on 
February 27 1997.    He assured the committee the identity of foreign military 
personnel is not an Australian secret and he also confirmed no foreign governments 
have instructed that such information is kept secret.    When questioned as whether 
there was any legal reason why such information should be secret, Mr White told 
the Committee it was a ‘policy’ reason.       Subsequent answers provided in written 
form to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee admitted there 
is no written policy on the release of names of foreign personnel.   
For all of these reasons I respectfully ask the Department to reconsider the charge it 
requests before processing our request for information.   We believe a waiver or 
significant reduction would be in the public interest, and thus fall within the 
discretionary provisions of S29 of the FOI Act. 
On February 18 DoD replied and its decision was not to waive the 
processing charges for the following reasons: 
a)  Without seeing the documents in question you could not know whether the 
giving of access would be in the public interest 
b)  Airing of the information on the X [name deleted by author for 
confidentiality reasons] program would involve what is essentially a 
commercial decision – that is whether or not the information is 
“newsworthy”. It is conceivable that the information may not be used in 
the X program as you are involved in the commercial enterprise of 
television and the documents are sought primarily for the purpose of 
business. 
c)  Section 29 of the FOI Act established prima facie that charges should be 
imposed so that applicants contribute to the cost of processing all their 
requests. As you work for a profitable business enterprise, it is my view 
that your employer has the financial resources to pay the charges. 
In the letter DoD revised its initial processing charge of $2692 reducing 
it to $1167. The grounds given were that since the initial assessment ‘the action 
areas have had the opportunity to review their assessments at this time and are 
better able to gauge a more accurate estimate.’   202
It is interesting to note that DoD’s response does not really deal with 
Reporter E’s public interest argument. DoD dismissed it under point a) above 
and instead opted to focus on the fact that Reporter E works for a commercial 
network and should therefore pay for the information. 
Based on the initial indications given by DoD where it was made quite 
clear that significant parts of the information requested probably could not be 
released, Reporter E and his editor decided to drop the request. 
Similar to Reporter D, since Reporter E did not pursue the request it 
could be argued that Department of Defence never officially refused the 
request. However, from a user’s point of view the high processing fee effectively 
halted the request process. Hence, for the purpose of evaluating this request it 
will be regarded as refused. 
‘The practice’ summary of findings case two 
The total score for the second Australian case was 12 out of 68, or 17 
per cent. Table 10 provides an overview of the key evaluation parameters. The 
comments includes the reporter’s comments and this authors analysis. 
Table 10 Australian ‘practice’ case 2 
 
Question  Score Comments 
3) Did the agency’s reply 
quote a processing fee?  0 out of 4 
‘They quoted $2692 just to 
consider our application, 
with no guarantee of it 
being released.    It is 
typical of the way Federal 
and State Government 
agencies jack up the cost of   203
decision-making time to 
deter requests.   It is far 
more than we should 
reasonably have to expect.   
In my original request for 
very much the same 
information, made in 1998 
the Department stated it 
would take 10 hours at $65 
per hour to process the 
request.   That totalled 
$1300.  But they previously 
agreed to ask only for a 
deposit of $325.     Now, 
five years later the cost of 
processing that information 
has escalated from 10 hours 
to 22 hours at $20 per 
hour…It is also significant 
that when I proceeded with 
the original 1998 
application, Defence 
amended their original 
estimate of costs from 
$1300 decision-making 
time and search time to 
$290!   I will make this 
point in my appeal letter, 
asking them – under S29 of 
the Act – to reduce the 
$2692 charge on the 
grounds that it is excessive 
(Interview:8, 2005).’ 
As shown above, the ‘appeal’ 
was only partly successful and 
not successful enough to 
continue the request. 
 
5) How much time elapsed 
from the agency’s confirmation 
of the receipt of the request to 
the grant/refusal of the 
request? 
0 out of 4 
‘It was more than 40 days 
to get to the stage of them 
sending me a statement of 
costs for the cost of 
considering the request.   
This seems excessive but in 
the context of me revising 
my original request to limit 
it to keep costs down, it’s 
probably reasonable.   The 
hindrance is not so much in   204
the consideration time.  It’s 
in the costs of decision-
making imposed before 
they even get to the 
consideration stage (ibid).’ 
 
6) What was the agencies 
decision?  0 out of 4  Application not granted 
8) Compared to the 
information ‘served’ to 
newsrooms by the 
government’s press 
secretaries and public 
relations officers, how does 
the information acquired rank 
in terms of usefulness for 
holding the government 
accountable? 
N/a   
13/33) Which of the following 
statements best sums up the 
attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during 
the course of the request?   
  
a)  the government holds 
information on behalf 
of the people and I 
should endeavour to 
deliver the information 
requested as soon as 
possible. 
b)  the government holds 
information on behalf 
of the people but it is 
not my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for you. 
c)  the government owns 
the information but I 
abide by its values of 
openness and 
transparency in 
relation to the public 
access to information. 
d)  the government owns 
the information and 
decides who will have 
Reply e) 1 out of 4 
‘It’s very much the case 
that the Government 
bureaucrats are politicised 
into accepting that release 
of information is a very bad 
thing.  The problem is that 
senior public servants have 
no security of tenure and 
their very career depends 
on minimising harm to the 
politicians who run their 
department.  Perhaps the 
best most recent example 
of that is the way that 
Senator Hill’s statement to 
Parliament on whether 
Australians interrogated 
people in Abu Ghraib was a 
deliberate lie – based on an 
implausible distinction 
between an ‘interview’ and 
an ‘interrogation’. 
Most of them don’t 
understand the intention 
behind the laws.  So they 
apply the black letter law 
and place obstacles to 
genuine public interest 
inquiries.    Any public-  205
access so I act 
conservatively rather 
than proactively in 
relation to public 
access. 
e)  the government owns 
the information and 
decides who will have 
access and my role is 
to guard information 
as opposed to 
dispensing it. 
 
spirited public institution 
would recognise – as did 
the Clinton Government – 
that there is a laudable 
public right in favour of 
release of information.  
And to charge for the cost 
of releasing it to the extent 
it’s done here is absurd 
(ibid).’ 
Reporter E’s observations cut 
to the core. The initial reaction 
and mindset is to not release 
documents. 
 
14/35) What do you perceive 
the end product to be?  0 out of 4 
‘It would be boring 
television seeing me 
shuffling papers around. 
However, I have written 
opinion pieces in papers 
and journals about earlier 
requests (ibid).’ 
 
In the interview with Reporter E the costs of legal appeals to, in the first, 
instance the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), were discussed. Reporter 
E pointed out this is not a viable option in Australia for two reasons: the very 
poor outcome from the FOI requestors’ perspective (the reason for this was 
covered above in ‘the promise’ findings) and the very prohibitive costs. ‘Apart 
from the $680 lodgement fee with the AAT, you also have to consider the huge 
fees for the lawyers you need to hire. Looking at counsel fees around $20 000 a 
day is not unusual (ibid).’ Asked why it was necessary to hire such expensive 
legal counsel Reporter E replied: ‘well, you’re up against the best government 
lawyers, against those you can’t really self-represent, so if you are to stand any 
chance, you need to hire the best as well (ibid).’ The Australian FOI appeals 
process will be discussed further below in the McKinnon vs. Treasury case.   206
As in case 1, the sticking point in case 2 is the interpretation and 
definition of what is in the public interest. The fact that the agencies themselves 
have initial right of interpretation opens the door to very high processing fees as 
a means of terminating FOI requests. Both Reporters D and E point out that in 
their experience this is a very common tactic. Clearly, a deterioration of the 
Australian FOI process has occurred since Reporter E submitted his initial 
request in 1997. The fact that DoD brushed aside his arguments when he 
pointed this out in his letter challenging the fees further illustrates how 
complacent Australian federal agencies seem to have become in relation to 
FOI. 
Case 3: Self-harm and suicide in detention centres 
The last Australian case build on Australia’s policy of mandatory 
detention of asylum seekers. In the last five years there has been considerable 
debate about whether the policy has caused psychological damage to the 
detainees. Cases of self-harm and suicide has occurred, but it is unclear how 
many. In 2001 the Australian federal government decided to ‘out-source’ part of 
the processing and detention of some asylum seekers to the island nation on 
Nauru. The policy was named ‘The Pacific Solution’. The total cost of this policy 
has never been disclosed and was also deemed to be of interest in the third FOI 
request. 
The original request read in part: 
Request for Information under the Federal Freedom of Information Act 
Further to the provisions of the federal FOI Act, the x Program on ABC Radio 
National would like to formally request the following information:   207
A copy of all reports/summaries into self-harm and attempted or successful 
suicides at all Australian detention centres for asylum seekers between 1990 and 
2003. If you propose releasing the information to us with the names deleted of the 
people involved in the reports we accept this. 
Any reports/estimates/summaries/calculations done on the total cost of the ‘Pacific 
Solution’, ie the Australian detention centre on Nauru between 2001 to present 
date. 
I look forward to receiving your decision and the schedule of documents as soon as 
possible. 
The request was dated December 3, 2004. On December 21, 2004 the 
FOI Delegate at DIMIA responded via a letter acknowledging the receipt of the 
request. She also pointed out that the department were ‘currently experiencing 
significant delays’ and might not be able to meet the 30 days deadline for a 
decision. 
Five and half months later on May 16, Reporter F faxed a reminder 
letter to DIMIA and enquired about the status of the request. In early August 
Reporter F received a message on her voice mail from DIMIA about processing 
costs (this is another breach of procedure since such communication should be 
in writing). Reporter F could not make contact with the FOI officer at this point in 
time. The officer left another phone message on September 13. Reporter F 
called back the same day. After apologies for the delay, the officer confirmed 
that DIMIA had been able to retrieve some of the information and would e-mail it 
to Reporter F. However, the self-harm information was incomplete. It only went 
back to 2002 and was not comprehensive. Reporter F was told that to do a full 
search would be very resource intensive and the department did not want to 
quote the charges (this is another breach of the Act) as it would ‘require huge 
changes to priorities within the Department’. The information received by 
Reporter F shows that between 2002 and 2005, 878 cases of self-harm were   208
reported at Australian detention centres. 14 deaths had occurred between 1998 
and 2005 and the Coroner had found that one of the deaths was caused by 
suicide. 
The information regarding the costs for the off shore processing centres 
was also incomplete. DIMIA had been able to collate some of the costs and it 
amounts to about $167 million, but other departments held more information on 
costs. 
‘The practice’: summary of findings case 3 
Compared to the first two Australian cases, the third had a very short 
’paper trail‘dragged out during a very long time frame. Until this case there had 
been no consideration of how the research project should deal with agencies 
that breached the Act. As time passed during this request, it became clear that 
the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) 
was dysfunctional in regards to FOI administration. Having considered various 
options it seemed logical that if a department did not meet the requirements of 
the Act, it would receive the score 0. Hence, there was no evaluation done of 
this request, however, the process of the request was monitored. 
It took the department nine months and seven days to deliver a 
decision. The Act stipulates 30 working days. 
A general observation by Reporter F, who is a senior journalist and 
producer at ABC Radio National, was that after the initial letter the case was 
delegated to junior staff at DIMIA who seemed to have neither the experience 
nor the delegated decision-making power to handle requests of this magnitude.   209
Discussion and analysis: ‘the practice’ 
To arrive at one quantitative score for ‘the practice’, the scores for the 
three studies were added and divided by three: (27+12+0)/3= 13 (out of 68). 
Expressed as a percentage Australia scored 19 per cent. This can be compared 
with Sweden’s score of 69 per cent in ‘the practice’. Combined with the 
qualitative data for ‘the practice’, it paints a very bleak picture of how FOI works 
in reality in Australia. The most important point to note is that none of the 
requests were granted in full and only one generated any information at all, and 
this information was incomplete and delivered nine months after the request. 
With this in mind it may seem odd that Australia generated any score at all in 
‘the practice’. The reason for this is of course that ‘the practice’ evaluated not 
only the information acquired, but also the process of acquisition. But the fact 
remains – the requests generated no information that could be used as part of a 
political accountability process, a very discouraging result indeed. 
Based on the result of the Australian ‘practice’ it can be concluded that 
the federal FOI system does not provide independent access to government-
held information. 
The two outstanding obstacles to obtaining information under FOI in 
Australia are the breaches of the turn around time and the excessive processing 
costs. ‘The practice’ clearly illustrated how hard it is to argue that the 
information sought is in the public interest. However, there are other very potent 
hindrances spectacularly illustrated by the recent McKinnon vs Treasury case.   210
McKinnon vs Treasury 
This case is not part of this project, but arose independently when the 
study was in progress. The case involved two FOI requests from the Australian 
newspaper’s FOI editor to the federal Treasury. The first request, lodged 
October 17, 2002, sought information on ‘bracket creep’ within the taxation 
system. Part of the original request read: 
Reports, reviews or evaluations completed in the 12 months from 3 December 
2001 to 3 December 2002 detailing the extent and impact of bracket creep and its 
impact on revenue collection of income tax, including information in relation to 
higher tax burdens faced by Australian and/or projections of revenue collection 
increases from bracket creep (McKinnon, 2005: 1). 
The second request covered the first home buyers scheme (FHS). It 
was lodged, December 3, 2002 and read in part: 
Documents relating to any review/report or evaluation completed on the First 
Home Buyers Scheme in the last two years, including documents summarising the 
level of fraud associated with the program, its use by high wealth individuals and 
its impact on the housing sector’s performance in the Australian economy 
(McKinnon, 2005: 1). 
The Treasury refused the release based on the numerous exemptions 
offered by the FOI Act. The applicant sought several internal reviews that were 
all unsuccessful and decided to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT). The hearing was listed before the AAT in Brisbane in early December 
2003. On December 1, 2003 the Treasurer issued a ‘conclusive certificate’ 
under S36 (3) of the FOI Act which reads: 
Where a Minister is satisfied, in relation to a document to which paragraph (1)(a) 
applies, that the disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public 
interest, he or she may sign a certificate to that effect (specifying the ground of 
public interest in relation to which the certificate is given and, subject to the 
operation of Part VI, such a certificate, so long as it remains in force, establishes 
conclusively that the disclosure of that document would be contrary to the public 
interest (Freedom of Information Act, 1982).   211
What this means in practice is that the any federal Minister is granted 
papal-like powers to ‘conclusively’ decide what information is to be released, 
regardless of the level of public interest. The Treasury’s initial grounds for not 
releasing the information in the bracket creep request are interesting to 
consider. The Treasury argued that the information may ‘create or fan ill-
informed criticism’ and that ‘the release of documents containing tentative and 
partially considered issues’ that could ‘confuse or mislead the public’ and 
encourage ‘ill-informed speculation and unhelpful debate (McKinnon, 2003: 5)’. 
The problem is of course that with no access to un-spun information there will 
be no debate at all. The Treasury’s views presented in its initial response 
permeate the rest of the case. It prompts the issuing of the conclusive certificate 
on similar grounds in which interestingly it is also noted that ‘the release of such 
documents would threaten the protection of the Westminster-based system of 
Government (McKinnon, 2005: 10).’ 
The core of the problem from a user’s perspective is that a ‘conclusive 
certificate’ severely limits the scope of hearing and ruling for the AAT and the 
subsequent courts. Sec 58 (3) of the FOI Act states that: ‘the powers of the 
Tribunal do not extend to reviewing the decision to give the certificate.’ 
Effectively this means that all the court is allowed to do is to determine whether 
the grounds for issuing the certificate were reasonable or not (ibid (4)). The 
McKinnon case has shown that the courts take a very generous view on what is 
reasonable. In the AAT hearing what this meant was that the Treasury just had 
to repeat its claim and grounds to be ruled reasonable. News Ltd appealed to 
the full bench of the Federal Court, which upheld the AAT ruling. The case was   212
subsequently appealed to the Hight Court of Australia and has been granted 
Leave of appeal in August 2006 (McKinnon, 2006: 22-23). 
The McKinnon case is significant since it is one of very few cases that 
has been appealed to the highest court. Significantly, it is the first case 
effectively challenging a ‘conclusive certificate’. It clearly shows that the 
Australian federal FOI Act favours the government in the appeals procedure. 
The fact that the courts are not allowed to review and try the reasons for a 
‘conclusive certificate’ is of grave concern from an accountability and flow of 
information perspective. The cost of driving FOI appeals is prohibitive. The 
estimated cost if News Ltd. loses the appeal in the High Court is $300 000 
(Jackson, 2005: 2) 
So, here we have a case that is arguably in the highest public interest 
(what can be more in the public interest than tax policy?) where the government 
spends an un-disclosed sum of money to defend its refusal to make public the 
requested documents in court and where the FOI requestor seeking to obtain 
information to hold the government accountable and stimulate public debate 
(two of the main aims of the FOI legislation) ends up paying a fortune 
challenging a power granted to the Minister that is clearly in conflict with the 
aims of the legislation. The McKinnon case alone clearly illustrates why the 
Australian FOI regime scored so poorly in the studies. 
Overall analysis: Australia 
Having presented the data in each study let us look at how the data 
connects to the overall research questions: to what extent, if any, are the   213
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study?  
Table 11 summarises the Australian scores: 
Table 11 Quantitative data Australia 
  ‘the promise’  ‘the spin’  ‘the practice’ 
Score  12 out of 68  49 out of 76   out of 68 
Score in %  17.6%  72%  19.1% 
 
The above scores are not very flattering. ‘The promise’ points to very 
weak legislation and an overall FOI system that offers only modest promise in 
terms of independent access to unspun information. Interestingly the bleak 
promise correlates with the very low score in ‘the practice’. So, the answer to 
the research question is that the gap between the promise and practice of FOI 
in Australia is very small indeed. The legislation promises very limited access 
and this is the case in reality. (It should be noted that the aims and objectives of 
the Act promise significant access to information, but the Act in itself does not 
deliver on these promises) However, what stands out in table 11 is ‘the spin’ 
score. According to that score the public servants and politicians are quite 
positive towards FOI to the point of favouring the facilitation of access. As we 
have seen in this chapter this is not the case in practice. So, in the Australian 
study ‘the spin’ title of the survey is a particularly adequate name. It shows 
clearly that the leading public servants and politicians would like us to think that 
FOI works, when in reality it does not. Hence, in the case of Australia the major 
gap is between the ‘spun’ version of FOI and the practice. This picture is 
underscored when you consider some of the qualitative findings:    214
o  None of the Australian requests generated information within the 
frame work of the legislation (the only information obtained was 
incomplete and the department refused further search and 
retrieval) 
o  The turnaround time for the three requests was long (2 months, 6 
months and 9 months respectively) 
o  The cost for processing the requests was high (initial quotes for 
the two cases where the departments followed procedure: 
$921.50 and $2692) This serves as a very effective deterrent to 
discourage requestors to follow the process through since you 
end up paying regardless of whether you receive actual 
information or blanked out documents 
o  There was no legal protection of journalistic sources/shield laws 
for journalists as described by ‘the promise’ and ‘spin’ sub-
studies 
 
Most important: the attitude towards ownership of government-held 
information correlates through all three sub-studies. ‘The promise’ makes it 
clear that departments have 30 plus 30 working days to process requests and 
that the law provides the government with a multitude of delaying tactics. The 
attitudes of government functionaries revealed in ‘the spin’ supported the view 
that the governments owns the information and that it decides who will have 
access. These findings were mirrored in ‘the practice’.   215
This situation is compounded by the powers granted to federal Ministers 
in the Act allowing them to use ‘conclusive certificates’ that effectively block 
access and weaken the appeal options. The McKinnon vs Treasury case shows 
how prohibitively expensive it is to drive FOI appeals. 
As pointed out earlier the issue of shield laws for journalists was the 
focus of a Senate inquiry in 1994 (Australia, 1994). The inquiry was triggered by 
a number of court cases between 1989 and 1993 that saw three Australian 
journalists jailed, and a number of others fined (Pearson, 2004: 235) after they 
were convicted of contempt of court for refusing to disclose their sources. This 
issue is still very current in Australia. In February 2004 two Canberra based 
Herald-Sun journalists exposed the contents of a secret government document 
outlining plans to not to proceed with a $500 million boost to veterans’ pensions. 
The document was leaked to the two journalists by a public servant. The 
Federal Government investigated the source of the leak and charged a public 
servant under Section 70 of the Crimes Act (described above). In August 2005 
the two journalists refused to disclose their source when called as witnesses in 
the case. They were charged with contempt of court and could face jail terms. 
The case is still before the court (Crittenden, 2005: 1). The debate regarding 
shield laws for journalists has been re-ignited by this case which gets to the 
core of whether the public interest benefits from encouraging leaks of this 
nature. Clearly it was very important to Australian war veterans to know of the 
document. Were it not for the leak, the public most likely would never have 
found out. Another issue that has been raised in the debate is that the   216
journalists are just doing their job of reporting and it is unfair that they should be 
used as tools in the government’s hunt for who leaked what (ibid, p. 2). 
The 1994 Senate inquiry ‘recommended that the courts weigh up the 
competing public interests before citing a journalist for contempt (Pearson, 
2004: 252)’. However, as this recent case shows, little seem to have changed in 
practice regarding protection of journalistic sources and shield laws for 
journalists in Australia since the 1994 Senate Report. Pearson points out that 
other Western democracies have jailed journalists for not revealing sources, 
among them Britain and South Africa. ‘Even the bastion of the free press, the 
United States, has jailed 17 journalists since 1984 for such offences (ibid).’ 
One of the few positive attributes of the current federal FOI regime in 
Australia is the annual FOI report compiled by the Attorney General’s 
department. The report is a useful tool for tracking the practical workings of the 
Act. The 2003-2004 report shows that during this year federal government 
agencies received 42 627 requests (Attorney-General, 2005: v), 92.1per cent of 
which were from individuals seeking personal information. Most of these 
requests were granted. So, from an individual perspective the Act does work. 
However, this project is concerned with the requests that are labelled ‘other’ in 
the report, for instance requests from journalists on matters of government 
policy and conduct for political accountability purposes. A closer look shows that 
most of the ‘other’ requests have turnaround times of between 30 to 90 days 
(ibid: 8), which confirms the findings in ‘the practice’. Even more telling is the 
information under fees and charges. Federal agencies notified $1 287 010 in 
charges, but only collected $268 947 (ibid, p.12). The report does not specify   217
how many requests were withdrawn, but the discrepancy between notified and 
collected charges infers a number of withdrawn requests (the 2002-2003 report 
specifies the number of withdrawn requests at 3333, but does not list the reason 
for withdrawal, (Attorney-General, 2004)). The statistics in the annual FOI 
reports confirm the findings in the Australian study. 
The end result for Australian federal FOI is bleak indeed: when put to 
the test Australian FOI completely failed to deliver. The problems start with the 
legislation that does not provide the framework to deliver on the FOI Act’s aims 
and objectives. The dysfunctionality of the Australian FOI regime is made clear 
by ‘the practice’ where none of the requests generated any information within 
the framework of the law. Perhaps most serious of all is that since the launch of 
FOI the leading elected Australian representatives and their supposedly 
independent and non-political leading public servants have tried to and are still 
trying to convince the Australian public that FOI in Australia is alive and well. 
The Australian results are frankly embarrassing for a country that claims to 
stand for liberal democratic values of which openness in governance is an 
important part. The poor performance is not surprising when you consider what 
the Federal Treasurer, Peter Costello, recently had to say in an address to 
public servants: 
Costello claimed freedom of information laws were conceived so that citizens 
could know what the government knew about them and so they could correct any 
misinformation in their personal files. 
Costello was reported as saying: “That is their [FoI laws] use,” before lamenting 
that some presumably meddling newspaper editors had developed a practice of 
using FOI laws to seek documents relating to policy matters (Day, 2005: 20).   218
Clearly Costello has not read, not understood or does not want to 
understand the aims and objectives of the federal FOI Act. What makes the 
situation even more deplorable is that the Federal government was given the 
analysis and tools in 1995
23 to rectify the situation – this far the lack of political 
will has been astounding and is eating away at the government’s democratic 
credentials. 
 
Conclusion 
The first two sub-studies combined to show that no legal protection of 
media whistleblowers exists in Australia and that the government respondents 
are very negative towards the prospect of legally protecting journalistic sources. 
Indeed, legislation exists that severely punishes public servants who disclose 
information to for instance media, on their own initiative. From a quantitative 
point of view the scores in the studies differ greatly: ‘the promise’ scored 18 per 
cent and ‘the spin’ scored 64 per cent. The implication of this discrepancy is that 
the administrators of FOI try to project an ‘all is well’ image belied by reality. In 
other words: they are applying spin to a dud legislation that was never meant to 
deliver proper third party access to government-held information. 
Of the three Australian FOI requests lodged in ‘the practice’, NONE 
delivered information, within the framework of the law. Ironically, the only 
                                                 
23 In 1995 The Australian Law Reform Commission produced a report that recommended 106 
amendments to the Act that would have addressed most of the legal issues. The report was very positive 
towards a well functioning and far-reaching FOI as a political accountability tool and pointed out its 
importance to representative democracy. Among other things the report recommends part removal of the 
conclusive certificate clause, re-structuring of the fee and charges system and the installation of a FOI 
Commissioner to oversee proper implementation of the Act. The recommendations would address most of 
the current problems with the FOI Act ALRC, Open Government: A Review of the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Australian Law Reform Commission, 1995).   219
request that did deliver was one where the department breached the legislation 
on two counts, one being a nine-month decision period. The score for ‘the 
practice’ was 19 per cent. 
So, it can be concluded that the federal Australian FOI regime was 
never intended to work. The number of exemptions, the prohibitively expensive 
processing charges and the internal appeals process made it a dud as a tool for 
political accountability from day one. The loop-holes in the law are simply too 
many. What compounds the seriousness of the situation is that successive 
federal governments, backed by the public service, have projected the image 
that the FOI system is working well, creating the illusion of an informed public, 
which from the citizen’s point of view, is worse than being ignorant.  
Former Prime Minister Paul Keating used the ‘banana republic’ analogy 
to convince Australians of the need for economic reform in the 1980s and 90s. 
Now, Australia has turned into a ‘public information banana republic’ with a flow 
of public information not worthy of a country that claims to be a mature liberal 
democracy.   220
 
Chapter Eight: USA 
Introduction 
The United States plays an important part as one of the role models for 
FOI internationally. It has long and proud tradition of a well-functioning FOI, 
which since the enactment of FOI in 1966 has provided relatively independent 
third party access to government-held information. This is exemplified by the 
thousands of journalistic articles based on information acquired using FOI. 
However, as this chapter will show, a recent shift has occurred, severely 
restricting the practical effectiveness of FOI in this country. 
Political Profile 
It may be useful to recall figure 1, first presented in chapter five, to 
situate the US politically compared to the other countries of study. 
Figure 1 Overview Political systems 
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As figure 1 shows the US has a federal system with a popularly elected 
President as head of the executive. 
The concept of balance of power lies at the heart of the US political 
system. The US founding fathers drew heavily on the ideas of the French 
political philosopher Montesquieu. In his most comprehensive political work 
L’Espirit des lois (The spirit of the laws), published in 1748, he outlined his 
balance of power concept. In Montesquieu’s France the powers were the 
Church, the military aristocracy and the legal aristocracy. The idea was that 
these three groups would be ‘able to restrain the monarch and each other 
because of their independent moral or social positions (Slevin, 1996: 327-28).’ 
The need for restraint, argued Montesquieu, was to prevent any one of the 
powers of society from becoming too powerful with the risk of despotism and 
consequent limitations on the freedom of the individual. The goal was to permit 
‘development of liberty in its modern form, as a sphere of life for each individual 
free from collective interference (ibid).’ The US constitutional fathers translated 
Montesquieu’s ideas into three arms of government, the legislative (Congress), 
the executive (the President) and the judiciary (the Courts). Apart from the 
‘natural’ occurrence of checks and balances as argued by Montesquieu, the 
three arms were also given legal powers to check each other. For instance, the 
President has to sign and approve legislation passed in Congress for the law to 
come into force while the President in turn has usually to take his/her law   222
proposals to Congress. The Supreme Court’s main task is to ensure actions by 
the executive and Congress does not go against the Constitution. 
The US Constitution is a very substantial document with 27 powerful 
and often referred to amendments (Congress, U. S., 1789). As pointed out in 
chapter seven, the US constitution does much more than divide up the powers 
between the different levels and arms of government. It also seeks to guarantee 
the rights of the individual by limiting the powers of government. The most 
important tool for this is the Bill of Rights (amendments 1-10), in which the 
fundamental rights of the individual are listed. The first amendment, on which 
the FOI regime is partly based, reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances (Congress, U. S., 1789). 
From an FOI perspective it is very significant that ‘the press’ is explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution as an institution that should be allowed to operate 
freely and that the government should not make laws limiting its operation. This 
gives FOI almost a constitutional standing, but not quite. 
The US is a federal republic with a popularly elected President as its 
Head of State. The President also heads the executive branch and appoints 
and leads the cabinet. The US parliament, the Congress, is made up of two 
houses: the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
The greatest difference to the other countries of study is that the US 
President is not drawn from the Congress. This means that he/she and the 
cabinet can stay in office even if the Congress carries a different political   223
majority. As a matter of fact, this has quite often been the case. The President 
is not directly responsible or accountable to the Congress, instead he/she 
answers directly to the public via elections. The President appoints his/her own 
members of the Executive. Generally they are drawn from the private sector 
and the public service, although serving members have also been appointed. 
The latter are required to resign from Congress before they take up an 
executive appointment. 
There are three levels of government in the US, federal (national), state 
and local. Similarly to Australia, most of the regional political power sits at the 
state government level. As far as FOI is concerned this means that the US has 
state acts as well as one federal Act. 
Evolution of FOI in USA 
The evolution of FOI in the US has been covered in detail in chapter 
two. However, there has been an important recent shift in the implementation of 
federal FOI in the US that deserves attention. Since September 11 2001 and 
the war on terror, access to documents and information has been severely 
restricted. This is clearly illustrated in the results of the American ‘practice’ study 
(see below). The shift can be traced to a memorandum dated October 12, 2001 
put out by the then Attorney General, John Ashcroft and added to the FOI Act 
as guidance for the implementation of FOI. After initial assurances that the 
Attorney General is committed to FOI the memo gets down to business: 
I encourage your agency to carefully consider the protection of all such 
values and interests when making disclosure determinations under the 
FOIA. Any discretionary decision by your agency to disclose 
information protected under the FOIA should be made only after full and   224
deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal 
privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the 
information.  
     In making these decisions, you should consult with the Department of 
Justice's Office of Information and Privacy when significant FOIA issues 
arise, as well as with our Civil Division on FOIA litigation matters. 
When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold 
records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of 
Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or 
present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other 
agencies to protect other important records (Freedom of Information Act, 
1966: 50-51) 
The message to federal government agencies is clear: be much more 
restrictive in releasing information; and if you refuse applications and they are 
appealed you can count on legal assistance from the Attorney General’s 
department. This memo has not been widely published, but is possibly the worst 
blow to US federal FOI since its inception in 1966 (the full memo is available as 
appendix 4). Because the US, as pointed out in chapter two, is one of the two 
‘model’ FOI systems, what it does in terms of FOI is of particular significance. 
The other model system, Sweden, has, at least officially, gone in the opposite 
direction to that indicated by the Ashcroft memo. However, Sweden has 
nowhere near the political reach of the US. The implications of this will be 
further discussed in chapter eleven. 
Data presentation and analysis 
The promise: USA 
 
Aims and objectives of legislation 
The main legislative vehicle is the Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, 
enacted in 1966 and fully operational in 1967. The FOIA has been amended 
several times and was in 1996 complemented by the Electronic Information Act   225
which extends FOIA to encompass information stored on digital media and 
requiring that electronic reading rooms be provided by agencies.  Private 
requests for information are made under the Privacy Act of 1974. The 
Government in the Sunshine Act requires the US government to open the 
deliberations of multi-agency bodies.  The Whistle Blower Protection Act of 
1994 provides some protection for federally employed whistleblowers. The 
False Claims Act (as amended in 1986) allows individual federal employees to 
take agencies to court over fraudulent behaviour. This Act is to date the most 
effective and far-reaching whistleblower protection in the US. However, none of 
the above acts provide legal protection to media whistleblowers. 
As pointed out above the US FOI regime is based on the First 
Amendment to the US constitution. The intent of providing the public with 
independent access to information was clearly articulated by former United 
States President James Madison when he chaired the committee which drafted 
the First Amendment to the US constitution: 
 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a 
people who mean to be their own governors must arm 
themselves with the power knowledge gives. A 
popular government without popular information or 
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce 
or a tragedy or perhaps both. (cited in Supperstone 
and Pitt-Payne, 2001: v) 
 
 
Further guidance as to the objectives and aims of the US FOI regime 
can be found in the very comprehensive citizens’ guide to using FOIA prepared   226
by the Committee of Government Reform (CGR). The introduction clearly points 
out that with the enactment of FOIA in 1966:  
the burden of proof shifted from the individual to the government. Those seeking 
information are no longer required to show a need for information. Instead, the 
‘need to know'’ standard has been replaced by a ‘right to know’ doctrine. The 
government now has to justify the need for secrecy (CGR, 2002). 
 
The US FOI regime does make far-reaching promises that are well 
summed up by a passage in the introduction to the citizen’s FOIA guide: 
 
Above all, the statute requires Federal agencies to provide the fullest possible 
disclosure of information to the public. The history of the act reflects that it is a 
disclosure law. It presumes that requested records will be disclosed, and the agency 
must make its case for withholding in terms of the act's exemptions to the rule of 
disclosure (CGR, 2002). 
 
In sum: all US government-held information should be regarded as 
public, and the agencies should make it their priority to grant access to the 
requested information as rapidly as possible. Such is the articulated promise of 
the US legislation which will be evaluated in ‘the promise’ study. 
‘The promise’: score and summary of findings 
The methodology for calculating the score has been detailed in both 
chapters three and six (‘the promise’ evaluation template can be viewed in full in 
appendix 1). The maximum possible score for ‘the promise’ was 68, describing 
a very far-reaching FOI regime including to a full or partial extent the private 
sector and providing substantial legal protection of media whistleblowers 
(journalistic sources).   227
The   ‘promise’ score for the US is 31 out of 68, indicating a reasonable 
legislative ambition. The areas covered by the evaluation template included: 
cost, turnaround time, the appeal process and protection of sources. Table 12 
shows a selection of key questions, scores and comments. When not indicated 
differently, the references in table 12 are based on the federal Freedom of 
Information Act, 1966 in its latest amended and revised version. 
Table 12 The Promise USA 
Question/parameter 
evaluated 
Score Comment 
Part I Access to documents    
2) Does the Act allow the 
agencies to charge processing 
fees? 
2 out of 4  FOIA spends an entire 
section on the fees that 
agencies can charge to 
retrieve and copy the 
requested information. It 
requires each agency to 
provide a set schedule for 
fees and clearly states that 
the fee should be as low a 
possible. It also 
distinguishes between 
information sought for 
commercial purposes 
(higher fees allowed) and 
information sought for non-
commercial use such as 
scientific and educational 
purposes. Importantly the 
media is specifically 
mentioned in the second 
group. Another very 
important part of the fee 
structure is that an agency 
is NOT allowed to require 
advanced payment of any 
fee. In contrast with, for 
instance, the Australian 
FOI Act (Freedom of 
Information Act, 1966: 
section 4)   228
 
It is clear that the intention 
of the Act is to encourage 
the agencies to charge as 
low a processing fee as 
possible. 
4) How long does the Act give 
the agency to make a decision 
on the request? 
 
3 out of 4  The response time is the 
problem area in US FOIA. 
An audit done in 2002 
found excessive backlogs 
in response times in many 
agencies. Failure to 
respond within 20 days is 
the most common breach of 
US FOIA (GAO, 2002). 
 
6) Does the Act require 
agencies to keep a running 
diary over current and 
archived documents? 
 
3 out of 4  This is a clear similarity 
between the Swedish and 
US FOI systems. 
(Freedom of Information 
Act, 1966: section 1) 
8) Are any federal/national 
agencies exempt from the 
Act? 
 
3 out of 4  Congress, the courts, the 
President’s immediate staff 
and the National Security 
Council are exempt 
(Banisar, 2004: 92). It is 
symbolically important that 
some government entities 
are exempt. On the other 
hand CIA and FBI are not 
exempt. 
10) Does the Act allow for 
legal costs being covered by 
the state? 
 
1 out of 4  Yes, at the discretion of the 
state. 
(Freedom of Information 
Act, 1966: section 3) 
 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of 
the constitution? 
 
0 out of 4  No, and the incumbent 
government can change the 
Act. 
12) Does the Act apply to the 
private sector? 
 
0 out of 4  No. And the Act does not 
apply to former 
government agencies that 
have been privatised. 
Part II Protection of 
journalistic sources 
  
1) What level of protection of 
journalistic sources exists? 
 
2 out of 4  ‘Numerous laws exists to 
protect whistleblowers 
from punitive action from 
employers, both   229
government and private. 
But no legislation exist that 
guarantees confidentiality 
for someone that supplies a 
journalist with information 
(Davies, C., 2005b)
24.’ 
 
2) When can journalists be 
forced to reveal their source?  
 
2 out of 4  In any court case 
(ibid) 
3) Are journalist in any way 
bound not to reveal their 
source? 
 
1 out of 4  ‘In the US, no, they are not 
legally bound to keep a 
promise to a source, 
although some would say 
that they are based on the 
legal principle of collateral 
estoppel...(ibid)’ 
4) Are colleagues and 
managers (eg the Minister and 
chief public servant) of a 
government agency in any 
way prevented from 
investigating the source of a 
’leak’ to the press? 
 
0 out of 4  ‘No limits on what they can 
do over here to investigate 
a leak...(ibid)’ 
 
5) If legal protection of 
journalistic sources exists – is 
the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
0 out of 4  ‘At the federal level, were 
protection to exist, it would 
have to come from statute 
because the Court in 
Branzburg v. Hayes ruled it 
was not a constitutional 
right...(ibid)’ 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the promise’ 
Overall table 12 shows a rather ambitious FOI legislation. The message 
sent to agencies is that they should waive rather than impose processing fees in 
the interest of public access and that processing should be speedy. As we shall 
see later, it is the speed that is lacking in the US system. The reason for the 
relatively low US score (31) compared to the Swedish score (63) is mainly 
                                                 
24 Charles Davies is the director of the Freedom of Information Center at Missouri University in the US.   230
explained by the fact that no legal protection of media whistleblowers exists on 
the federal level in the US system. This is surprising, especially when one 
considers the fact that several of the most important disclosures of corruption 
and maladministration in the US have come from whistleblowers. On the other 
hand, the prime Watergate source, ‘Deep Throat’ did keep his identity secret 
until 2005, more than 30 years after the event.    
Judging from the score it seems clear that the aims of the US FOI 
regime are far-reaching and that the Act lays a reasonable foundation to deliver 
on its promises of making government-held information public. The next 
question is: what are the attitudes towards FOI of those in charge of 
implementing the Act? 
‘The spin’: USA 
The research question for ‘the spin’ was: what are the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among leading 
politicians and public servants? 
Timing 
As with Australia the election cycle impacted on timing. The US 
presidential election was set for early November, 2004. Because the date was 
fixed it was easier to plan around it than in the Australian case where the 
federal election date was flexible. Another issue with the US election was the 
‘spoil system’. If the incumbent Bush government had lost, it would have meant 
replacing not only political posts, but also a large number of the public servants. 
This could have impacted on the capacity and the will to reply to the survey.   231
Hence, the US questionnaires were finalised and mailed in August 2004, 
leaving plenty of time for the incumbent administration to reply. Therefore it can 
be safely assumed that the election campaign did not impact on the response 
rate of the survey. 
‘The spin’: score and summary of findings 
In total 68 questionnaires were sent, 8 responses were received within 
three weeks giving a response rate of 12% (compared with 31% for Sweden 
and 7% for Australia). Since ‘the spin’ is not a statistical quantitative study as 
such, the response rate has no bearing on the end result. Rather, it is argued 
that each reply is a ‘case’ in itself with the attitudes held by the respondent 
having an impact on the FOI policies in his/her department. However, the 
number of responses could be taken as an indicator of how important FOI is for 
those charged with its administration. ‘The spin’ posed 19 questions in three 
sections to capture the attitudes towards FOI. Table 13 provides an overview of 
the pivotal questions. 
The score was calculated by adding up the total score for each survey 
and then dividing it by the total number of replies producing an average score, 
the higher the score, the more positive the attitudes towards FOI and protection 
of journalistic sources. In the US case the total score was 382/8, which gave the 
average score of 48 out of 76.
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Table 13 ‘the spin USA 
Question Score  Comment 
Part I General attitudes 
FOI 
  
Questions 1-5  ‘Strongly agree’ and 
‘agree’ in most responses. 
Six responses included ‘no 
opinion’ and ‘disagree’. 
The data indicates a 
qualified positive general 
attitudes towards FOI. 
Compared to Sweden and 
Australia the US responses 
are more cautious. 
6. FOI should be 
extended further to partly 
cover the corporate 
sector when public 
interests are at stake. 
 
Responses much more 
varied covering the whole 
spectrum of reply 
alternatives. Score: 16 out 
of 32 or 50%. 
The score shows that there 
is not majority support 
among the respondents for 
extending US FOI further 
to cover the private sector. 
Part II Access to 
government held records 
  
2) In your view, what 
length of time is 
reasonable before your 
department makes a 
decision on the request? 
 
11 out of 32 – 40%  This was a bit of a trick 
question. As pointed out in 
the cover letter the survey 
was primarily concerned 
with the attitudes of the 
respondents. 
If they found the law too 
demanding, they had the 
option to voice this.  
Two of the respondents 
wanted 40 days or more, 
four thought 21-30 days 
were reasonable and only 
two found that the 20 days 
allocated by the Act was a 
good time-frame. This 
clearly shows that the 
implementers of the Act are 
not satisfied with the 
current time-frame. The 
effect of this will become 
clear in ‘the practice’ sub-
study. 
3) If your department  23 out of 32 – 72%  Replies kept within the   233
needs to charge a 
processing fee, which of 
the costs below do you 
find reasonable? 
 
lower part of the reply 
spectrum. The data shows 
that all respondents seem to 
favour a ‘low-cost-as-
possible’ policy. 
7) Which of the following 
statements is closest to 
the attitude held by 
yourself and your staff? 
 
a) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people and I 
should endeavour 
to deliver the 
information 
requested as 
soon as possible 
b) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people but it is not 
my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for an 
FOI applicant   
c) the  government 
owns the 
information but 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
good  
d) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access 
e) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access and 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
not good 
 
28 out of 32 – 88%  This is the single most 
important question in ‘the 
spin’. It cuts to the core of 
how FOI is interpreted, 
regardless of what the law 
says.  
88% is a very convincing 
score, further backed up by 
the fact that six out of eight 
respondents picked 
alternative a). The other 
two picked c). This 
indicates that that 
American public servants 
and politicians view 
themselves as facilitators of 
information access. As 
pointed out in earlier 
chapters, the importance of 
this attitude cannot be over 
emphasized in relation to 
the practical functionality 
of FOI. 
The complete table 
containing all countries of 
study can be viewed in 
chapter eleven.   234
8) In your view, which 
statement most 
adequately describes the 
‘fourth estate’ role that 
some media and 
reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
a)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process and 
delegated to the 
media by the 
citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process, but 
exists on a 
mandate invented 
by the media itself 
c)  It does not have 
any particular 
influence on the 
political 
accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention 
by the media to 
justify its 
existence 
e)  It is a threat to the 
political 
accountability 
process because 
of the 
incompetence of 
most journalists 
 
24 out of 32 – 75%. 
Majority of respondents 
picked alternative b. 
A very interesting outcome. 
Although it indicates 
awareness of the fourth 
estate role and sympathy 
for it, it is clear that most of 
the respondents see it as an 
invention by media and not 
a mutual understanding 
between the public and the 
media. 
 
9) In your view, which is 
the most important 
function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool 
for political 
accountability 
b) To  increase 
transparency of 
the governing 
22 out 32 – 69%  The coding in this question 
is based on the 
accountability function of 
FOI. The score is not really 
all that relevant, when 
looking at this parameter in 
isolation. What is more 
important is what reply 
alternative was the most 
common one.   235
process to 
prevent 
maladministration 
and corruption 
c) To  increase  the 
public’s 
participation in the 
political process 
d)  To allow citizens a 
means to check 
what personal 
data agencies 
hold and to 
correct errors 
e)  FOI is an 
unnecessary law 
that fills no 
particular function 
In the US ‘spin’ most 
picked b). Only one picked 
a). Importantly all 
respondents take the view 
that FOI has a function to 
fill. 
Part III Protection of 
Journalistic sources 
  
1) What is your view of 
legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made 
stronger and include 
the corporate sector 
when public interests 
are at stake 
b)  It should be made 
stronger in the public 
sector to encourage 
public servants to 
make public 
maladministration 
c)  It should stay the way 
it is 
d)  It should not be 
implemented in 
Australia – problems 
within a department 
are best handled 
internally 
e)  It should not be 
implemented in 
Australia. Journalists 
in general cannot not 
be trusted with this 
level of confidence 
18 out of 32 – 56%  Varied responses. The 
dominant view is that it 
should stay the way it is, 
alternative c). i.e. no legal 
protection for sources.   236
 
2) With public access to 
documents, is there a 
need for legal protection 
of journalistic sources? 
 
a) Yes  –  it 
complements the 
access to 
document regime 
and strengthens 
the overall flow of 
public information 
b) Yes  –  it 
encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the 
document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat 
to good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists 
and the media 
would abuse this 
privilege and it 
should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
16 out of 20 – 50%  Confirms the response in 
the question 1. Very 
hesitant reception of legal 
protection of media 
whistleblowers. 
 
(This can be compared with 
Sweden where the replies 
to this question gave a 
resounding round of praise 
for protecting sources. 81% 
picked reply a), the rest 
picked b.) 
3) What are your initial 
feelings towards a public 
servant who leaks 
information to the media 
to disclose 
maladministration? 
  
a)  Yes – it complements 
the access to 
document regime and 
strengthens the 
overall flow of public 
information 
b)  Yes – it encourages 
12 out of 32 – 37%  Even more hesitant when it 
comes to the crunch. This 
score clearly shows that the 
loyalty is to the department 
and not to the public.  
(Very similar score to the 
Australian ‘spin’, which 
had 35%)   237
public servants to talk 
to journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the document 
access regime is 
enough 
d)  No – it is a threat to 
good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists and 
the media would 
abuse this privilege 
and it should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
 
4) In some countries you 
break the law if you 
investigate who leaked 
information to the media. 
Which of the following 
statements corresponds 
best with your views on 
this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most 
important part of 
the source 
protection. 
Without the legal 
protection it would 
be a ‘paper tiger’ 
b) Journalistic 
sources should 
have legal 
protection, but 
exemptions when 
it is allowed to 
investigate a leak 
should exist 
c) Legal  protection 
for journalistic 
sources as a 
principle is good, 
but the 
11 out of 32 – 34%  Clearly this idea did not sit 
well with the American 
respondents. It further 
confirms the general very 
hesitant attitude towards 
source protection. 
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exemptions for 
when journalists 
can be forced to 
reveal their 
sources should be 
far-reaching 
d) Journalistic 
sources do not 
need legal 
protection – 
protection by 
ethical guidelines 
for department 
managers is 
enough 
e) Journalists  are  not 
credible and 
accountable 
enough to be 
granted the 
privilege of legal 
protection of their 
sources 
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the spin’ 
Part I of ‘the spin’ shows a general positive, albeit slightly hesitant, 
attitude towards FOI. Part II indicates a sincere will to keep processing costs as 
low as possible. Regarding the time-frame stipulated by the Act to process 
requests – 20 days – most are of the view that this is not enough time. Several 
of the respondents thought that more than 41 days was reasonable. Part III – 
legal protection of journalistic sources - got a very cool response from the 
respondents. While not as hostile to the idea as that of their Australian 
counterparts the general attitude seems to be that source protection should stay 
the way it is, i.e. no shield laws for journalists.   239
The overall hesitancy in the replies is well illustrated by a comment 
added at the end of one of the questionnaires where the respondents were 
asked to enter the name of the department/agency they worked for and their 
position. The respondent wrote: 
This is funny – I don’t trust you to not exploit my being in the position I hold, thus, 
I’m not identifying my Department – what does that say about the thesis of your 
study? 
Good question! I think it indicates that an ambivalent and suspicious 
attitude towards FOI seems to exist within the American administration, 
especially since the respondent identified him/herself as an FOIA officer. 
It must be noted, though, that this suspicious attitude is somewhat 
countered by the responses to the key seventh question where a very clear 
majority take the view that the government holds information on behalf of the 
public. 
Based on the data captured by ‘the spin’ the US respondents displayed 
a predominantly positive attitude towards FOI apart from protection of 
journalistic sources where the attitudes were predominantly negative. The US 
‘spin’ data also indicates possible practical problems in turnaround time for 
requests. 
‘The practice’: USA 
Looking at the US results from the first two US studies (31 out of 68 for 
‘the promise’ and 48 out of 76 for ‘the spin’) the FOI promise appears relatively 
very far-reaching and public servants seem more willing to give access to 
information than the legislation allows. In summary: ‘the promise’ says to the US   240
public: ‘the aim is that all government held information should be public, but 
there are some exceptions to this rule. The legislation is on your side and the 
government has to make its case when not releasing information.’ ‘The spin’ 
says: ‘FOI as a general idea is good and we as public servants and politicians 
hold the information on behalf of the people and we will release it on request.’ 
The question that remains to be answered is: is this promise is borne out by the 
practice of US FOI?  
Recruitment of reporters 
The recruitment process for the US ‘practice’ study can only be 
described as a long and hard slog. It took from August 10, 2004 to May 17, 
2005 to recruit the three US journalists (compared to 1-2 months in Sweden and 
Australia). As with the other countries of study recruitment started with US 
members of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). 
Since the US has eight ICIJ members one would have thought this an easy 
task. Not so. None of the ICIJ members replied to e-mails and phone calls. I 
also e-mailed ICIJ to ask for assistance and support – again no response. After 
two months I gave up on ICIJ and moved to other organisations. 
Overall US journalists and media have a strong tradition of being very 
involved and proactive in protecting the right to know as embodied by FOI, and 
there are numerous organisations dedicated to this cause. I attempted to 
contact several. The first was one of the most prominent: Investigative 
Reporters and Editors (IRE). I received no response when I outlined the project 
and asked for assistance, however, via their website (www.ire.org) I identified 
six possible candidates. I e-mailed all six, but got no replies. After six months I   241
discovered the Coalition of Journalists for Open Government (CJOG) and got a 
first response. 
CJOG was formed in 2003 and consists ‘of more than two dozen 
journalism-related organisations concerned about secrecy in government 
(CJOG, 2005)’. CJOG came into being as a direct response to the increased 
government secrecy in the US following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
2001. The CJOG co-ordinator posted a call for reporters to volunteer for the US 
‘practice’ study in their e-newsletter – no responses. CJOG recommended the 
Washington bureau of the COX Newspaper group as a possible recruitment 
source. The editor had a keen interest in FOI and passed me on to one of his 
reporters. She was willing to join the study. I got two e-mails from her, then she 
vanished and did not reply to either e-mails or phone messages. I went back to 
the ICIJ membership list and tried another round of e-mails and attempted for 
the third time to contact the organisation – no response. 
The breakthrough finally came in mid May 2005, ten months after the 
start of the recruitment process for US reporters. By now I had given up on 
contacting US reporters directly, a method that had worked well both in Sweden 
and Australia. Trawling various academic institutions via internet I came across 
the FOI Center at Missouri University and its School of Journalism (one of the 
most prominent journalism schools in the US). The director and some of his 
staff at the Center were very positive toward the study. In a stroke of luck all 
three had a background as working journalists, so they fit the reporter profile for 
the ‘practice’. As a result the director and two colleagues lodged the US FOI 
requests.    242
It is still a mystery to me why the US recruitment process was so hard. 
The same methods and introduction letters that had worked so well in Sweden 
and Australia were used, slightly tweaked to fit the US FOI context. It could be 
that US reporters are most concerned with FOI at a state and local government 
level, as the FOIA Audit toolkit designed by the FOI Center indicates
25. They 
may be too busy and are less prepared than their colleagues in other countries 
to participate in research. Perhaps they find other ways of campaigning for FOI 
more effective.  
‘The practice’: score and summary of findings 
In the US case the findings for ‘the practice’ are very easy to 
summarise: they rated a score of 0. This is because all three departments are in 
severe breach of FOIA, similar to the third Australian request. 
Request one asked for a breakdown of the travel expenses for the 
President during 2003. The request was put to the Office of Administration. 
Request two sought any reports on suicide and self-harm by asylum 
seekers and illegal immigrants held in US detention centres between 1990 and 
2004. The centres are run by the Department of Homeland Security that 
received the request. 
The third request was put to the Department of State and asked for the 
following information: 
                                                 
25 The FOIA Audit toolkit is concerned with the State and local levels of government only and is available 
at http://foi.missouri.edu/.   243
Any reports/summaries/documents/audits outlining the weapons and munitions 
sales by US based/owned companies and US government agencies to the Iraqi 
government from 1980 to 1990.  
I am seeking information regarding what sort of weapons and other goods that 
could be classified as strategic that the Iraqi regime bought from the US.  
Other relevant information is the price of the sales. If the individual prices cannot 
be disclosed I request total annual sums. 
All requests were lodged in the first two weeks of June 2005. The US 
FOI Act gives departments and agencies 20 days to make a decision. At the 
time of writing, April 2006, the departments are ten months late. One of the 
comments by the Director of the FOI Center when asked whether they had had 
any responses is telling: 
None at all. I wouldn’t expect a word for weeks…maybe months. I asked Justice 
for something last year [this e-mail dated July 20 2005] and got a response two 
weeks ago (Davies, C., 2005a). 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the practice’ 
In terms of data there is nothing to analyse. Similar to the Australian 
study, the US ‘practice’ study produced no information at all within the legislated 
time-frame of the FOI Act. This is of course very disappointing. The American 
reporters did receive neither a confirmation the requests had been received, nor 
any decisions within the time-frame set out by the FOI Act. In the Australian 
cases there were at least communications between the reporters and the 
departments to analyse, in the US cases there was nothing. Hence no 
interviews with the American reporters were conducted. 
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter the US has been held up 
as one of the model FOI systems and it is true that pre-September 11 the US 
FOI regime provided the US media with extensive independent access to   244
government-held information. This is illustrated by the database containing 
thousands of media stories based on successful FOI requests maintained by 
the FOI Center (FOIC, 2005). A very prominent example is the School of the 
Americas exposé as described in chapter seven. 
The ongoing communication with the US reporters participating in this 
study shows that the Ashcroft memo, described above, has been embraced by 
the Bush administration and the bureaucracy. One of the reporters describes it 
thus: 
Much has happened to federal FOIA, not the least of which is this regime, which 
has cast a permissive tone that all the federal agencies have heard loud and clear: 
don’t give up any information without a fight, charge people like hell for it, 
obfuscate, lawyer them to death…it’s a secret regime, and it has trickled down into 
the bureaucracy in a huge way. It will take decades to regain what’s been lost. It’s 
so bad that many Republicans are joining the fight, on the side of opening more 
stuff up (Davies, C., 2005b)
26. 
‘Decades to regain what’s been lost’- it is a chilling thought that the 
most powerful nation on earth has gone from a relatively open system of 
governance to a closed and secretive regime. 
In applying the US data to the research question for the ‘practice’: in 
practice, does FOI supply journalists (and media organisations) with 
independent access to government held information? the answer is NO. 
The outstanding problem in US FOI practice is clearly the huge backlog of work 
in the departments processing the requests. In the wake of the Ashcroft memo 
the question arises as to how much of the backlog is legitimate, or whether it is 
                                                 
26 As pointed out above Charles Davies is the Director of the FOI Center at Missouri University. He was 
also one of the US reporters that lodged requests. As he is previously identified in the study as the 
Director of the FOI Center, it was decided to disclose his name as one of the US reporters.   245
used as an excuse to justify delays in response. The bleak result for the US 
‘practice’ study confirms the point made by Banisar that: 
The FOIA has been undermined by a lack of central oversight and in many 
agencies, long delays in processing requests. In some instances, information is 
released only after years or decades (2004: 87). 
 
One example of this ‘lack of central oversight’ is that each department 
and agency produces its own annual FOI report. There are 14 federal 
departments and 69 federal agencies that are required to produce reports. This 
does not provide a good overview of how the system is functioning. In this 
instance the Australian system where the Attorney General’s department 
compiles a report that encompasses all departments and agencies under FOI is 
preferable.  
A comparison of the United States State Department’s (USSD) annual 
reports for 2000 and 2004 shows that the number of ‘denials’ of requests has 
almost tripled from 93 in 2000 to 345 in 2004. The fees collected have also 
increased dramatically from US$ 5821 in 2000 to US$30 767 in 2004. On the 
positive side it should be noted that the State Department has managed to cut 
its numbers of pending requests from 5782 in 2000 to 1996 at the end of the 
2004 fiscal year, however the backlog is still significant (USSD, 2004). 
Reviewing the 2004 reports for the other 13 federal departments confirms the 
backlog problem. The numbers of pending requests at the end of the 2004 fiscal 
year range between 1000 and 2000 requests per department.   246
Overall analysis: USA 
Having presented the data in each study let us look at how the data 
connects to the overall research questions: to what extent, if any, are the 
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? Table 14 summarises the scores. 
Table 14 Quantitative data USA 
  ‘the promise’  ‘the spin’  ‘the practice’ 
Score  31 out of 68  48 out of 76   0 of 68 
Score in %  45%  63%  0% 
The data indicates that currently the federal US FOI regime is highly, if 
not totally dysfunctional, at least in relation to the aims and objectives spelt out 
in the legislation. The system does not deliver in the way the Act intends it to. 
The quantitative data is further underscored by some of the recent experiences 
of US journalists described above.  
The US FOI Act scored significantly better in ‘the promise’ compared to 
Australia. However, like Australia, the public servants and politicians seem to 
promise much more than they deliver. As a matter of fact, they promise very 
good access and yet, as shown by the practice, they deliver nothing. The poor 
state of the US FOI system is confirmed by the qualitative findings: 
o  Data gathering: none of the US requests generated information 
within the framework of the legislation. 
o  Delivery time: Currently the US federal departments evaluated 
in ‘the practice’ have been in breach of the legislation for more 
than nine months.   247
o  Whisteblower protection: there is no legal protection on the 
federal level of journalistic sources as described by ‘the promise’ 
and ‘spin’ sub-studies. 
One of the most interesting findings in ‘the spin’ is the very high score in 
question 7 – concerning who owns the information: the government or the 
public. Clearly the respondents took the view that the government holds the 
information on behalf of the public. However, this attitude does not seem to 
translate into practice. It could be that this attitude is based on earlier FOI 
practice, pre-September 11, 2001. 
Conclusion   
The US legislation is ambitious and quite detailed in describing the 
practical function of FOI. As opposed to its Australian counterpart it is much 
more user-friendly and puts a lot of pressure on departments and agencies to 
provide access. Its greatest weaknesses are the lack of a tool to make agencies 
comply with the 20-day decision period; the appeals process that allows for very 
lengthy legal processing; and the lack of legal protection of media 
whistleblowers. 
The administrators of FOI are positive towards the FOI regime, apart 
from the 20-day time limitation. Interestingly they also see the public as owners 
of government-held information, a very important difference to their Australian 
colleagues who take the opposite view. 
Unfortunately this view of information custodianship does not translate 
into facilitating access to the information as the FOI requests put to three   248
departments in ‘the practice’ generated no responses and no information at all 
within the framework of the Act. 
The most important finding in the US study is the overall picture of an 
FOI system in severe crisis. In just 10 years it has gone from being one of the 
most progressive and user-friendly access regimes in the world to one in a state 
of dysfunction. From a global FOI perspective this is alarming indeed. It seems 
as if the current Bush administration has seized the opportunity provided by the 
war on terror to effectively change the tradition of open government into secret 
government. This is illustrated by the Ashcroft memo discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter. It is further illustrated by one high profile example: the Private 
Jessica Lynch story from the Iraqi war. When the war was going badly the US 
army successfully ‘liberated’ a female soldier from an Iraqi hospital where she 
was treated for injuries. The whole episode was captured on video by US Army 
personnel and was ‘sold’ to information starved world media as a great success 
story. According to the US Army Private Lynch was rescued from maltreatment 
and torture at the Iraqi hospital. After the war a documentary team from BBC’s 
Correspondent program found a totally different story. Private Lynch was 
receiving good treatment at the hospital and the ‘rescue’ was completely 
unnecessary. The US Army videotapes could have confirmed which version of 
the events was most true. The BBC reporter lodged an FOI request with 
Pentagon asking for copies of all the tapes. The request was refused 
(Kampfner, 2003).   249
Based on all the above evidence is fair to say that the current state of 
the federal FOI regime in the US is not worthy of a mature liberal democracy 
which sees itself as a model for the world. 
Having evaluated three established and long standing liberal 
democracies, let us turn to a relative newcomer to the democratic FOI family: 
South Africa.   250
Chapter Nine: South Africa 
 
Introduction 
During the 1990s South Africa (SA) provided the world with political 
inspiration when it managed to transform itself from one of the most oppressive 
countries in the world into a fledgling democracy. As part of this process it 
decided to design a system of government that is as transparent as possible. 
Freedom of Information was considered one of the pillars of this system. 
Political profile 
Of the five countries of study SA is the nation that has gone through the 
most remarkable political changes in contemporary times. It is hard to think of 
any other example in world history where a minority, ruling by violent physical 
and mental oppression, decides to hand over political power to the oppressed 
majority. Even more impressive is that this handover was executed with a 
minimum of violence. The troubled history of SA is acknowledged in the 
preamble to its 1996 constitution: 
We, the people of South Africa,  
Recognise the injustices of our past;  
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;  
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and  
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.  
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution 
as the supreme law of the Republic so as to   
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights;    251
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which 
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally 
protected by law;  
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person; and  
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place 
as a sovereign state in the family of nations.  
May God protect our people.  
Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.  
God seën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa.  
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika 
 (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) 
 
The changes in the SA political landscape have been well documented 
by many scholars and observers and this thesis will provide only a very brief 
overview to show how the political events impacted on the evolution of South 
African FOI.  
In May 1910 the Union of South Africa became a self-governing part of 
the British Commonwealth. The South Africa Act, passed by the British 
Parliament in 1909, served as the SA constitution until 1961 (Congress,1996). 
In May 1961 SA officially became the Republic of South Africa. The 
constitution was re-written and, among other things, legally formalised the 
system of apartheid where black voters were denied what the rest of the liberal 
democratic world considered basic rights for citizens such as: the right to vote, 
the right to stand for election, the right of assembly, etc. The law that came to 
symbolise the depth of oppression in the apartheid system was the Separate   252
Amenities Act that called for, among other things, separate toilet facilities for 
white and black South Africans (ibid). In 1984 the Constitution was rewritten to 
pave the way for a new tri-cameral system that allowed representation for 
coloured (also referred to as non-black) and Indian South Africans. Because the 
system still excluded the black majority it made SA even more of a pariah in the 
international community and a period of severe international isolation began. 
The 1984 constitution was in effect the beginning of the end for 
apartheid. The black majority headed by the African National Congress (ANC) 
started to complement its armed fight for freedom with mass demonstrations 
and civil disobedience prompting the government to implement a number of 
martial laws that led to the use of violence to curb the protests. The then 
President P. W. Botha instigated a number of secret meetings with the jailed 
leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela. These meetings were made official and 
formal by Botha’s successor F. W. de Klerk who in a historic speech in February 
1990 announced the release of eight long-term political prisoners including 
Mandela. This paved the way for further negotiations between the ANC and the 
ruling white National Party and the other ethnic groups. In September 1992 an 
agreement was reached to form a democratically elected five-year interim 
government lead by a political coalition. On May 8 1996 the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa was adopted by the South African Parliament (ibid). 
So, in less then ten years SA had gone from being one of the most un-
fair and un-democratic nations in the world to a fledgling democracy. This is 
important to keep in mind when evaluating the SA FOI system.   253
In describing the current SA political system it may be useful to recall 
figure 1 first presented in chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As figure 1 shows the SA system employs a mix between the 
Westminster and federal systems, much like Australia. The main difference 
between SA and Australia is that SA has a President as its Head of State and 
not the British Monarch. SA has three levels of government: the national 
parliament, nine Provinces (equal to States in the Australian and US systems) 
and local governments. 
The national parliament is bi-cameral and consists of the National 
Assembly (the lower house) and the National Council of Provinces (the upper 
house). The function of and the balance of power between the two houses are 
similar to other federal systems. The Lower House is where most of the 
Federal system  Unitary system 
President executive
Parliamentary executive
US 
Australia 
South Africa 
Sweden
Thailand  254
legislative work is done, but the bills must also pass the Upper House, which in 
effect becomes a house of review mainly representing the interests of the 
provinces. 
The President is elected by the National Assembly. He/she appoints 
and leads the Cabinet that is directly responsible to the National Assembly. In 
reality, just like in other parliamentary systems, it is the majority or coalition that 
elects the President. The fact that the executive head is called President and 
not Prime Minister is at first slightly confusing since presidential systems usually 
have directly-elected Presidents who are answerable not to parliament, but to 
the public. Perhaps SA tried to avoid the problems of the French and Weimar 
models that had both a President and a cabinet executive.  
Although SA is a young democracy its constitution and political model 
easily merit its qualification as a fully-fledged liberal democracy. It has also 
passed one of the most important democratic tests by holding several 
successful and fair elections.  
Evolution of FOI in South Africa 
The origin of FOI in SA is closely linked to its political history. A 
common property of authoritarian systems is the obsession with secrecy and 
the need to control information and the apartheid government in SA was no 
exception. During the apartheid era misinformation was rife and this explains 
the high priority accorded to information access post-apartheid. Currie and 
Klaaren observe that the drive to construct a FOI system was ‘motivated by a 
desire not to repeat the mistakes of the past (2003: 73). Hence the right to   255
access was written into the Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights. Section 32 
reads: 
(1) Everyone has the right of access to 
(a)  any information held by the state; and 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may 
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial 
burden on the state (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) 
So the Constitution guarantees both the right of access and the 
legislation to make it happen in practice. The constitutional foundation for the 
Act will be further discussed below. 
Freedom of Information was deemed so important that work on the draft 
legislation started in 1994 in parallel with work on what was to become the final 
version of the Constitution. The ‘task team’ was lead by the then Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki (currently the President of SA) (Currie and Klaaren, 
2003: 73). The draft legislation was presented to Cabinet in 1996 under the 
name the Open Democracy Bill. The draft suggested the legislation would be an 
‘omnibus’ legislation, that is a law that covered all aspects of the information 
regime. In other FOI systems areas such as privacy, right to open meetings and 
whistleblower protection are usually covered by separate acts. Clearly the draft 
Act was a bit too far-reaching for the cabinet and it was watered down. One of 
the things that was dropped was the whistleblower protection section (ibid). 
However, as we shall se below the Act is still quite far-reaching. 
The Bill was passed in January 2000 under the name of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act (PAIA). It went through a transitional period during   256
which some changes were made, most notably that the processing time allowed 
for agencies went from 90 to 60 to the current and final 30 days (Banisar, 2004: 
77). One trait that makes the SA Act unique remained unchanged: it applies to 
private bodies, such as corporate entities (this will be discussed further below). 
The implementation of the Act has been slow and problematic. The SA 
non-government organisation, the Open Democracy Advice Centre, published a 
pilot survey in 2002 that found that 54 per cent of public sector employees were 
unaware of the Act. Another 16 per cent were aware of the Act but not 
implementing it. Only 30 per cent were aware of the Act and implementing it 
(Currie and Klaaren, 2003: 74). The private sector scored even worse. Only 11 
per cent (6 out of 56) were implementing the Act (ibid). 
The Act delegates to the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) the oversight of the implementation of the Act. The SAHRC also has 
the very important task of spreading information about the Act and educating 
public servants and corporate officers on how to implement the Act. The 
SAHRC notes in its successive annual reports that severe under-funding has 
impeded its ability to monitor implementation effectively (Banisar, 2004: 78). A 
concrete example is the delayed appearance of the general how-to-use PAIA 
manual that SAHRC was supposed to publish by the end of 2003, but which did 
not appear until March 2005 (SAHRC, 2005). 
It should be pointed out that although SA has a federal political system 
the PAIA applies to all levels of government, in contrast to both Australia and 
the US that have one Act that applies to federal agencies and state acts that 
cover state-based agencies.   257
Data presentation and analysis 
The promise: South Africa 
Aims and objectives of the legislation 
The main means of legislation is the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act of 2000. The aims and objectives are clearly defined at the end of the 
preamble to the POAI Act as being to: ‘foster a culture of transparency and 
accountability in public and private bodies by giving effect to the right of access 
to information’ and ‘actively promote a society in which the people of South 
Africa have effective access to information to enable them to more fully exercise 
and protect all for their rights (Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000: 2).’ 
The preamble to the Act explicitly recognises one of the driving forces behind 
the Act: ‘the system of government in South Africa before 27 April 1994, 
amongst others, resulted in a secretive and unresponsive culture in public and 
private bodies which often led to an abuse of power and human rights violations 
(ibid).’ 
The aims and objectives so clearly spelled out by the SA Act closely 
correspond with the generic aims of most FOI regimes detailed in chapter two:  
o Provide  access to personal information held by 
government agencies for control and correction of errors 
o Allow scrutiny (to achieve accountability of political 
representatives and public servants) of administration and 
political decisions/processes and policy making by providing   258
access (both first party and third party) to government-held 
information 
o  Inhibit and prevent maladministration and corruption via 
increased transparency and openness 
o  Increase the quality of policy making by increased public 
participation in the policy process via increased access to 
government held information 
The SA FOI regime will be assessed on its main goals: to foster and 
provide a culture of transparency and accountability and to allow SA citizens to 
exercise their constitutional right of independent access to information. 
‘The promise’: score and summary of findings 
South Africa’s ‘promise’ score was 31 out of 68, indicating a reasonable 
legislative ambition. Table 15 provides an overview of the score and qualitative 
analysis. When not indicated differently, the references in table 15 are based on 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. 
Table 15 ‘the promise’ South Africa 
Question/parameter 
evaluated 
Score Comment 
Part I Access to documents    
2) Does the Act allow the 
agencies to charge processing 
fees? 
1 out of 4  As with the Australian FOI 
Act, the fee structure is 
determined outside the Act. 
Although the Act and its 
guidelines point out that the 
fees for retrieving and 
collating information 
should be reasonable, no 
maximum fees are   259
stipulated. Requests for 
personal information do not 
incur a fee, all other 
requests do. Furthermore, 
’a request for a record...will 
be processed only after a 
request fee has been paid’ 
and ’the fee payable for 
access to a record depends 
on the form in which access 
is required and the 
reasonable time required to 
search for and prepare a 
record (SAHRC, 2002)’. A 
provision to argue 
exemption of the request 
fee exists. As experience 
has shown in Australia, 
when the Act and its 
regulations do  not stipulate 
maximum fees, many 
agencies utilise the method 
of charging excessive fees 
to deter applicants from 
pursuing their application 
since they run the risk of 
getting blank pages in the 
end. 
 
4) How long does the Act give 
the agency to make a decision 
on the request? 
 
1 out of 3  30 days. This is in line with 
most other countries of 
study, but does not send a 
message of urgency to the 
agencies (Promotion of 
Access to Information Act, 
2000: sections 25 and 26) 
6) Does the Act require 
agencies to keep a running 
diary over current and 
archived documents? 
 
0 out of 4  No 
8) Are any federal/national 
agencies exempt from the 
Act? 
 
4 out of 4  That no agencies are 
exempt is highly 
significant. Not to exempt 
agencies that hold sensitive 
information like the 
intelligence agencies is a 
way for the legislators to 
show that the Act applies   260
across the board. Similarly 
to Sweden the SA 
legislators have opted for a 
version where exemptions 
are listed in the Act. 
Exemptions include 
information relating to: 
personal privacy, 
commercial, 
confidentiality, safety of 
persons and property, law-
enforcement proceedings, 
defence, etc. However, 
almost all exemptions 
require  the agency to show 
how the release of the 
information would cause 
harm and most exemptions 
must be weighed against a 
fairly potent public interest 
clause (ibid sections 33-46) 
 
10) Does the Act allow for 
legal costs being covered by 
the state? 
 
3 out of 4  Yes – subject to the public 
interest (ibid sections 78-
82) 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of 
the constitution? 
 
3 out of 4  The Act as such is not part 
of the constitution, but as 
pointed out above it is 
based on the citizens’ rights 
set out in the constitution in 
section 32. Because the 
existence of an FOI act is 
explicitly expressed in the 
Constitution, it can be 
argued that the Act 
effectively has 
constitutional status. If the 
government were to abolish 
PAIA it would breach the 
Constitution. 
 
12) Does the Act apply to the 
private sector? 
 
4 out of 4  This is the truly progressive 
part of the POAI 
legislation. However, there 
are certain hurdles to clear. 
Section 50 (1) (a) qualifies 
the access to records held 
by private entities. To get   261
access the record must be 
part of protecting and 
upholding citizens’ rights 
(Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000). 
These rights are set out by 
the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution. So, a quite 
complicated legal 
discussion can be foreseen 
in these cases. But, the core 
of the matter is that the Act 
provides this option. As 
yet, this is unique in the 
FOI family. 
 
Part II Protection of 
journalistic sources 
  
1) What level of protection of 
journalistic sources exists? 
 
0 out of 0  There is no legal protection 
for media whistleblowers 
2) When can journalists be 
forced to reveal their source?  
 
2 out of 4  In any court case. SA is 
currently coming to grips 
with the concept of 
protection of journalistic 
sources. Media 
organisations argue that the 
Constitution offers 
protection for media 
whistleblowers. Whether 
this applies or not is 
currently being debated and 
there are calls for a media 
whistleblower Act (Steyn, 
2004) 
3) Are journalist in any way 
bound not to reveal their 
source? 
 
1 out of 4  They are not legally bound, 
but ethical practice is not to 
reveal a confidential source 
(ibid). 
4) Are colleagues and 
managers (eg the Minister and 
chief public servant) of a 
government agency in any 
way prevented from 
investigating the source of a 
’leak’ to the press? 
 
0 out of 0  No 
5) If legal protection of 
journalistic sources exists – is 
0 out of 0  No   262
the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the promise’ 
Judging from the score it seems clear that the Act is trying to deliver on 
the aim that independent access to information is a constitutional right of the 
public.  
There are two truly unique traits in PAIA: the strong Constitutional 
backing of the Act (matched only by Sweden whose whole FOI regime is part of 
its Constitution) and the fact that PAIA covers the private sector as well. Overall 
table 15 describes an FOI regime that is sincerely attempting to be far-reaching. 
However, a few trouble spots can be noted, most importantly the unclear 
processing fee guidelines. As pointed out, this can be used by agencies to deter 
requestors, as exemplified by the Australian cases. Another potential problem 
arises from the lack of funding to the agency overseeing the implementation of 
the Act, as mentioned above. There is a lack of clarity about how the appeals 
process will work and how costly it will be. This will be further discussed below. 
Finally, the complete lack of legal protection of journalistic sources is serious 
and is the main reason for the relatively low score. It is however encouraging 
that shield laws for journalists are being discussed. It would have been even 
better if this had been included in the legislation, as was the intention in the 
draft PAIA.   263
 ‘The Spin’: South Africa 
The research question for ‘the spin’ was: what are the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among leading 
politicians and public servants? 
 ‘The spin’: score and summary of findings 
In total 66 questionnaires were sent, 6 responses were received giving 
a response rate of 9%. As noted in the previous studies, this is not a statistical 
quantitative study and each reply is a ‘case study’ in itself capturing individual 
attitudes held by administrators towards FOI.   However, as has also been 
noted, the rate of response may be an indicator of the priority given to FOI in 
each department. The SA response rate compares with the Swedish rate of 31 
per cent, the Australian of 7 per cent and the US of 12 per cent. The response 
rates will be further discussed in chapter eleven. 
After adding up the total score for each survey and then dividing it by 
the total number of replies in the SA case the total score was 270/5
27, which 
gave the average score of 54 out of 76. Table 16 provides an overview of the 
pivotal questions. 
                                                 
27 One of the responses was invalid since the respondent crossed out most of the questions and wrote ‘I 
don’t know’ and ‘not applicable’ across the pages.   264
 
Table 16 ‘the spin’ SA 
Question Score  Comment 
Part I General attitudes FOI    
Questions 1-4  ‘Strongly agree’ and 
‘agree’ in all responses. 
Question  five that asked if 
politicians and public 
servants are generally well 
informed regarding FOI 
generated the reply 
‘disagree’ from all 
respondents. 
The data indicates positive 
general attitudes towards 
FOI. 
An anomaly compared to 
the other three countries of 
study is that all SA 
respondents thought that 
the general level of 
knowledge of FOI among 
SA public servants and 
politicians is very low. 
6. It is good that the SA 
FOI applies to the 
corporate sector. 
 
All responses ‘strongly 
agree’ or ‘agree’. 18 out of 
20 – 90% 
Clearly the respondents are 
very supportive of PAIA 
covering the private sector 
as well ( note: this question 
was re-written to suit the 
fact that the SA Act does 
apply to the private sector 
as opposed to the other 
countries of study) 
Part II Access to government 
held records 
  
2) In your view, what 
length of time is 
reasonable before your 
department makes a 
decision on the request? 
 
13 out of 20 – 65%  This was a bit of a trick 
question. As pointed out in 
the cover letter the survey 
was primarily concerned 
with the attitudes of the 
respondents. 
If they found the law too 
demanding, they had the 
option to voice this.  
Although there is support 
for a short turn-around 
time, there is hesitation that 
indicates that the 
respondents would like 
more decision-making 
time. 
 
3) If your department 
needs to charge a 
18 out of 20 – 90%  Overwhelming support for 
a lowest-cost-possible   265
processing fee, which of 
the costs below do you 
find reasonable? 
 
interpretation of the law. 
7) Which of the following 
statements is closest to 
the attitude held by 
yourself and your staff? 
 
a) the  government 
holds information 
on behalf of the 
people and I 
should endeavour 
to deliver the 
information 
requested as 
soon as possible 
b) the  government 
holds information 
on behalf of the 
people but it is not 
my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for an 
FOI applicant   
c) the  government 
owns the 
information but 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
good  
d) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access 
e) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access and 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
not good 
 
13 out of 20 – 65%  This is the single most 
important question in ‘the 
spin’. It cuts to the core of 
how FOI is interpreted, 
regardless of what the law 
says.  
65% is not a convincing 
score in this important 
question. Three out of the 
five respondents picked 
response c), the other two 
a) and b). 
The score indicates that the 
SA public servants and 
politicians are ambivalent 
about the ownership 
questions and hence what 
their role is: facilitators of 
information access or 
gatekeepers. 
 As pointed out in earlier 
chapters, the importance of 
this attitude cannot be over 
emphasised in regards to 
the practical functionality 
of FOI. 
The complete table 
containing all countries of 
study can be viewed in 
chapter 11. 
8) In your view, which  19 out of 20 – 95%  A very clear backing of the   266
statement most 
adequately describes the 
‘fourth estate’ role that 
some media and 
reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
a)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process and 
delegated to the 
media by the 
citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process, but 
exists on a 
mandate invented 
by the media itself 
c)  It does not have 
any particular 
influence on the 
political 
accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention 
by the media to 
justify its 
existence 
e)  It is a threat to the 
political 
accountability 
process because 
of the 
incompetence of 
most journalists 
 
role of media, which 
indicates a willingness to 
facilitate FOI requests from 
the media. 
9) In your view, which is 
the most important 
function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool 
for political 
accountability 
b) To  increase 
transparency of 
the governing 
process to 
15 out of 20 – 75%  This question relates to the 
accountability function of 
FOI. The score is not really 
all that relevant, when 
looking at this parameter in 
isolation. What is more 
important is what reply 
alternative was the most 
common one. 
In the SA ‘spin’ most 
picked b). Only one picked   267
prevent 
maladministration 
and corruption 
c) To  increase  the 
public’s 
participation in the 
political process 
d)  To allow citizens a 
means to check 
what personal 
data agencies 
hold and to 
correct errors 
e)  FOI is an 
unnecessary law 
that fills no 
particular function 
a). Importantly all 
respondents take the view 
that FOI has a function to 
fill and strongly support the 
theoretical foundation for 
the legislation. 
Part III Protection of 
Journalistic sources 
  
1) What is your view of 
legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made 
stronger and include 
the corporate sector 
when public interests 
are at stake 
b)  It should be made 
stronger in the public 
sector to encourage 
public servants to 
make public 
maladministration 
c)  It should stay the way 
it is 
d)  It should not be 
implemented in SA – 
problems within a 
department are best 
handled internally 
e)  It should not be 
implemented in SA. 
Journalists in general 
cannot not be trusted 
with this level of 
confidence 
 
14 out 20 – 70%  Predominantly positive 
responses – one e) reply. 
2) With public access to  14 out 20 – 70%  Confirms the response in   268
documents, is there a 
need for legal protection 
of journalistic sources? 
 
a) Yes  –  it 
complements the 
access to 
document regime 
and strengthens 
the overall flow of 
public information 
b) Yes  –  it 
encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the 
document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat 
to good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists 
and the media 
would abuse this 
privilege and it 
should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
the question 1. Positive 
attitude towards 
whistleblower protection. 
 
(This can be compared with 
Sweden where the replies 
to this question were a 
resounding round of praise 
for protecting sources. 81% 
picked reply a, the rest 
picked b.) 
3) What are your initial 
feelings towards a public 
servant who leaks 
information to the media 
to disclose 
maladministration? 
  
a)  Yes – it complements 
the access to 
document regime and 
strengthens the 
overall flow of public 
information 
b)  Yes – it encourages 
public servants to talk 
to journalists, but it 
12 out 0f 20 – 60%  More hesitant when it 
comes to the crunch – but 
still on the supportive side.   269
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the document 
access regime is 
enough 
d)  No – it is a threat to 
good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists and 
the media would 
abuse this privilege 
and it should not be 
implemented in SA 
 
 
4) In some countries you 
break the law if you 
investigate who leaked 
information to the media. 
Which of the following 
statements corresponds 
best with your views on 
this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most 
important part of 
the source 
protection. 
Without the legal 
protection it would 
be a ‘paper tiger’ 
b) Journalistic 
sources should 
have legal 
protection, but 
exemptions when 
it is allowed to 
investigate a leak 
should exist 
c) Legal  protection 
for journalistic 
sources as a 
principle is good, 
but the 
exemptions for 
when journalists 
can be forced to 
13 out of 20 – 65%  Majority in favour of this 
most extensive part of 
source protection.   270
reveal their 
sources should be 
far-reaching 
d) Journalistic 
sources do not 
need legal 
protection – 
protection by 
ethical guidelines 
for department 
managers is 
enough 
e) Journalists  are  not 
credible and 
accountable 
enough to be 
granted the 
privilege of legal 
protection of their 
sources 
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the spin’ 
The most interesting question in the SA ‘spin’ was the unanimous view 
that the general knowledge of FOI among public servants and politicians is very 
low. This was contrary to the response of the other three countries and it 
confirms the result of the survey by the Open Democracy Advice Centre 
discussed above. While there were differing views on who owns the information 
held by the government, a majority of the respondents thought that the public 
owns the information. The support for legal protection of media whistleblowers 
was overwhelming; close to the Swedish response and much more positive 
than the Australian and US views on shield laws for journalists.   271
Overall, the high score, 54, indicates that the respondents hold very 
positive views towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources. The question 
is do these attitudes translate into practice? 
‘The practice’: South Africa 
The research question for ‘the practice’ was: in practice, does FOI 
supply journalists (and media organisations) with independent access to 
government held information? 
Looking at the SA scores this far (31 out of 68 for ‘the promise’ and 54 
out of 76 for ‘the spin’) it could be said that the FOI promise is relatively far-
reaching. As in the Australian and US cases, according to the attitudes 
displayed in ‘the spin’, the politicians and public servants in SA seem more 
willing to give access to information than the legislation allows. In other words: 
‘the promise’ says to the public: ‘this legislation gives you the right to access 
virtually all government-held information. It falls on the agencies to justify why 
they will not release requested information’. ‘The spin’ says: ‘FOI is an important 
part of our new democratic system and we as public servants and politicians 
hold the information on behalf of the people and we will release it on request.’ 
Unfortunately this far-reaching promise did not translate into practice. 
Recruitment of reporters 
Similar to the US study, the SA recruitment process was not easy. The 
initial e-mail was sent to the only SA ICIJ member at the beginning of August 
2004. After many follow up e-mails and one phone conversation where he said 
he was interested further contact ceased in mid-September. After various   272
unsuccessful attempts to request assistance from the SA journalism union and 
a number of academic institutions, contact was made with a former academic 
colleague now working at one of the SA universities. She relayed the 
recruitment e-mail to five SA journalists. In mid-November 2004 the first SA 
reporter agreed to take part. Through her the second was recruited by end of 
May 2005 and the last SA reporter signed on early August 2005, close to a year 
after recruitment had begun. 
In the SA case there are more possible reasons for the recruitment 
difficulties compared to the US case. Firstly, the SA media have only operated 
in an uncensored free way for 12 years. Parallel to the constitutional revolution, 
the SA media landscape went through a revolution of its own, perhaps best 
exemplified by the South African Broadcasting Corporation that went from a 
heavily censored mouthpiece of the apartheid government to an independent 
and objective public broadcaster (Congress, 1996). Secondly, based on the 
interviews with the South African reporters, the general awareness of PAIA 
among South African journalists appears to be very low.  Perhaps this made 
them feel less inclined to take part in the study. However, it should be pointed 
out that the recruitment result in SA was better than in the US in that it 
generated three actively working reporters. Reporter F is a researcher with a 
well-respected TV current affairs program. Reporter G is a reporter with one of 
the biggest daily newspapers and so is Reporter H. Again the gender 
distribution was two males and one female.   273
‘The practice’: score and summary of findings 
Similar to the US ‘practice’ the score for SA is 0, for the same reasons: 
the receiving departments failed to meet the most basic criteria of the Act – 
delivering a decision on time. 
The first request, submitted by Reporter F, sought information the 
Department of Immigration on suicide and self-harm in SA detention centres for 
refugees. The original request was lodged May 23 2005. Three days later 
Reporter F received a phone call from the Deputy Information Officer that 
confirmed the receipt of the requests. He asked Reporter F what her deadline 
was. Reporter F responded that it was two weeks and got the impression that 
she would receive the information within that timeframe. Reporter F was also 
asked to e-mail her request, which she did. Two weeks passed without any 
decision. In late June she left a phone message to remind the information 
officer. At the time of writing (April, 2006) she had received no decision on her 
request. When asked how she found the process, Reporter F responded: ‘very 
disappointing! When I got the confirmation call after three days I thought that 
this will really work, but since then I’ve heard nothing (Interview: 9, 2005).’ 
The second request, by Reporter G, was lodged with the Office of the 
President and asked for the President’s expenditure for overseas travel during 
2004. It was lodged on June 9 2005. Fifteen days later, June 24, Reporter G 
received a letter from the President’s office confirming the receipt of the 
request. More than a month later, July 27, he got a phone message from a 
public servant in the President’s office saying that the request could not be 
processed since it was not submitted using the correct form. At this point the   274
department was in breach of the Act since it was more than 30 days (63 days) 
since the original request was submitted. According to the Act a decision should 
be made within 30 days. The public servant promised to mail the request form 
to Reporter G, but this never eventuated. Instead the form was located using 
the Internet. On September 12, Reporter G lodged the request again using the 
form. On September 15 he received a confirmation letter. At the time of writing 
(April, 2006) the President’s office is now for the second time in breach of the 
Act, since the processing time has expired (Interview: 10, 2005). 
As already noted, the current SA President, Thabo Mbeki, led the team 
that drafted the PAIA. It is at the very least embarrassing that the highest office 
in the land held by one of the ‘fathers’ of FOI in SA cannot process a 
straightforward request within the framework of the Act. 
The third SA request, by Reporter H, was lodged on June 10 with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and sought information on SA weapons trade 
with a number of surrounding nations. As of October, Reporter H has heard 
nothing from the Department (Interview: 11, 2005). At the time of writing (April, 
2006), Reporter H is still waiting for a response. 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the practice’ 
The poor result for SA in ‘the practice’ is consistent with the survey 
done by the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) in 2002. The survey 
found that ‘on the whole, PAIA has not been properly or consistently 
implemented, not only because of the newness of the Act, but because of low 
levels of awareness and information of the requirements set out in the Act.   275
Where implementation has taken place it has been partial and inconsistent 
(Banisar, 2004: 79).’ It is disappointing that little seems to have improved since 
the 2002 ODAC survey. The inconsistency in implementation is also confirmed 
by the findings in ‘the practice’ where one department, the President’s office, 
asked for the request to be submitted using the proper forms, where the other 
two departments did not demand such a procedure. 
As pointed out above, the overseeing agency, the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) has received very limited funding for its task of 
monitoring FOI. This could be one explanation for the poor implementation of 
FOI. It also indicates a low level commitment to the FOI regime by the SA 
government in spite of its supposedly high profile. Another result of the lack of 
funding for SAHRC relates to its reporting duties. The Act delegates to the 
agency the task of reporting on the use of the Act. The first report was 
supposed to be submitted to the SA Parliament by the end of 2003, but has yet 
to be presented. Hence, there are no statistics available that can be used as a 
tracking tool for the functionality of PAIA. 
There is however some cause for hope. Currie and Klaaren describe 
one court case involving an appeal of a refused PAIA request. The ruling was 
very favourable to the requestor and other pending cases indicate a similar 
trend (2003: 75-76). 
When we apply the SA data to the research question for the ‘practice’: 
in practice, does PAIA supply journalists (and media organisations) with 
independent access to government held information? The answer is NO. 
The reason is that the Act does not deliver on the most basic of requirements:   276
delivering decisions on time. A more serious question is whether the 
departments and agencies deliver decisions at all. Furthermore, if the public 
agencies cannot set a good example by adhering to the Act, what message 
does that send to the private bodies that fall under the Act? 
Overall analysis: South Africa 
Having presented the data in each study let us look at how the data 
connects to the overall research questions: to what extent, if any, are the 
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? Table 17 provides a quantitative overview: 
Table 17 Quantitative data SA 
  ‘the promise’  ‘the spin’  ‘the practice’ 
Score  31 out of 68  54 out of 76   0 of 68 
Score in %  45%  71%  0% 
Looking at the above data the answer is: the promise is not borne out at 
all in practice. Currently the SA FOI regime is highly, if not totally dysfunctional, 
at least within the aims and objectives set by the legislation. The system does 
not deliver in the way the Act intends it to.  
The SA FOI Act scored significantly better in ‘the promise’ compared to 
Australia. However, like both Australia and the US, the public servants and 
politicians seem to promise much more than they deliver. As a matter of fact, 
they promise very good access and, as the practice shows, deliver nothing. The 
poor state of the SA FOI system is further underscored by the qualitative 
findings:   277
o  Data gathering:  None of the SA requests generated information 
within the framework of the legislation even though the initial 
contacts with information officers were promising.  
o  Delivery time: Currently the SA departments evaluated in ‘the 
practice’ have been in breach of the legislation for six months 
with no indication they will ultimately comply. 
o  Whistleblower protection: While there is no legal protection of 
journalistic sources as described by ‘the promise’ very positive 
attitudes towards source protection were displayed by the replies 
in ‘the spin’. 
South Africa’s extraordinary transformation from totalitarian to 
democratic state and the newness of the PAIA are factors that may explain 
some of the dysfunctionality of the SA FOI system. However, it must be seen as 
serious that the agency that is put in charge of overseeing the implementation 
of PAIA is so under-funded. As mentioned above this demonstrates a low 
commitment to the free flow of information from the current government. The 
FOI system has now existed for five years in SA and it would have been 
reasonable to expect at least one of the requests in this study to generate 
information within the framework of the legislation. The poor performance of the 
President’s office is particularly disappointing considering his supposed 
commitment to FOI.   278
Conclusion   
When South Africa became a democracy in the 1990s it was held up as 
an international inspirational example. This chapter has shown that its troubled 
past played a vital role in giving the FOI issue a prominent place in South 
Africa’s new Constitution. The SA studies also showed that the FOI legislation is 
powerful and that the attitudes of leading politicians and public servants are 
very positive towards FOI. Unfortunately the idea of holding information on 
behalf of the public does not appear to translate into facilitating access to that 
information 
From a wider African perspective SA plays a vital leadership role. The 
other African nations will look to SA to lead the way on transparency and 
openness in governance. Let us hope for a more positive outcome next time 
‘the practice’ is implemented in South Africa. 
It is now time to turn to the last country in this project: Thailand, one of 
three Southeast Asian nations that have enacted FOI.   279
Chapter Ten: Thailand 
Introduction 
Thailand is the last country of study in this project. It proved to be the 
greatest challenge in recruiting reporters for ‘the practice’. So, much so, that this 
sub-study is incomplete in the Thai case. However, other data were captured 
that was able to contribute to the project. 
Political profile 
Thailand is unusual politically in Southeast Asia (SEA) in several 
respects. It is one of very few SEA countries that have not been colonised 
during any period in contemporary history. It is one of three SEA nations that 
have legislated for FOI (the other two are Japan and South Korea) and it is 
considered a relatively mature liberal democracy. However, as we shall see, the 
current and previous Thai governments struggle with the concept of a free and 
independent press. 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy. The monarchical history goes 
back a long way. The first united Thai state was proclaimed as the Kingdom of 
Sukhothai in the 13
th century (1257-1378). This established an absolute 
monarchy that as its greatest feat managed to steer Thailand through the 19
th 
century as an autonomous state when so many of the other SEA countries were 
ruled by the various colonial powers of the time such as the United Kingdom, 
France and the Netherlands (Thailand, 2005: 1). The absolute monarchy was 
challenged in the 1920s and in 1932 King Prajadhipok agreed to transfer power 
to a constitution-based system of government (ibid).   280
The armed forces and their leaders have always played a prominent 
role in Thai politics. Although national elections to choose political 
representatives have been held since the 1930s, many democratically elected 
governments have been overthrown by military coups. The last coup was in 
1991. Subsequently governments have been elected and dismissed by 
elections (CH, 2003). 
To situate the Thai political system in the general political context it may 
be useful to recall figure 1 first presented in chapter five. 
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Figure 1 shows that Sweden and Thailand have a very similar base for 
their political systems. Both countries are constitutional monarchies with a 
Monarch as Head of State; both countries draw their executive heads from the 
majority party/coalition in parliament; and in both countries the executive is 
directly responsible to the House of Representatives. Both are also highly 
unitary countries as described in chapter five. 
Thailand’s legislative branch is bi-cameral. The House of 
Representatives has 500 members. The members of the 200 seat Senate (the 
upper house) used to be appointed by the King, but in 2000 were directly 
elected for the first time (Thailand, 2005: 4). An interesting point is that 
candidates who stand for a senate seat cannot belong to a political party.  
In what was a political first in Thailand the general elections in February 
2005 saw the incumbent Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra re-elected with a 
landslide majority. The party founded by Thaksin in 1999, Thai Rak Thai (Thai 
loves Thai), increased the absolute majority gained in the 2001 elections to 375 
of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives (Electionworld, 2005)
28. 
Thus far the Thai political system seems like a fully functioning liberal 
democracy with fair and free elections and an enacted FOI regime as an added 
bonus. However as mentioned above, media freedom and independence is an 
issue. This is best illustrated by the fact that the government and military control 
most national television and radio networks (BBC, 2005). Add to this the fact 
                                                 
28 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra resinged as PM on April 4, 2006 after months of demonstrations 
against allaged corrupt behaviour.   282
that Prime Minister Thaksin is the largest owner of private media in the country 
and a very restricted media landscape emerges. This will be further discussed 
below. 
Another recent problem for Thailand’s democracy has been the re-
emergence of separatist violence in its southern Muslim region. The 
government has enacted emergency powers in the region: ‘the laws enable the 
authorities to censor the media and to detain suspects without charge (BBC, 
2005).’ Connors points out that Thailand has pulled off a PR coup of gigantic 
proportions in managing to the keep the tourist brand alive in spite of the fact 
that ‘a week hardly goes by without a bombing incident or seemingly random 
slaying’ in Thailand’s southern regions of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani where 
Malay Muslims are in majority (Connors, 2005: 1). 
Evolution of FOI in Thailand 
The right of access to government-held information is supported by 
section 48 of the 1997 Constitution: 
A person shall have the right to get access to public information in possession of a 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation, unless the 
disclosure of such information shall affect the security of the State, public safety or 
interests of other persons which shall be protected as provided by law (cited in 
Banisar, 2004: 84). 
This section first appeared in the previous Constitution in 1991. The 
Official Information Act (OIA) was approved in July 1997. In most countries the 
enactment of an FOI system is usually preceded by a lengthy and often heated 
debate as to why FOI should be made law and how it would benefit the country. 
This does not seem to be the case in Thailand. In spite of extensive research no   283
such background information has been found. Because of Thailand’s unitary 
system with two levels of government, OIA applies to all levels of government. 
Data presentation and analysis 
‘The promise’: Thailand 
Aims and objectives of the legislation 
All FOI acts evaluated in this project spell out the aims and objectives of 
the legislation either in a preamble or as part of the legislation itself. Not so the 
Thai Act.  Because no aims and objectives are stated it is hard to ‘benchmark’ 
the Thai legislation and define what it promises. Instead the Act will be 
evaluated on what it provides for. In general the Thai Act is a very sparse 
document compared to the other acts evaluated. One reason for this could be 
that the Act delegates to the very powerful Official Information Board, consisting 
of the top public servants (the Permanent Secretaries) within each national 
department, the power ‘to supervise and give advice with regards to the 
performance of duties of State officials and state agencies for the 
implementation of this Act (Official Information Act, 1997: Sec 28 (1)).’ The 
vagueness of the Act provides the Board with a very large scope for 
interpretation and top-down implementation. It has been very hard to gain 
independent and credible information on how the Act works in practice. 
Attempts were made via the website of the Office of the Official Information 
Commission (OIC), which is part of the Prime Minister’s office. The English 
language version of the site was mostly under construction. According to 
Banisar: ‘there were many requests in the first three years of the Act (2004: 
85).’ There was one particularly high profile case where a requestor sought   284
information regarding the entrance tests to an elite state school. Her request 
was initially refused. She appealed to the OIC and the courts and was 
eventually granted access. The documents showed that children of influential 
people gained entry in spite of low scores (ibid). Following a number of initial 
successful requests, Banisar observes that interest for the Act seems to be 
slipping, ‘especially with the media, who appear to use the Act very infrequently 
(ibid).’  
The Prime Minister seems to be aware of the problems with the FOI 
system. In 2002 the Thai government proclaimed the ‘Year of Access to Official 
Information’. Prime Minister Thaksin called on citizens to use the Act as a 
means to fight corruption. He said: ‘I believe 95 per cent of government 
information can be disclosed to the public. I myself have nothing to hide (ibid, 
p.86).’ 
‘The promise’: score and summary of findings 
 
Thailand’s ‘promise’ score is 18 out of 68, indicating a very low 
legislative ambition. When not indicated differently, the references in table 18 
are based on the Official Information Act of 1997.   285
 
Table 18 ‘the promise’ Thailand 
Question/parameter 
evaluated 
Score Comment 
Part I Access to documents    
2) Does the Act allow the 
agencies to charge processing 
fees? 
0 out of 4  The Act is vague. Section 7 
(8) states: 
‘A person whether 
interested in the matter 
concerned or not, has the 
right to inspect or obtain a 
copy or a certified copy of 
the information under 
paragraph one. In an 
appropriate case, a State 
agency may, with the 
approval of the Board, lay 
down rules on the 
collection of fees therefore. 
For this purpose, regard 
shall also be had to the 
making of concession given 
to persons with low 
incomes, unless otherwise 
provided by specific law 
(Official Information Act, 
1997: Sec 7 (8))’ 
 
In effect the Act leaves it 
up to each agency to 
determine the processing 
fees, in consultation with 
the Board. This is a major 
gap in the law that makes it 
possible for agencies to 
charge excessive fees to 
deter requestors from 
proceeding. 
 
4) How long does the Act give 
the agency to make a decision 
on the request? 
 
0 out of 4  Section 11 puts the 
processing time (including 
acknowledgement of 
receipt of request) to ‘a 
reasonable period of time’. 
Again, this is too vague and   286
much to open for 
interpretation which gives 
openings for breaches and 
non-compliance. All other 
acts evaluated clearly 
stipulate a time frame in the 
Act. 
 
6) Does the Act require 
agencies to keep a running 
diary over current and 
archived documents? 
 
3 out of 4  Yes, to a certain extent, as 
regulated by Section 12. 
This is the one feature of 
the OIA that sets it apart in 
a positive light from the 
other evaluated acts (apart 
from the Swedish one that 
also demands the agencies 
to keep a diary) 
Question/parameter 
evaluated 
Score Comment 
8) Are any federal/national 
agencies exempt from the 
Act? 
 
3 out of 4  Section 14 states that: 
‘official information which 
may jeopardise the Royal 
Institution shall not be 
disclosed’. In what way 
disclosure of information 
could harm the Royal 
Institution is very unclear. 
Apart from that no other 
agencies are exempt. There 
are the usual exemptions 
for information relating to: 
national security, 
international relations, 
national or economic 
security, law enforcement, 
personal information etc. 
So, only one agency is 
explicitly exempt. This can 
be compared to the 
Australian Act where 12 
agencies are exempt. 
 
10) Does the Act allow for 
legal costs being covered by 
the state? 
 
0 out of 4  No 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of 
the constitution? 
 
0 out of 4  The Act does have some 
support in the Constitution, 
but only general support. It   287
does not have the explicit 
support as in the cases of 
South Africa or Sweden. 
 
12) Does the Act apply to the 
private sector? 
 
0 out of 4  No 
 
Part II Protection of 
journalistic sources 
  
1) What level of protection of 
journalistic sources exists? 
 
0 out of 0  There is no legal protection 
for media whistleblowers 
2) When can journalists be 
forced to reveal their source?  
 
2 out of 4  In any court case. There 
seems to be considerable 
fear among journalists for 
professional repercussions 
such as transferral to a less 
attractive job after 
publishing critical stories 
about government 
(Harrison, 2004: 21) 
3) Are journalist in any way 
bound not to reveal their 
source? 
 
0 out of 4  No 
4) Are colleagues and 
managers (eg the Minister and 
chief public servant) of a 
government agency in any 
way prevented from 
investigating the source of a 
’leak’ to the press? 
 
0 out of 0  No 
5) If legal protection of 
journalistic sources exists – is 
the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
0 out of 0  No 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the promise’ 
There is really only one positive aspect about the OIA: the onus on 
agencies to keep a diary over available documents. This is the only reason why 
OIA scored higher than the Australian FOI Act (18 compared to 13). Thailand 
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and Australia have by far the least ambitious FOI legislations. As already noted 
the worst feature of the Thai Act is the Information Board, which clearly serves 
as a central instrument of government to control what information is being 
released. 
The lack of specificity in the OIA gives the Information Board virtually 
unlimited room for interpretation on issues such as ‘reasonable’ turnaround time 
and ‘reasonable’ processing fees. 
When ‘the promise’ data is applied to the research question: what are 
the aims of the Thai FOI legislation and what does it promise to deliver in 
terms of information access? It can only be concluded that the Thai FOI Act 
promises very little in terms of independent information access. 
‘The spin’: Thailand 
The research question for ‘the spin’ was: what are the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among leading 
politicians and public servants? 
 
‘The spin’: score and summary of findings 
In total 67 questionnaires were sent, 17 responses were received giving 
a response rate of 25 per cent. The Thai response rate can be compared with 
the Swedish rate at 31 per cent and the Australian at 7 per cent. It must be 
noted that the relatively high Thai response rate (second only to Sweden) 
indicates that the Thai government finds FOI a highly important issue. The 
response rates will be further discussed in chapter 11.   289
The total score for ‘the spin’ was 968/17, which gave the average score 
of 56 out of 76. ‘The spin’ posed 19 questions in three sections to capture the 
attitudes towards FOI. Table 19 provides an overview of the pivotal questions. 
Table 19 ‘the spin’ Thailand 
Question Score  Comment 
Part I General attitudes FOI    
Questions 1-5  ‘Strongly agree’ and 
‘agree’ in  close to all 
responses. 
 
The data indicates very 
positive general attitudes 
towards FOI. 
 
6. OIA should apply to 
the to the corporate 
sector. 
 
Almost all responses 
‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’. 
49 out of 68 – 72% 
Clearly the respondents are 
very supportive of the 
suggestion that OIA should 
apply to the private sector 
as well. 
Part II Access to 
government held records 
  
2) In your view, what 
length of time is 
reasonable before your 
department makes a 
decision on the request? 
 
60 out of 68 – 88%  This was a bit of a trick 
question. As pointed out in 
the cover letter the survey 
was primarily concerned 
with the attitudes of the 
respondents. 
If they found the law too 
demanding, they had the 
option to voice this.  
According to the responses 
the turnaround time for 
most FOI request in 
Thailand should be 1-5 
days. 
3) If your department 
needs to charge a 
processing fee, which of 
the costs below do you 
find reasonable? 
 
61 out of 68 – 90%  Overwhelming support for 
a low-cost-as-possible 
interpretation of the law. 
7) Which of the following 
statements is closest to 
the attitude held by 
yourself and your staff? 
 
49 out of 68 – 72%  This is the single most 
important question in ‘the 
spin’. It cuts to the core of 
how FOI is interpreted, 
regardless of what the law   290
a) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people and I 
should endeavour 
to deliver the 
information 
requested as 
soon as possible 
b) the  government 
hold information 
on behalf of the 
people but it is not 
my role to serve 
as an ‘information 
facilitator’ for an 
FOI applicant   
c) the  government 
owns the 
information but 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
good  
d) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access 
e) the  government 
owns the 
information and 
decides who will 
have access and 
increased 
openness and 
transparency is 
not good 
 
says.  
72% is a relatively 
convincing score. However 
the responses vary between 
a) or c) and e) only. This 
indicates that there is a firm 
divide in the attitudes 
towards ownership of 
information. 
8) In your view, which 
statement most 
adequately describes the 
‘fourth estate’ role that 
some media and 
reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
a)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
53 out of 68 – 78%  A clear backing of the role 
of media, which indicates a 
will to facilitate FOI 
requests from the media.   291
process and 
delegated to the 
media by the 
citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of 
the political 
accountability 
process, but 
exists on a 
mandate invented 
by the media itself 
c)  It does not have 
any particular 
influence on the 
political 
accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention 
by the media to 
justify its 
existence 
e)  It is a threat to the 
political 
accountability 
process because 
of the 
incompetence of 
most journalists 
 
9) In your view, which is 
the most important 
function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool 
for political 
accountability 
b) To  increase 
transparency of 
the governing 
process to 
prevent 
maladministration 
and corruption 
c) To  increase  the 
public’s 
participation in the 
political process 
d)  To allow citizens a 
means to check 
45 out of 68 – 66%  The coding in this question 
is based on the 
accountability function of 
FOI. The score is not really 
all that relevant, when 
looking at this parameter in 
isolation. What is more 
important is what reply 
alternative was the most 
common one. 
In the Thai ‘spin’ only one 
respondent picked a), most 
picked b) followed by c). 
This indicates that FOI as 
tool for political 
accountability is not high 
on the agenda. Still, the 
responses illustrate views 
that FOI has a function to 
fill and support the   292
what personal 
data agencies 
hold and to 
correct errors 
e)  FOI is an 
unnecessary law 
that fills no 
particular function 
theoretical foundation for 
the legislation. 
Part III Protection of 
Journalistic sources 
  
1) What is your view of 
legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made 
stronger and include 
the corporate sector 
when public interests 
are at stake 
b)  It should be made 
stronger in the public 
sector to encourage 
public servants to 
make public 
maladministration 
c)  It should stay the way 
it is 
d)  It should not be 
implemented in SA – 
problems within a 
department are best 
handled internally 
e)  It should not be 
implemented in SA. 
Journalists in general 
cannot not be trusted 
with this level of 
confidence 
 
51 out of 68 – 75%  Predominantly positive 
responses – three c) and d) 
replies. 
2) With public access to 
documents, is there a 
need for legal protection 
of journalistic sources? 
 
a) Yes  –  it 
complements the 
access to 
document regime 
and strengthens 
55 out of 68 – 81%  Confirms the response in 
the question 1. Very 
positive attitudes towards 
whistleblower protection. 
 
   293
the overall flow of 
public information 
b) Yes  –  it 
encourages public 
servants to talk to 
journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the 
document access 
regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat 
to good public 
administration 
e)  No – journalists 
and the media 
would abuse this 
privilege and it 
should not be 
implemented in 
Australia 
 
3) What are your initial 
feelings towards a public 
servant who leaks 
information to the media 
to disclose 
maladministration? 
  
a)  Yes – it complements 
the access to 
document regime and 
strengthens the 
overall flow of public 
information 
b)  Yes – it encourages 
public servants to talk 
to journalists, but it 
could probably be 
replaced by a re-
worked document 
access regime 
c)  No – the document 
access regime is 
enough 
d)  No – it is a threat to 
good public 
55 out of 68 – 81%  So, even when it comes to 
‘the crunch’ the Thai 
respondents are very 
positive towards the 
concept of whistleblowing. 
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administration 
e)  No – journalists and 
the media would 
abuse this privilege 
and it should not be 
implemented in SA 
 
 
4) In some countries you 
break the law if you 
investigate who leaked 
information to the media. 
Which of the following 
statements corresponds 
best with your views on 
this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most 
important part of 
the source 
protection. 
Without the legal 
protection it would 
be a ‘paper tiger’ 
b) Journalistic 
sources should 
have legal 
protection, but 
exemptions when 
it is allowed to 
investigate a leak 
should exist 
c) Legal  protection 
for journalistic 
sources as a 
principle is good, 
but the 
exemptions for 
when journalists 
can be forced to 
reveal their 
sources should be 
far-reaching 
d) Journalistic 
sources do not 
need legal 
protection – 
protection by 
ethical guidelines 
45 out of 68 – 66% 
 
More hesitancy, but still a 
healthy majority that agrees 
with extending the ultimate 
legal protection to media 
whistleblowers.   295
for department 
managers is 
enough 
e) Journalists  are  not 
credible and 
accountable 
enough to be 
granted the 
privilege of legal 
protection of their 
sources 
 
 
Discussion and analysis: ‘the spin’ 
The ’spin’ score for Thailand, 56, is the second highest in the project 
after Sweden’s 65. Judging by the Thai ’spin’ data only, Thailand’s FOI regime 
should work very efficiently and provide quick, cheap and independent access 
to most government-held information. The Thai public servants and politicians 
also appear to be very supportive of media’s fourth estate role. According to the 
replies to question 8, they even wholeheartedly support the concept of media 
whistleblowing. In terms of the research question: what are the attitudes 
towards FOI and protection of journalistic sources among leading 
politicians and public servants? The overall interpretation of the Thai ‘spin’ 
data is that it gives a ringing endorsement of everything that a very progressive 
FOI regime stands for. The question is: how does this measure up in ’the 
practice’? 
‘The practice’: Thailand 
Unfortunately this project will not provide an answer to the above 
question. Despite every effort, the three Thai journalists needed for ‘the   296
practice’ could not be recruited. The possible reasons for this will be discussed 
below. 
Recruitment of reporters 
As with the other countries of study, recruitment started with the 
membership list of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ). There is no Thai member. The closest was an Australian freelance 
journalist based in Thailand. That was my starting point. The first e-mail was 
sent August 8 2004, but generated no reply. 
There are two English language newspapers in Thailand: The Bangkok 
Post and The Nation. Both are privately owned and independent enough to at 
times critically scrutinize government. Most journalists working at these two 
publications are, for obvious reasons, very skilled in English. They are also 
native Thai speakers, essential for putting in the Thai FOI requests. So, these 
two publications seemed a logical starting point. A recruitment letter to the 
Editor of the Bangkok Post early September 2004 generated no response. 
Via the Walkley Magazine I tracked down an Australian journalist who 
had worked for two months at the Bangkok Post. He provided me with the name 
and e-mail of one of the editors who he knew had a keen interest in FOI. E-mail 
contact was attempted in early October 2004, but received no response. After a 
very brief phone conversation in mid-October he asked me to re-send the e-
mail, which I did, but there was still no response. The next stop was an 
Australian sub-editor at The Nation – again, no response. At this point I decided 
to seek the advice of the Asia Research Centre (ARC) at Murdoch University.   297
The ARC pointed out that most Asia researchers and watchers avoided 
using Thailand as a base for case studies since it is notoriously hard to get Thai 
academics and journalists to participate in research projects. One of the 
academics suggested the use of Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan or South Korea 
instead. As mentioned above, the only other SEA countries with an enacted FOI 
are Japan and South Korea. However, both these countries are too similar to 
Sweden, Australia and the US economically. Thailand was essential to ensure 
the study had an adequate range of political and economic systems . After a 
fortnight of e-mails the very helpful Director of the ARC found a Thai academic 
who recommended a reporter at The Nation. 
The initial recruitment e-mail was sent in early March, 2005. Reporter I 
responded within two days. She agreed to participate and recommended two 
other names. One was a close colleague at The Nation who was also a press 
freedom activist. The other reporter was an editor of a political magazine that 
frequently used FOI. Suddenly it was all happening. Two new recruitment e-
mails were sent – no response. Reporter I preferred to be briefed via e-mail 
instead of via phone. All necessary information was sent, including making clear 
my role and the fact that the agency receiving the request must not know that 
the request was part of a study. After three weeks, March 27, the next e-mail 
arrived. Reporter I seemed very hesitant in participating and referred to a heavy 
workload. I explained that lodging the requests were not a complex process and 
offered assistance. No response. At this point the other case studies were 
demanding attention and it was decided to put Thailand aside for the moment.   298
On May 30, 2005 three draft OIA requests were e-mailed to Reporter I. 
This was to offer her the same assistance as some of the other journalists in the 
other countries of study. By now a considerable amount of research had been 
done on the media political situation in Thailand and I felt obliged to ask 
Reporter I the following question: 
It would also be very useful for me to know if there are any other issues but time 
that play a role. 
The only way I can ask is to be frank: do you fear any sort of ‘problems’ for you 
professionally if you lodge an OIA request? Like political pressure? Or censorship 
issues? Having your honest answer to that question would be very useful to me. 
You should be aware that you will at all times remain anonymous in my writings 
about this study. I will only refer to you as Thai Journalist A. So, your identity 
stays with me (extract from e-mail to Reporter I) 
There was no reply and the attempt to recruit Thai journalists was 
abandoned (apart from one last effort on November 26 when the Thai 
Journalism Union was e-mailed a request for assistance – no response). 
More research is needed to determine why the recruitment process in 
Thailand failed. Three hypothetical reasons can be identified. 
1.  Low awareness and knowledge of FOI legislation. This could 
apply to some of the contacted reporters, but the last three 
including Reporter I had more than average FOI knowledge. 
2.  The fact that Thai journalists are not operating in a media context 
where press freedom is extensive, and hence critical and 
investigative journalism which would make most use of FOI is not 
commonplace. On the other hand – recruitment was successful 
in South Africa, where journalism was also restricted until only a 
decade ago.   299
3.  Thai journalists might be fearful of repercussions such as loss of 
job or transfer to a less interesting job if they scrutinize 
government in a critical way. This includes lodging FOI requests.  
Recent writings and observations support this latter interpretation. One 
writer points out that ‘the media are free to criticise government policies and 
cover instances of corruption and human rights abuses, but journalists tend to 
exercise self-censorship regarding the military, the monarchy, the judiciary and 
other sensitive issues (BBC, 2005: 4).’ Other observers claim that Prime 
Minister Thaksin via his own very extensive media ownership and that of his 
colleagues and affiliates economically controls the media by directing 
advertising. Harrison gives a recent example of this trend: 
Last December, the Post [Bangkok Post] published the headline “King warns PM 
on arrogance” above a front-page report of remark made by the king in his birthday 
speech. Veera [Editor of the Bangkok Post] was hauled before one the company’s 
major shareholders and asked to explain. “They said that the Prime Minister was 
not very happy,” he says. “After that I was given three months to make changes in 
the editorial department.” (2004: 21) 
Generally the mood amongst Thai journalists seems to be quite 
pessimistic. The editor of The Nation observes that ‘the media at the moment is 
in a state of intensive care…the point is you have a leader who doesn’t respect 
freedom of the press (ibid).’ 
The director of the Southeast Asian Press Alliance is even more 
pessimistic: 
The optimistic mood of the late 90s that followed the establishment of Thailand’s 
new constitution has been replaced with one of hopelessness. Now the domino is 
falling back again…the overall situation is really dismal because if Thailand falls, 
then there is no leading voice of the region (ibid).   300
Judging from the comments above, it does not sound like a system 
within which FOI would flourish or where use of the legislation would be 
encouraged. 
Overall analysis: Thailand 
Having presented the data in each study let us look at how the data 
connects to the overall research questions: to what extent, if any, are the 
promises made by Freedom of Information legislation borne out by the 
practice in the countries of study? Table 20 provides a quantitative overview: 
Table 20 Quantitative data Thailand 
  ‘the promise’  ‘the spin’  ‘the practice’ 
Score  18 out of 68  56 out of 76   N/a 
Score in %  26%  76%   
Apart from the failed ‘practice’ study, the most striking feature of the 
Thai data is the big gap between what the legislation promises and how the 
public servants and politicians view it. Either they have faith way beyond the 
capabilities of the law or they have interpreted it very much in favour of the 
users. However the ‘spun’ version of Thai FOI will not be put to the test in this 
project because of the failure to recruit reporters.  
Conclusion   
The Thai study revealed the largest gap of all between the promise of 
the legislation and the attitude of the government administrators. Despite the 
administrators’ vision of easy, fast and very extensive access to government-
held information this is belied by the weakness of the actual legislative 
instrument. Because it was not possible to put the legislation to the test the   301
overall research question concerning the effectiveness of FOI remains 
unanswered in Thailand’s case. Just as South Africa plays a leadership role in 
furthering transparency in governance in Africa, so does Thailand in Southeast 
Asia. As one of three Southeast Asian nations with FOI legislation it is vital to 
map how it works in practice. This is a loose end that needs to be tied up, but 
time restrictions prevent this being achieved in the context of the present study. 
 This was the last of the data presentation chapters. It is now time to 
turn to the most exciting part of comparative research – the overall comparative 
table.   302
 
 
Chapter Eleven: The FOI Index 
Introduction 
This chapter will present the FOI Index. It will summarise the most 
relevant data from the preceding five country studies, in a comparative table 
providing overview of the data on which the FOI Index is based. The findings 
will be discussed and recommendations for reform for each country of study will 
be explored. 
The Freedom of Information Index 
The sub-studies discussed in chapters six to ten generated three scores 
per country. To achieve an index score the three scores needed to be collapsed 
into one score. This was done by dividing the totalled country scores by the total 
possible score of 212 (68+76+68). For instance: Sweden generated the 
following scores: ‘the promise’: 63 out of 68, ‘the spin’: 65 out of 76 and ‘the   303
practice’: 47out of 68, generating a total score of 175 out of the possible 
maximum of 212, or 82 per cent. The index scale ranges from 0.0 to 10.0, 
where 10.0 is a fully functional FOI system scoring top on all evaluation 
parameters across all three sub-studies. 10.0 is not a utopian score. It is quite 
achievable, but requires a far-reaching FOI system including extensive legal 
protection of media whistleblowers in addition to public servants and politicians 
acting as information access facilitators. The reason for the 0.0-10.0 scale was 
that it was perceived to be easier to digest quickly rather than presenting the 
score in percentage format. Sweden’s score, 82 per cent, thus translates into 
8.2 out of 10.0. Table 21 (starting on the next page) summarises the scores and 
the most important qualitative data and provides an initial analysis of the data. 
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Table 21 
The FOI 
Index 
Sweden 
Score 
Sweden 
Comment 
SA 
Score 
SA 
Comment 
US 
Score 
US 
Comment 
Australia 
Score 
Australia 
Comment 
Thailand 
Score 
Thailand 
Comment 
Overall 
Analysis 
The 
Promise 
63  Very far-
reaching 
promise 
 
FOI system 
part of 
constitution 
 
Extensive 
legal 
protection of 
sources 
 
All 
information 
perceived 
public and 
accessible 
within days at 
very low cost 
 
No processing 
costs 
 
No agencies 
exempt from 
Act 
 
Act does not 
apply to 
private sector 
31  Relatively 
ambitious 
legislation 
FOI system 
explicitly 
backed by 
constitution 
 
No legal 
protection of 
sources 
 
Most 
information 
perceived 
public within 
30 days 
 
Processing 
costs 
 
No agencies 
exempt from 
Act 
 
Act applies 
to private 
sector 
31  Relatively 
ambitious 
legislation 
FOI system  
backed by 
constitution 
 
No legal 
protection of 
sources 
 
Most 
information 
perceived 
public within 
20 days 
 
Processing 
costs 
 
Several 
agencies 
exempt from 
Act 
 
Act does not 
apply to 
private sector 
12  Very low 
legislative 
ambition 
 
This Act is not 
on the users 
side. This is 
clearly 
illustrated by 
the 
‘conclusive 
certificate’ 
function 
which 
effectively 
allows a 
Minister to 
block requests 
 
The 
evaluation 
showed that 
this Act was 
never meant 
to work. It 
cannot deliver 
on its aims 
and objectives 
in its current 
form 
 
12 agencies 
exempt under 
the Act 
 
Very high 
processing 
costs 
18  Very low 
legislative 
ambition 
 
The Act 
delegates 
much of the 
interpretation 
to the 
‘Information 
Board’ 
consisting of 
the Permanent 
Secretaries to 
the most 
influential 
departments 
 
The Act is 
very non-
specific on 
key issues 
such as turn 
around time 
and 
processing 
costs 
 
1 agency 
exempt 
 
No legal 
protection of 
sources 
 
Act does not 
apply to the 
private sector 
One important 
reason for 
Sweden’s high 
score is the 
extensive legal 
protection for 
media 
whistleblowers. 
 
The US and SA 
scores are close 
to 50% and 
must be 
regarded as a 
pass. 
 
Two things 
stand out: 
Sweden’s 
source 
protection 
regime and 
that the SA 
Act applies to 
the private 
sector. 
 
The Australian 
and Thai FOI 
systems fail the 
test. These two 
legislations 
were never 
meant to work, 
not even in 
theory. They 
promise little 
and deliver  
close to 
nothing.   305
Table 21 
continued 
Sweden 
Score 
Sweden 
Comment 
SA 
Score 
SA 
Comment 
US 
Score 
US 
Comment 
Australia 
Score 
Australia 
Comment 
Thailand 
Score 
Thailand 
Comment 
Overall 
Analysis 
The Spin  65  Result backs 
‘the promise’ 
virtually no 
gap ‘promise’ 
– ‘spin’ 
 
Respondents 
see 
themselves as 
access 
facilitators 
and hold 
information 
on behalf of 
the public 
 
Very positive 
attitudes 
towards 
source 
protection 
54  Gap between 
‘promise’ and 
‘spin’ 
indicating a 
‘spun’ version 
of how FOI 
works in 
practice 
 
Respondents 
see 
themselves as 
access 
facilitators 
and hold 
information 
on behalf of 
the public 
 
Very positive 
attitudes 
towards 
source 
protection 
48  Gap between 
‘promise’ and 
‘spin’ 
indicating a 
‘spun’ 
version of 
how FOI 
works in 
practice 
 
Respondents 
see 
themselves as 
access 
facilitators 
and hold 
information 
on behalf of 
the public – 
but more 
hesitant to 
this concept 
compared to 
Sweden and 
SA. 
 
Great 
hesitancy 
towards 
source 
protection 
 
49  Extensive gap 
between 
‘promise’ and 
‘practice’ 
indicating a 
very ‘spun’ 
version of 
how FOI 
works in 
practice 
 
Majority of 
respondents 
say that the 
government 
own the 
information 
and do not 
see 
themselves as 
information 
access 
facilitators 
 
Great 
hesitancy 
towards 
source 
protection 
56  Greatest gap 
between 
‘promise’ and 
‘spin’ in the 
project. Very 
hard to 
conceive how 
such a weak 
legislation 
could deliver 
the level 
access 
indicated by 
the result of 
‘the spin’ 
 
Respondents 
see 
themselves as 
access 
facilitators 
and hold 
information 
on behalf of 
the public 
 
Very positive 
attitudes 
towards 
source 
protection 
Only Sweden 
shows 
consistency 
between 
‘promise’ and 
‘spin’. All 
other countries 
display gaps to 
various 
degrees. A high 
spin score and 
low promise 
score indicates 
that the 
respondents are 
projecting a 
‘spun’ version 
of FOI that the 
Act does not 
back up. 
What really 
stands out is 
that the 
Australian 
‘spin’ is the 
only one were 
most 
respondents 
thought the 
government 
owns the 
information 
This is crucial 
in explaining 
Australia’s 
poor Index 
score. 
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Table 21 
continued 
 
Sweden 
Score 
Sweden 
Comment 
SA 
Score 
SA 
Comment 
US 
Score 
US 
Comment 
Australia 
Score 
Australia 
Comment 
Thailand 
Score 
Thailand 
Comment 
Overall 
Analysis 
The 
Practice 
47  Information 
generated and 
released 
within days in 
two cases 
 
Very high FOI 
knowledge 
level among 
public 
servants 
 
Last case 
where 
appealed and 
reached the 
Highest 
Admin court 
within a year 
at no cost to 
appellant – 
information 
not released 
0  The requests 
generated no 
information 
 
All three 
departments 
that received 
the FOI 
requests in 
severe breach 
of the time 
frame for 
decision 
making as set 
out by the 
Act. At the 
time of 
writing the 
breaches vary 
between 2 
month to 7 
months and 
counting 
 
 
0  The requests 
generated no 
information 
 
All three 
departments 
that received 
the FOI 
requests in 
severe breach 
of the time 
frame for 
decision 
making as set 
out by the 
Act. At the 
time of 
writing the 
breaches are 6 
months and 
counting 
12  The requests 
generated no 
information 
within the 
framework 
of the Act 
 
Two requests 
were 
terminated 
after very 
costly 
processing 
costs were 
quoted 
 
Last request 
received 
incomplete 
access after 9 
months 
 
 
Incomplete The  three 
Thai 
journalists 
needed to 
implement 
‘the practice’ 
could not be 
recruited, 
despite 10 
months of 
recruitment 
efforts. This 
indicates a 
great 
hesitancy 
among Thai 
reporters to 
use FOI. 
Possible 
reasons for 
this are 
discussed in 
chap ten 
The most 
important 
finding is that 
only the 
Swedish 
study 
generated any 
information. 
Had the US 
and SA 
requests 
generated 
information, 
or even been 
handled 
according to 
the Acts, 
these two 
countries 
would have 
scored much 
better 
  Sweden    South 
Africa 
  USA    Australia    Thailand    
FOI 
Index 
Out of 
10.0 
8.2    4.0    3.7   3.5    Incomplete   
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Main findings and conclusions 
 
It is of course very disappointing for the international practice of FOI 
that only two out of 12 submitted FOI requests generated any information within 
the framework of the legislations. This is the main finding that clearly illustrates 
the very poor state of FOI in three of the countries where the studies were 
completed. 
The study clearly shows that the two ‘template’ FOI systems, Sweden 
and USA (discussed and compared in detail in chapter two) have gone down 
opposite paths since September 11, 2001.  
It is surprising how quickly the federal FOI system in the US has 
deteriorated from being one of the best functioning as late as the second half of 
the 1990s to the sorry state illustrated by the 3.7 FOI Index score. The US has 
effectively become more secretive and does not facilitate access to information. 
One of the sources for this change is former Attorney General Ashcroft’s memo 
from 2001 as described in chapter seven (the complete memo is available as 
appendix 4).  
By way of contrast in June 2002 the Swedish government finished its 
‘Open Sweden’ campaign that sought to spread information and educate the 
public (particularly young adults and immigrants) and public servants about FOI 
and openness in general. The aim of the campaign was to make Sweden into 
an international role model of transparency and openness in governance. 
Interestingly the report identified the lack of a reporting system on the 
functionality of Swedish FOI as a problem (Sweden, 2002: 13) and this has   308
been confirmed in the present study discussed below. The ‘Open Sweden’ 
campaign was used to launch attempts to export Sweden’s FOI system to the 
European Union. Although critics point out that Sweden has slowed down the 
flow of information, as discussed in chapter six, in a comparative sense its FOI 
regime still works well in practice, as indicated by its 8.2 FOI Index score. 
Unfortunately this is likely to have less impact on FOI globally than the US 
changes. 
One of the reasons that Sweden post September 11, 2001 has opted 
for a different FOI path compared to the US could be traced back to specifically 
Swedish traits in political communication. Apart from the obvious long historical 
tradition of transparency in governance, clear differences between how Swedish 
politicians communicate with the public, compared to their American colleagues, 
can be observed. Nord points out that political advertisements are still not 
allowed during election campaigns in Sweden. He also observes that ‘political 
awareness among ordinary citizens is generally higher in Sweden than in many 
other countries (Nord, 2001: 118).’ Interestingly Nord still concludes that in spite 
of these differences between Sweden and the US: 
Americanization or modernization of Swedish election campaigns has taken place, 
probably not because of the US origin of the changes, but due to the fact that 
similar changes in most advanced democracies – regarding public opinion, media 
development, and politics – contribute to the harmonization of the effects of this 
process (ibid). 
The results of this project show that the general changes in political 
communication in Sweden have not impacted on the FOI regime – yet. It 
remains to be seen if Sweden will eventually be influenced by the US in future 
changes to the implementation of its FOI system. In the interest of the health of   309
FOI globally it is to be hoped that Sweden sticks to its current far-reaching FOI 
regime. 
The study showed that the South African FOI legislation is quite 
progressive and that there is strong support for the FOI concept among the 
leading politicians and public servants. However, there is a major awareness 
and educational problem. The main reason appears to be that the agency 
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the FOI system, the South 
African Human Right Commission, is grossly under-funded to the extent that it 
cannot do its job properly. This indicates that, although FOI is supported by the 
SA government officially, in practice it is not given priority. 
In more than one way, Australia is the worst case in the study. Not only 
did it generate the lowest FOI Index score, but its FOI system was exposed as 
being dysfunctional in practice, despite presenting itself as a fully functioning 
part of a mature democracy. The Australian results are frankly embarrassing for 
a country that claims to stand for liberal democratic values of which openness in 
governance is an important part. 
While Thailand scored highly in the ‘spin’ this is undermined by the low 
score in the ‘promise’. With as yet no reportable results from ‘the practice’ it is 
not possible to comment further at this stage. 
The ‘promise’ and ‘practice’ gap 
The overall aim of this project was to see whether there was a gap 
between FOI promise and practice. Ideally there should be no gap at all with   310
promise and practice scoring equally. However, as table 22 shows a gap was 
found to exist in all the countries evaluated 
Table 22 ‘promise’ – ‘practice’ gap 
  Sweden Australia  USA  SA  Thailand 
‘the 
promise’ 
63 12 31 31 18 
‘the practice’  47 13 0  0  incomplete 
 
Although Sweden scores highest, there is still a gap. As for Australia, 
the promise-practice gap is small simply because the legislation promises very 
limited access and this is borne out by ‘the practice’. So, relatively speaking, 
Australia plays in a different FOI league compared to Sweden.  
Interestingly another gap also showed up during the course of the 
project: the difference between how the leading politicians and public servants 
perceived FOI and what the legislation promises and delivers in practice, as 
illustrated in Table 23:   311
 
Table 23 gap between ‘spin’ and ‘promise’ and ‘practice’ 
  Sweden Australia  USA  SA  Thailand 
‘the 
promise’ 
63 12 31 31 18 
‘the spin’  65 49 48 54 56 
‘the practice’  47  13  0 0 incomplete 
Ideally the scores in the sub-studies should be as close to each other 
as possible. While in Sweden the scores are relatively close, in the other 
countries of study the gaps between ‘the spin’ and the other two sub-studies are 
very large indeed. This indicates that ‘the spin’, was a very adequate name for 
the survey study: the attitudes held by the respondents must be considered a 
‘spun’ version of FOI reality. 
29 
Discussion of findings 
 
The main issues that emerge as impacting on the effectiveness of FOI are: 
1) Newness of the FOI concept. 
Going from secrecy in governance to true transparency is not easy in 
the best of circumstances. Among other things, it requires a change of the ‘old 
                                                 
29 While the total possible maximum score for ‘the spin’ is eight points more than the other two sub-
studies, this was not considered large enough to skew the results of the study as a whole.   312
guard’ among the public servants and a very active, well-resourced and 
independent overseeing agency to drive the change of attitudes that is so 
important for FOI to work in practice. Coupled to this is the need to build 
awareness of FOI and its potential and uses amongst the potential users. South 
Africa was an example of the challenges facing a comparatively immature FOI 
regime. 
2) Lack of political will. 
Passing FOI legislation is relatively easy; the hard part is making it work 
in practice. This requires sincere and real political will, not only during one 
political term, but consistently over decades. This political will appears to be 
lacking in Australia, as illustrated by the recent McKinnon vs Treasury case (see 
chapter seven) and the fact that the federal government has ignored 
suggestions for reform of FOI by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
Political will has gone dormant in the US and the jury is still out on SA. The only 
country in the study where the political will to make FOI work still exists appears 
to be Sweden. 
3) Use of FOI as ‘window dressing’. 
FOI may be used as a way to convey an image of transparency and 
openness in governance that simply is not carried through in practice. In this 
study the US, Australia and SA are examples of this. The SA FOI regime seems 
genuine in concept but is currently not working as intended and might yield a 
different result if it were to be evaluated again in three to five years. The US and 
Australia both have mature FOI regimes and have no excuses for their low   313
rating. It raises questions about exactly how they define democracy in their 
campaign to extent it to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
From a more general point of view it is useful to consider Roberts’ 
observations regarding the impact of different political systems on FOI. His main 
point is that there is a ‘tension between the demand for transparency and elite 
anxiety about the decline of governability (Roberts, 2005: 20).’ This is 
particularly evident in countries with a Westminster-based system ‘distinguished 
as they are by a concentration of executive authority (ibid).’ The point being 
made is: why would any governing body want to give up information that will 
expose its possible shortcomings? In the short term the disadvantages to 
government are obvious. However, in the long-term, a truly transparent system 
will benefit both the rulers and the ruled. Proper political accountability will weed 
out corruption and maladministration (provided the executive is prepared to 
sack the politician/public servant who has been exposed, sadly an as yet 
uncommon occurrence) and in the long run increase the staying power of the 
government from a voter confidence point of view. From the public’s point of 
view, independent access to government-held information would be likely to 
increase faith in government and encourage political participation. The 
keywords are short term and long term. With the current ruling paradigm 
characterised by ‘short termism’ and a focus extending little beyond the next 
election it is hard to see how the long-term commitment needed to build a 
working FOI regime can be accommodated.   314
Impact on journalism and the fourth estate role 
As has been noted in the discussion of the fourth estate in chapter one, 
independent access to un-spun government-held information is absolutely 
crucial if the media are to fulfil their role as independent scrutinizers of political 
power. This is how a Swedish journalist in a previous study described what it 
would be like to try to do the job without the benefit of a well functioning FOI 
system: 
It would be like turning of the water – it’s that natural and taken for granted. I’m 
from the generation journalists that were ‘born and bred’ with it [FOI]. The first 
job you got in a newsroom was to do the rounds at different government agencies, 
read their mail and archive indexes, and to learn how to interpret them (Lidberg, 
2003: 14). 
Luckily for the Swedish journalists (and for political accountability and 
ultimately Swedish society) the ‘water’ is still flowing. The other countries 
studied in this project are less lucky. Another concrete effect of not having a 
well functioning FOI is that reporters are much more dependent on leaks from 
people in power to acquire information. As all journalists know, many of the best 
stories have started with a leak. However a problem occurs when you cannot 
verify, via for instance FOI, the quality of information supplied by your source. 
The reporter is also much less able to identify the agenda of the informant (all 
information supplied by a leak is done so for a reason). Ultimately this means 
that in systems with poorly functioning FOI regimes, individual reporters and 
media outlets are less independent from the power they are attempting to hold 
accountable, and so less able to fulfil their fourth estate role. 
This research has shown that:   315
Sweden’s FOI system still delivers independent access to high quality 
information that would otherwise not enter the public domain. The conclusion 
reached in an earlier study that Swedish FOI encourages ‘everyday 
investigative journalism’ (Lidberg, 2003: 14) is confirmed by the findings in this 
broader comparative research. 
South Africa certainly has a law that potentially provides journalists with 
individual access to government and corporately held information; however, this 
study has shown that the powerful promises of the law are not carried through 
in practice. 
The decline of FOI in the US has had a devastating effect on journalists’ 
independent access to information. The impact is best described by the Director 
of the Center for Freedom of Information at the Missouri School of Journalism. 
In chapter eight he pointed out that ‘it will take decades to regain what’s been 
lost’ (Davies, C., 2005b) in terms of information access. 
In Australia many journalists have come to the end of the road with the 
current version of federal FOI. There are countless examples of frustrated FOI 
requests, some of them described in chapter seven. Given the current close 
relationships between the US and Australia, there is little reason for hope that in 
terms of FOI reform Australia will take a different path from that of its close ally.  
As for Thailand, the verdict is still open. Because of the limited data 
captured by this study, the incentive is very strong to complete the last sub-
study to get a complete picture.   316
Recommendations 
Given the discussed deficiencies, the following recommendations would 
make FOI work more effectively in the countries of study. 
Sweden: 
1.  Implement some sort of statistical reporting system tracking FOI 
requests. One possible problem with this is adding a 
bureaucratic level to an otherwise very non-bureaucratic system, 
(one of the strengths of the Swedish FOI system). 
2.  Make the Secrecy Act part of the Constitution to stop the 
government of the day using this ‘back door’ to restrict FOI 
access.  
South Africa:  
1.  Dramatically increase the funding of the South African Human 
Rights Commission to allow it to properly oversee the 
implementation of FOI and to run educational and awareness 
campaigns. 
2.  Legislate to provide legal protection for media whistleblowers. 
The US: 
1.  Replace or delete the Ashcroft memo. The Act is specific enough 
regarding implementation and much more generous than the 
very restrictive Ashcroft memorandum.   317
2.  Provide additional resources to government agencies to clear the 
backlog of FOI requests. 
3.  Run an awareness and education campaign reviving and 
reinforcing the aims and objects of FOI legislation. 
4.  Legislate to provide legal protection for media whistleblowers on 
the federal level. 
Australia: 
1.  Revoke or at least re-work the ‘conclusive certificate’ section (for 
details, see chapter seven) 
2.  Point 1 is part of the 106 recommendations to changes and 
amendments made in the review conducted by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in 1996. The ALRC 
recommendations also cover changes to the processing cost 
regime and the processing time allowed for agencies. In 
recommendation 31, the ALRC pointed out that the processing 
time should be shortened to 14 days within three years (ALRC, 
1996) 
3.  The ALRCs most important suggestions are recommendations 
18-23 that outlined the functions and powers of an independent 
Freedom of Information Commissioner. The ALRC pointed out 
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the existence of such a person would lift the profile of FOI, both within 
agencies and in the community and would assist applicants to use the 
Act. It would give agencies the incentive to accord the FOI the higher 
priority  required to ensure its effective and efficient administration 
(ALRC, 1996) 
The ALRC perceives the role of the FOI Commissioner as two-fold: 
First, the Commissioner will, on the basis of regular audits, monitor 
agencies’ compliance with, and administration of, the Act. Second, he or 
she will promote the Act and provide advice and assistance to agencies 
and members of the public. Additional functions will include providing 
legislative policy advice and participation in broader information policy 
(ibid). 
Overall the recommendations cover all the areas identified as 
problematic in this study. The sheer number of recommendations is a clear 
illustration of the inadequacies of the federal Australian FOI Act. The 
government has had this very potent reform tool at its disposal since 1996 and 
acted on none of the essential recommendations. This in itself indicates the low 
level of political commitment to FOI in Australia. 
4.  Legislate to provide legal protection for media whistleblowers. 
 
Thailand: 
1.  Abolish the Information Board and replace it with and 
independent FOI Commissioner (like the one suggested above in 
the ALRC review of the Australian Act). 
2.  Amend the FOI Act to include specific time frames for processing 
requests. This would make it easier for both the applicant and 
the appeal system to determine whether the agency was   319
following the law. As it stands now there is too much room for 
interpretation. 
3.  Amend the Act to include clear guidelines on processing costs. 
Rationale as in point two. 
4.  Regulate private ownership of media companies. There are 
indications that advertising is used as a form of censorship to 
punish media outlets that cover controversial topics often 
suitable for the use of FOI. As discussed in chapter ten, some 
publications have been threatened with less advertising if they 
publish articles covering a certain topic. 
5.  Encourage journalists and the public to use FOI. This can be 
achieved by FOI awareness campaigns and the creation of FOI 
advisory centres supporting users of FOI free of charge. 
‘The spin’ reply league table 
As pointed out in the data presentation chapters the response rate to 
‘the spin’ survey did not feed into the scores and subsequently into the Index 
score. However, it is interesting to compare the response rates as they are an 
indicator of how important FOI issues are to each government of study: the 
hypothesis is that the higher the response rate – the higher FOI sits on the 
governments’ agenda. Table 24 provides an overview of the response rates: 
Table 24 Responses to ‘the spin’   320
 Sweden  Thailand  USA  South 
Africa 
Australia 
Response rate  31% 25% 12%  9%  7% 
 
The numbers underscore the findings in the rest of the study. Thailand’s 
25 per cent is a bit of an anomaly, but cannot really be analysed fully since the 
data for this country is incomplete. Again, Australia scores poorly, further 
emphasising that FOI does not register on the political radar. 
 
Reliability and validity 
A secondary, but important, aim of the project was to design and trial a 
comparative instrument that could help assess how well different FOI regimes 
work in theory and practice. This was described in chapter three as a separate 
research question: is it possible to design an evaluation tool that captures 
data that describes how a specific FOI regime works in practice; and can 
it be presented in an index? For this to be possible it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the measuring instruments are both reliable and valid. 
Reliability of the sub-studies 
 Neuman observes that reliability: 
…means dependability or consistency. It suggests that the same thing is repeated or 
reoccurs under identical or very similar conditions. The opposite of reliability is a   321
measurement that process yields erratic, unstable or inconsistent results (2000: 
164). 
So, if another researcher were to use the same methodology as used in 
this project to evaluate the same FOI regimes he/she would capture data of a 
similar range. You could not expect to get exactly the same results if this study 
were repeated since society is in a state of constant change. This is, after all 
one of the main differences between natural science and social science and the 
reason why natural science methods have to be altered to fit investigations into 
the social world which are predominately concerned with human interaction. We 
need more than just numbers to describe this interaction.  
As Yin notes, in social science research ‘the emphasis is on doing the 
same case again, not on “replicating” the results of one case by doing another 
case study. The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study 
(2003: 37).’ Miles and Huberman elaborate further: ‘the underlying issue here is 
whether the process of the study is consistent, reasonably stable over time and 
across researchers and methods (1994: 278).’ 
To summarize the qualitative data has been operationalized into 
quantitative terms. The qualitative nature of ‘the promise’ and ‘the practice’ sub-
studies limits the capacity to conduct statistical reliability analysis. However, the 
total number of data entry points in ‘the spin’ (in effect the total number of 
responses) was considered sufficient to enter the data into the SPSS statistical 
software package to conduct a scale analysis. The ideal situation would have 
been to run a full-scale pilot of the whole project and to conduct the scale 
analysis before the study was implemented. However, this is a very costly 
exercise which would have required much more funding than was available for   322
this project. Instead a compromise solution was to run a pilot of the study as 
part of the Swedish implementation (this was described in chapter four). 
A scale analysis looks at the correlation patterns of responses across 
questions. Where an item correlates poorly with the rest, it can be examined 
more closely to work out why and whether it should be re-worked or removed 
from the bank of questions. This analysis gives an indication of the extent to 
which a group of likert-style questions forms an internally consistent scale. The 
level of reliability in an instrument is often described in the ‘coefficient alpha’ 
(also referred to as Cronbach’s alpha). According to DeVellis, alpha is ‘ an 
indication of the proportion of variance in the scale scores that is attributable to 
the true score’ and ‘one of the most important indicators of a scale’s quality.’ He 
points out that any problems with the design of the survey, such as ‘poor 
variability’ and ‘negative correlations among items’, ie questions, ‘will tend to 
reduce alpha… (1991: 83).’ 
In theory alpha varies between 0.0 to 1.0, however, DeVellis observes 
that in practice values under 0.60 are unacceptable. He further rates the 
increments as follows: ‘between .65 and .70, minimally acceptable; between .70 
to .80 respectable; between .80 and .90 very good (1991: 85).’ The Cronbach’s 
alpha for ‘the spin’ was 0.835, indicating very high reliability. On further 
breakdown only question six in part I (whether FOI should be extended to cover 
the private sector) received responses that seemed not to correlate with the rest 
of the responses in the questionnaire.   323
Validity of the sub-studies 
According to Neuman ‘validity addresses the question of how well the 
social reality being measured through research matches the constructs 
researchers use to understand it (2000: 164).’ Miles and Huberman define 
validity through a number of questions: ‘Here we arrive at the crunch questions: 
truth value. Do the findings of the study make sense? Are they credible to the 
people we study and to our readers? Do we have an authentic portrait of what 
we were looking at? (1994: 278).’ 
Since the data in this study is predominantly qualitative it is important to 
consider the fact that, as Neuman points out: ‘qualitative researchers are more 
interested in authenticity than validity. Authenticity means giving a fair, honest, 
and balanced account of social life (2000: 171).’ The authenticity of the data 
captured in this project can hardly be in doubt. The three instruments are 
available as appendices 1,2 and 3 for the reader to see how the data was 
captured. The data captured has been compared with available reports and 
studies on FOI performance
30 that back the findings and indicate high validity. 
To complement the qualitative validity of the findings, there is also an 
element of quantitative validity, that is: the connection between the construct 
and the measurement. The construct was that a gap between the promise and 
practice of various FOI regimes could exist. The data captured by this study 
clearly shows that a gap does exist; hence the measurement sought connected 
back to the hypothesis.  
                                                 
30 For example the openness tests conducted by the Swedish Journalism Union, the annual FOI reports in 
Australia and the US and previous studies of FOI regimes by other researchers. These are outlined in 
chapter three in the literature review and referred to in the data presentation chapters six to ten.   324
FOI Index reliability and validity 
The purpose of an index is to provide overview. Neuman observes that: 
‘an index is a combination of items into a single numerical score (2000: 177).’ 
For evident reasons the reliability of an index is built on the reliability of the 
instruments used to capture the data on which the index is based. It has been 
shown above that the reliability of the sub-studies is high; hence it can be 
concluded that the reliability of the FOI Index is high as well. Another factor that 
contributes to the high reliability of the FOI Index is that it measures most 
evaluation parameters at least twice, an important criterion to create a reliable 
index (ibid). It is also important that the instruments that capture the data for the 
index pose questions that pull in the same direction. The scale analysis of ‘the 
spin’ has shown that this is the case in this project. 
It should be pointed out that the reliability for the FOI Index applies to 
the four countries evaluated in this study. While the high overall reliability bodes 
well, the index will benefit from being implemented in as many countries with 
FOI laws as possible, preferably all, to enable further evaluation of its reliability. 
Conclusion 
The comparative summary in this chapter shows that a gap between 
the promise and practice of FOI exists in all countries of study to varying 
degrees. 
Only two out of 12 FOI requests lodged in four countries generated any 
information. The requests in SA, USA and Australia generated no information 
within the framework of the legislation.   325
The ongoing war on terror has impacted on the flow of government-held 
information in The United States and there are indications that this applies 
globally with governments now seeking to justify restricting access to 
information in a way not seen since the rise of FOI legislations.   326
 
 
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion 
This thesis has been about the flow of government-held information. Its 
starting point was exploring the theoretical pillars for FOI laws: political 
representation, accountability, and the scrutinising role of the media as the 
fourth estate. With the ongoing war on terror, the issue of political accountability 
is more current than ever. This is especially true in the lead up to a conflict. The 
following conversation took place between G. M. Gilbert, prison psychologist 
during the Nuremberg war crime trials 1945-46 and Herman Goering. The trial 
was in recess during Easter 1946 and Gilbert visited Goering in his cell. 
We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I 
did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them 
war and destruction. 
“Why of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged. “Why would some 
poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out 
of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally the common people don’t   327
want war; neither in Russia, nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in 
Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it’s the leaders of the country who 
determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, 
whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship.” 
“There is one difference,” I pointed out. “In a democracy the people have some say 
in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only 
Congress can declare war.” 
“Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be 
brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them 
they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and 
exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.” (Gilbert, 1947: 
278-79) 
More than ever we need the ‘independent accountability agencies’, 
discussed in chapter one, to question the reigning political and economical 
paradigms. This thesis has argued that journalists and the media by taking on 
and fulfilling the fourth estate role are such ‘accountability agencies’. But to do 
their job properly they need independent access to government-held information 
– they need well-functioning, far-reaching Freedom of Information systems. 
Through three separate studies this project has evaluated the FOI 
regimes in five countries: Sweden, Australia, USA, South Africa and Thailand. 
In the four countries where the research was able to be properly completed  
there was a gap between what each country promised and what it delivered in 
real independent access to government-held information at a national level. The 
gap varied between small in Sweden to very substantial in South Africa, the US 
and Australia.  
The project has also shown that the data captured can be used to 
create a FOI Index, allowing the evaluated countries to be ranked against each 
other.    328
Where is FOI going? 
So, do the findings of the study give any indication as to the state of FOI 
globally and where it will go? From a strict data collection point of view five 
countries constitute too small a sample to generalise in global terms. However, 
the US has been a world leader in FOI ever since the concept got international 
political traction after World War II. The findings in this study indicate that the 
FOI family seems to have lost its leader, though hopefully only temporarily. This 
may have a negative impact on FOI globally given the greater political influence 
of the US even though Sweden offers an example of a better functioning 
system. It should be pointed out that some, like Banisar, take a more optimistic 
view claiming that the momentum for openness and transparency is substantial 
(Banisar, 2004: 2). However, this project is the first study to capture 
comparative data evaluating FOI in practice on an international scale. It can 
safely be concluded that the war on terror is not good for FOI globally. 
Tactics similar to those described above by Herman Goering are being 
used as an excuse to limit FOI. As long as political leaders have the option of 
using the war on terror (or any other perceived ‘outside’ threat) to create more 
secrecy, there appears to be little reason for optimism for the future of FOI. 
However, it could be argued that FOI is, like democracy itself, at its 
strongest when it is under threat. If political leaders continue to use FOI as 
‘democratic window dressing’, an increasing number may come to its defence. 
Future research areas 
 
The study throws up several important areas worthy of further research.    329
1.  The focus of future research would be to make the FOI Index global 
including all existing FOI regimes. With 58 FOI laws currently enacted a 
problem keeping the index up to date can be foreseen. Once you have 
completed the first evaluation of all 58, it is probably time to start over 
again. Perhaps this could be solved by delegating the implementation of 
the study to a body in each country. The methodology behind the index 
would also benefit from being implemented as many times a possible. 
This would allow for further development and refinement of the research 
instruments. 
2.  The most obvious loose end to tie up is the incomplete Thai study. 
Because of its high score in ‘the spin’ sub-study, it would be highly 
interesting to put Thai FOI to the test.  
3.  There is some evidence that the New Zealand FOI regime is very 
successful in delivering on its promises. Hence, implementing the study 
there could yield interesting results. NZ could be the first country in a 
possible next stage in the development of a truly global FOI Index.  
4.  Another intriguing area is crime/court reporting and FOI. During the 
course of this study it has been noted that there are vast differences in 
how FOI laws apply to the judiciary between countries.  
5.  After the defeat of the draft European Constitution in the French 
referendum, the EU project has slowed down considerably. There is little 
doubt it will be revived, especially considering the drive and enthusiasm 
among the new eastern European members. The EU has taken its first   330
stumbling steps towards a common FOI regime. It would be very 
rewarding applying the FOI Index to this system to see how it measures 
up internationally. 
6.  This thesis has been concerned with government-held information only, 
for the simple reason that most FOI laws only applies to the public sector 
(apart from a few exceptions like the South African law). It is however, 
highly debateable if our political leaders have as much influence on our 
daily lives as the corporations. Sam Gibara, CEO of Goodyear, puts it 
thus: 
Governments today do not have the power over corporations they had 50 or 60 
years ago. This is a major change, so governments have become powerless 
compared to where they were before (Achbar, 2003: Chapter 21). 
Ira Jackson, Director of the Centre for Business and Government, Kennedy 
School Harvard University is even more to the point: 
Capitalism today, commands the towering heights and has displaced politics and 
politicians as the new high priests and reining oligarchs of our system (ibid). 
In spite of this huge shift in power away from politics to capitalism 
represented by the big corporations and in spite of the fact that corporations 
probably influence our daily lives as much, if not more, than our elected 
representatives, the accountability mechanisms that apply to the corporate 
world are very limited. As a member of the public the only way to get some 
insight, albeit very limited, into a corporation is to buy shares, read its annual 
report and go to its annual shareholders’ meeting. We only have to look at 
the spectacular corporate collapses of the last few years, such as the energy 
giant Enron in the US and the telecommunications company One Tel in   331
Australia, to realise the demand for accountability during the ‘term’ of a 
company, just as FOI applies to governments while they govern. Increased 
accountability could be a way to re-build public trust for corporations. 
Applying the FOI Index model to a number of corporations would be 
fascinating. 
Public support for FOI 
Does the public care about FOI? There are indications they do. A 2001 
survey done by the First Amendment Center and the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors showed that more than 90 per cent of the respondents 
thought access to public records was important to them ‘and six in 10 said 
public access to government records was ‘crucial’ to the functioning of good 
government (Owens, 2001: 1).’ It can be argued that there are parallels 
between the public perceptions of democracy and FOI. If you ask the public: ‘Do 
you support democracy?’ you are likely to get an overwhelming yes. Similarly if 
you ask ‘Do you support Freedom of Information?’ you will probably also get a 
strong majority in favour (who says no to a ‘freedom’?). The question is how 
deep does this support extend? New trends in journalism could potentially 
expand the pool of supporters for FOI. The web has spawned a new type of 
journalism, citizen journalism, or citJ. One definition of citJ can be found on one 
of the greatest achievements of the blogosphere – Wikipedia (an online 
dictionary which is constantly updated). According to Wikipedia, citJ ‘usually 
involves empowering ordinary citizens – including traditionally marginalised 
members of society – to engage in activities that were previously the domain of 
professional reporters (Higgins, 2005: 11).’ There are a number of issues 
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concerning citizen journalism, such as credibility of sources, quality in content, 
who is to be defined as a citJ, etc, but those apart, if the number of citJs 
continues to grow and if they realise that FOI can be used as a tool to acquire 
information (at least in some countries) we may see the rise of a new, 
potentially strong, FOI user group. 
The last three years of research and the main findings of this project 
can be summed up in one sentence: there is only one thing worse than 
ignorance – the illusion of knowledge. Currently it seems that the spin-
doctors have the upper hand in creating this illusion. 
In the end the question of information access is quite a philosophical 
one. If we are to develop and further ourselves socially as a collective, we need 
to extend our knowledge. Part of this extension process is to have independent 
access to quality un-spun information. From this knowledge will come wisdom. 
Kofi Annan, Secretary General for the United Nations and Nobel Peace Price 
winner provides an appropriate note to end on: 
…it is ignorance, not knowledge, that makes enemies of men. It is ignorance, not 
knowledge, that makes fighters of children. It is ignorance, not knowledge, that 
leads some to advocate tyranny over democracy. It is ignorance, not knowledge, 
that makes some think that human misery is inevitable. It is ignorance, not 
knowledge, that make others say that there are many worlds, when we know there 
is one. Ours (Annan, 1997). 
 
 
 Appendix 1: ‘the practice’ evaluation template 
This is the Australian version of the template. For the other countries of 
study the template was changed slightly to accommodate local variations, such 
as currency. 
Evaluation Template ‘The Practice’ 
 
 
Note: If the agency evaluated breaches the FOI legislation, for example not 
complying with time frame for decision, the evaluation will not progress 
and the case will be awarded the score 0. 
 
 
1) How long did it take you to prepare the request (this includes research time 
deciding what to specifically ask for and what to exclude in your request)? 
 
a) 1-5  hours   
b) 5-8  hours   
c) 1-2  days   
d) 2-3  days   
e)  more than 3 days 
 
PROBE: what did you exclude? And why?  
 
2) What did it cost to lodge the request? 
 
a) A$  0   
b) A$  0-20     
c) A$  21-40     
d) A$  41-80     
e)  more than A$ 100 
 
3) Did the agency’s reply quote a processing fee? 
 
a) no  fee   
b) A$  20     
c) A$  21-100   
d) A$  101-200   
e)  more than A$ 200 
 
PROBE: Is this cost average? More or less than you expected? Reasons?   334
 
4) How much time elapsed before confirmation from the agency that they had 
received the request? 
 
a) 1-5  days     
b) 5-10  days     
c) 10-15  days     
d) 15-20  days   
e)  more than 20 days 
 
PROBE: Expected time? Average? 
 
5) How much time elapsed from the agency’s confirmation of the receipt of the 
request to the grant/refusal of the request? 
 
a) 1-10  days     
b) 10-20  days     
c) 20-30  days     
d) 30-40  days   
e)  more than 40 days 
 
PROBE: Expected? Average? 
 
6) What was the agency’s decision? 
 
a)  application granted in full with no processing cost 
b)  application granted in full subject to a processing cost 
c)  application partially granted with no processing cost 
d)  application partially granted subject to a processing cost 
e) application  not  granted 
 
If the application was granted, proceed to question 7. 
If the application was partially granted, please proceed to question 16.  
If the application was not granted, please proceed to question 28. 
 
7) In your experience, can you base an article on the information you have 
acquired? 
 
a) yes   
b)  yes – but it needs further research 1-7 days   
c)  yes – further research 7-14 days   
d)  yes – further research more than 14 days   
e) no 
 
PROBE: Why? Please substantiate your answer. 
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8) Compared to the information ‘served’ to newsrooms by the government’s 
press secretaries and public relations officers, how does the information acquired 
rank in terms of usefulness for holding the government accountable? 
 
a)  much higher quality  
b) higher  quality   
c) on  par   
d)  lower quality  
e) much  lower  quality 
 
PROBE: Why? Please give examples. 
 
9) In your role as an independent scruitiniser of politicians and public servants – 
is the information acquired of assistance? 
 
a) indispensable   
b)  of great assistance   
c) of  some  assistance   
d) of  limited  assistance   
e)  based on this information I would terminate the investigation 
  
PROBE: In what way? Please give examples? 
  
10) How was the information released to you? 
 
a)  I was sent copies at no cost (via mail, fax or e-mail)   
b)  I collected the documents physically from the agency and was allowed 
free photocopying   
c)  I had to pay photocopying costs   
d)  I was allowed to sight the documents and take notes, but no photocopying 
e)  I was allowed to sight the documents but not take notes 
 
PROBE: Did you ask for another mode of delivery? What was the reaction? 
 
11) In your view, what was the extent of knowledge of FOI among the public 
servant/s you dealt with? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average   
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
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PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this opinion? Please give examples. 
 
12) In your view, were the public servant/s you dealt with during the course of the 
request: 
 
a) facilitating     
b) helpful     
c) indifferent   
d) obstructionist   
e) hostile 
 
PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples. 
 
13) Which of the following statements best sums up the attitude held by the 
public servant/s you dealt with during the course of the request?   
 
a)  the government holds information on behalf of the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the information requested as soon as possible. 
b)  the government holds information on behalf of the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for you. 
c)  the government owns the information but I abide by its values of openness 
and transparency in relation to the public access to information. 
d)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
so I act conservatively rather than proactively in relation to public access. 
e)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
and my role is to guard information as opposed to dispensing it. 
  
PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples. 
 
14) What do you perceive the end product to be? 
 
a) 1-3  articles     
b) 1-2  articles     
c) 1  article   
d) further  research   
e)  termination of investigation 
 
PROBE: Why? Please motivate your answer. How have you made the decision 
on the format of the final product? 
 
15) Where do you take the story from here? 
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PROBE: Please describe freely how you would use the information you have 
acquired to reach the end goal – the finished story 
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Partly granted application: 
 
16) Are you satisfied with the agency’s reasons for the partial disclosure? 
 
a) yes     
b)  partly, but there is scope for an appeal   
c)  partly, no scope for an appeal     
d)  no, but there is scope for an appeal   
e)  no and no scope for an appeal 
 
PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples 
 
17) In your experience – what do you estimate the cost to be if you were to 
appeal? 
 
a) A$  0-100     
b) A$  101-200     
c) A$  201-300  
d) A$  300-400   
e)  more than A$ 400 
 
18) In the event of an appeal, based on your experience, how do you judge your 
chances of winning the appeal? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average     
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
 
PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples 
 
19) How was the information released to you?  
 
a)  I was sent copies at no cost (via mail, fax or e-mail)   
b)  I collected the documents physically from the agency but was allowed free 
photocopying     
c)  I had to pay photocopying costs   
d)  I was allowed to sight the documents and take notes, but no photocopying 
e)  I was allowed to sight the documents, but not take notes 
 
PROBE: Did you ask for another mode of delivery? What was the reaction? 
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20) In your view, what was the extent of knowledge of FOI among the public 
servant/s you dealt with? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average   
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
 
PROBE:  On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples 
 
 
21) In your view, were the public servant/s you dealt with during the course of the 
request: 
 
a) facilitating     
b) helpful     
c) indifferent   
d) obstructionist   
e) hostile 
 
PROBE: In what way? Please exemplify? 
 
22) Which of the following statements best sum up the attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during the course of the request?   
 
a)  the government holds information on behalf of the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the information requested as soon as possible. 
b)  the government holds information on behalf of the people but 
it is not my role to serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for you. 
c)  the government owns the information but I abide by its values of openness 
and transparency in relation to the public access to information. 
d)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
so I act conservatively rather than proactively in relation to public access. 
e)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
and my role is to guard information as opposed to dispensing it. 
 
23) In your experience, can you base an article on the information you have 
acquired? 
 
a) yes     
b)  yes – but it needs further research 1-7 days     
c)  yes – further research 7-14 days   
d)  yes – further research more than 14 days     340
e) no 
 
PROBE: Why? How have you made the decision on the format of the final 
product? 
 
24) Compared to the information ‘served’ to newsrooms by the governments 
press secretaries and public relations officers, how does the information acquired 
rank in terms of usefulness for holding the government accountable ? 
 
a)  much higher quality  
b) higher  quality   
c) on  par   
d)  lower quality   
e) much  lower  quality 
 
PROBE: Why? Please give examples. 
 
25) If your role is to be an independent scruitiniser of politicians and public 
servants – is the information acquired of assistance? 
 
a) indispensable   
b)  of great assistance   
c) of  some  assistance   
d) of  limited  assistance   
e)  based on this information I would terminate the investigation 
 
PROBE: Why? Please exemplify. 
 
26) What do you perceive the end product to be? 
 
a) 1-3  articles     
b) 1-2  articles     
c) 1  article   
d) further  research   
e)  termination of investigation 
 
PROBE: Why? How have you made the decision on the format of the final 
product? 
 
27) Where do you take the story from here? 
 
PROBE: Please describe freely how you would use the information you have 
acquired to reach the end goal – the finished story) 
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Application refused: 
 
28) Are you satisfied with the agency’s reasons for the refusal? 
 
a) yes     
b)  partly, but there is scope for an appeal   
c)  partly, no scope for an appeal     
d)  no, but there is scope for an appeal   
e)  no and no scope for an appeal 
 
PROBE: Why? Please motivate your answer.  
 
29) In your experience – what do you estimate the cost to be if you were to 
appeal? 
 
a) A$  0-100     
b) A$  100-200     
c) A$  200-300  
d) A$  300-400   
e)  more than A$ 400 
 
30) In your experience, how do you judge your chances of winning the appeal? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average     
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
 
PROBE: Why? Please motivate your answer.  
 
31) In your view, what was the extent of knowledge of FOI among the public 
servant/s you dealt with? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average   
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
 
PROBE: Why? Please illustrate with examples. 
 
32) In your view, were the public servant/s you dealt with during the course of the 
request: 
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a) facilitating     
b) helpful     
c) indifferent   
d) obstructionist   
e) hostile 
 
PROBE: On what evidence have you formed this judgement? Please give 
examples 
 
33) Which of the following statements best sum up the attitude held by the public 
servant/s you dealt with during the course of the request?   
a)  the government holds information on behalf of the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the information requested as soon as possible. 
b)  the government holds information on behalf of the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for you. 
c)  the government owns the information but I abide by its values of openness 
and transparency in relation to the public access to information. 
d)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
so I act conservatively rather than proactively in relation to public access. 
e)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
and my role is to guard information as opposed to dispensing it. 
 
34) In your experience, can you base an article on the FOI process and the fact 
that the agency refused the request? 
 
a) yes     
b)  yes – but it needs further research 1-7 day     
c)  yes – further research 7-14 days   
d)  yes – further research more than 14 days   
e) no 
 
PROBE: Why? Please motivate your answer. 
 
35) What do you perceive the end product to be? 
 
a) 1-3  articles     
b) 1-2  articles     
c) 1  article   
d) further  research   
e)  termination of investigation 
 
PROBE: Why? Please motivate your answer.  
 
36) Where do you take the story from here? 
 
PROBE: Please describe freely how/if you can pursue this story.   343
Appendix 2: coded data ‘the practice’ 
 
Country Case 
Question 
1  Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
S w e  1   3   444443   4
S w e  2   4   444443   4
Swe 3  4  4 4 3 4 0 n/a  n/a 
Aus 1  4  2 0 4 2 0 n/a  n/a 
Aus 2  3  2 0 3 0 0 n/a  n/a 
Aus 3  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
USA 1  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
USA 2  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
USA 3  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
SA 1  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
SA 2  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
SA 3  0  0 0 0 0 0 n/a  n/a 
 
Country  Case  Q9  Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15*  Q16 
Swe  1 4 4 3 3 4 4   n/a 
Swe  2 4 2 4 3 4 1   n/a 
Swe  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
Aus  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
Aus  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
Aus  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
USA  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
USA  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
USA  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
SA  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
SA  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
SA  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a 
*Questions 15,27 and 36 do not generate quantitative data 
 
Country  Case  Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 
Swe  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Swe  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Swe  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Aus  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Aus  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Aus  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
USA  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
USA  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
USA  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SA  1  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SA  2  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SA  3  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Country  Case  Q25 Q26 Q27*  Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31 Q32 
Swe  1  n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Swe  2  n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Swe  3  n/a n/a   1 4 1 3  3 
Aus  1  n/a n/a   2 0 1 3  3 
Aus  2  n/a n/a   1 0 0 2  1 
Aus  3  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
USA  1  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
USA  2  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
USA  3  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
SA  1  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
SA  2  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
SA  3  n/a n/a   0 0 0 0  0 
 
Country  Case  Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36* 
Total 
score 
Swe  1  n/a n/a n/a   52
Swe  2  n/a n/a n/a   49
Swe  3 3 1 4   39
Aus  1 1 3 2   27
Aus  2 0 0 0   12
Aus  3 0 0 0   0
USA  1 0 0 0   0
USA  2 0 0 0   0
USA  3 0 0 0   0
SA  1 0 0 0   0
SA  2 0 0 0   0
SA  3 0 0 0   0
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Appendix 3: ‘the spin’ questionnaire 
This is the Australian survey. The questionnaires were changed slightly 
between countries to accommodate for the variances in FOI systems. 
 
Johan Lidberg 
Project Researcher, PhD Candidate 
School of Media, Communication 
+ Culture (MCC) 
 
 
 
 
South Street 
 Murdoch 6150, WA 
Phone: +61 404 949250 
j.lidberg@murdoch.edu.au 
The Promise and Practice of Freedom of Information – an 
International Comparative Study 
This PhD project is about the flow of public information. It will investigate whether there 
is a gap between what elected representatives promise (the policies and legislations) 
regarding access to government held documents and how the Freedom of Information 
(FOI) laws are interpreted and implemented in practice and what they deliver in access to 
information. One aim of the study is to investigate if it is possible to create an 
international comparative Freedom of Information Index/Indicator that will rank the FOI 
regimes in different countries based on a number of parameters indicating the extent of 
access to government information.    
 
This survey is one part of the project and covers practice and attitudes towards FOI and 
will also seek to map attitudes towards the protection of journalistic sources. If your 
opinion does not correspond with the current FOI rules and regulations – let your 
opinion be the answer. Some questions may seem awkward. This is due to the 
international comparative nature of the project and I ask for your patience. 
 
Your participation is greatly appreciated and essential for the success of the project. The 
answers you provide will be treated confidentially. You may decide to withdraw from the 
study at any time. If you have any questions about how the material will be used, please 
feel free to contact either myself, Johan Lidberg, on phone +61 404 949250, e-mail: 
j.lidberg@murdoch.edu.au or my supervisors, Associate Professor Gail Phillips, on 
phone +61 8 93602320, e-mail: g.phillips@murdoch.edu.au or Dr Steve Tanner on +61 8 
93602850, e-mail: s.tanner@murdoch.edu.au.    346
My supervisors and I are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have on how 
this study has been conducted, or alternatively you can contact Murdoch University’s 
Human Research Ethics Committee on +61 8 9360 6677, e-mail: 
ethics@central.murdoch.edu.au. 
The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to fill out.  
Thank you for your cooperation!  
Please note that the questionnaire is printed on both sides of the paper.   347
Part I – General Attitudes towards FOI 
 
You will be given six statements. Your reply options are: 
 
Strongly Agree, Agree, Uncertain, Disagree and Strongly Disagree  
Please circle one option only 
1. A well functioning FOI legislation is an important part of the political system. 
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain   Disagree   Strongly  Disagree   
           
 
 
2. Transparency of the governing process, as safeguarded by FOI, inhibits 
corruption. 
 
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain   Disagree   Strongly  Disagree    
  
 
3. FOI works as a tool for political accountability. 
 
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain  Disagree Strongly  Disagree    
 
 
4. Public servants and politicians should be helpful in assisting FOI requests.     
 
  
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain  Disagree Strongly  Disagree     
5. Generally, Australian public servants and politicians have good 
knowledge of how FOI works.                    
              
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain  Disagree Strongly  Disagree     
 
 
 
6. FOI should be extended further to partly cover the corporate sector when 
public interests are at stake. 
 
Strongly  Agree   Agree   Uncertain  Disagree Strongly  Disagree      348
Part II Access to Government Held Documents 
Please circle one alternative per question 
 
 
 
1) In your view, what length of time is reasonable before the applicant receives 
confirmation of receipt from your department? 
 
a) 1-5  days     
b) 6-10  days     
c) 11-15  days     
d) 16-20  days   
e)  more than 21 days 
 
 
2) In your view, what length of time is reasonable before your department 
makes a decision on the request? 
 
a) 1-10  days     
b) 11-20  days     
c) 21-30  days     
d) 31-40  days   
e)  more than 41 days 
 
 
3) If your department needs to charge a processing fee, which of the costs 
below do you find reasonable? 
 
a) A$0-99   
b) A$100-199     
c) A$200-299   
d) A$300-399   
e)  more than A$400 
 
 
 
4) When you grant an application – which is your most common mode of 
release of the documents? 
 
a)  Copies of documents sent at no cost (via mail, fax or e-mail)  
b)  Copies of documents sent (via mail, fax or e-mail) subject to charge 
c)  Collection of the documents physically from the agency and free 
photocopying 
d)  Collection of the documents physically from the agency -  charge 
photocopying costs 
e)  Sighting of the documents and note taking, but no photocopying   
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5) In your view, what level of knowledge and understanding do the public 
servants and politicians in your department have of FOI? 
 
a) very  good   
b) good  
c) average     
d) poor     
e) very  poor 
 
 
6) In your view, what general attitude do public servants in your department 
have towards FOI requests? 
 
a) facilitating     
b) helpful     
c) indifferent   
d) obstructionist   
e) hostile 
 
 
 
7) Which of the following statements is closest to the attitude held by yourself 
and your staff? 
 
a)  the government hold information on behalf of the people and I should 
endeavour to deliver the information requested as soon as possible 
b)  the government hold information on behalf of the people but it is not my 
role to serve as an ‘information facilitator’ for an FOI applicant   
c)  the government owns the information but increased openness and 
transparency is good   
d)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
e)  the government owns the information and decides who will have access 
and increased openness and transparency is not good 
  
 
8) In your view, which statement most adequately describes the ‘fourth estate’ 
role that some media and reporters claim to fulfil? 
 
a)  It is a vital part of the political accountability process and delegated to the 
media by the citizens 
b)  It is a vital part of the political accountability process, but exists on a 
mandate invented by the media itself 
c)  It does not have any particular influence on the political accountability 
process 
d)  It is an invention by the media to justify its existence 
e)  It is a threat to the political accountability process because of the 
incompetence of most journalists 
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9) In your view, which is the most important function of FOI? 
 
a)  To work as a tool for political accountability 
b)  To increase transparency of the governing process to prevent 
maladministration and corruption 
c)  To increase the public’s participation in the political process 
d)  To allow citizens a means to check what personal data agencies hold 
and to correct errors 
e)  FOI is an unnecessary law that fills no particular function  351
Part III Protection of journalistic sources 
 
To encourage public servants to make corruption and maladministration 
public, legal protection of journalistic sources, at times called media 
whistleblowers, has been discussed and debated in a number of countries. It 
has been argued that legal protection of journalistic sources would 
complement the system of access to public documents and enhance the 
overall Freedom of Information regime. 
 
Please circle ONE alternative only 
 
1) What is your view of legal protection of journalistic sources? 
 
a)  It should be made stronger and include the corporate sector when public 
interests are at stake 
b)  It should be made stronger in the public sector to encourage public 
servants to make public maladministration 
c)  It should stay the way it is 
d)  It should not be implemented in Australia – problems within a department 
are best handled internally 
e)  It should not be implemented in Australia. Journalists in general cannot 
not be trusted with this level of confidence 
 
 
2) With public access to documents, is there a need for legal protection of 
journalistic sources? 
 
a)  Yes – it complements the access to document regime and strengthens 
the overall flow of public information 
b)  Yes – it encourages public servants to talk to journalists, but it could 
probably be replaced by a re-worked document access regime 
c)  No – the document access regime is enough 
d)  No – it is a threat to good public administration 
e)  No – journalists and the media would abuse this privilege and it should 
not be implemented in Australia 
 
 
3) What are your initial feelings towards a public servant who leaks information 
to the media to disclose maladministration? 
  
a)  Generally it is the right thing to do and it should be encouraged 
b)  The first option should always be solving it within the department – if that 
does not work, then a leak could be the right thing to do 
c)  It must be the very last option when all other options have been 
exhausted 
d)  A leak is never an option – problems should be addressed internally 
within the department 
e)  A public servant that leaks information to the media betrays his 
colleagues and employer   352
 
 
4) In some countries you break the law if you investigate who leaked 
information to the media. Which of the following statements corresponds best 
with your views on this legislation? 
 
a)  It is the most important part of the source protection. Without the legal 
protection it would be a ‘paper tiger’ 
b)  Journalistic sources should have legal protection, but exemptions when it 
is allowed to investigate a leak should exist 
c)  Legal protection for journalistic sources as a principle is good, but the 
exemptions for when journalists can be forced to reveal their sources 
should be far-reaching 
d)  Journalistic sources do not need legal protection – protection by ethical 
guidelines for department managers is enough 
e)  Journalists are not credible and accountable enough to be granted the 
privilege of legal protection of their sources 
 
 
 
The following entries are voluntary. They are however of great value to the 
project and will be treated confidentially: 
 
Ministry/Department: 
 
Position: 
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Appendix 4: coded data ‘the spin’ 
Country Reply 
Question 
A1  QA2 QA3 QA4 QA5 QA6 QB1  QB2 
Swe 1  4  4 4 4 3 3 4  4 
Swe 2  4  4 3 4 3 0 4  3 
Swe 3  4  4 3 3 2 1 2  0 
Swe 4  4  4 4 4 3 1 4  4 
Swe 5  4  4 4 4 3 1 4  4 
Swe 6  4  4 3 4 3 2 4  4 
Swe 7  4  4 4 4 3 3 4  2 
Swe 8  4  3 4 4 4 3 4  4 
Swe 9  4  4 4 4 3 2 3  3 
Swe 10  4  4 4 4 3 4 4  4 
Swe 11  4  4 3 4 1 3 3  3 
Swe 12  4  4 4 4 4 2 3  3 
Swe 13  4  4 4 4 3 3 3  4 
Swe 14  4  4 4 4 3 0 4  4 
Swe 15  4  4 4 4 4 2 4  4 
Swe 16  4  4 4 4 3 1 4  4 
Swe 17  4  4 4 4 3 3 3  4 
Swe 18  4  4 4 4 3 2 4  4 
Swe 19  4  4 4 4 4 4 4  4 
Swe 20  4  4 4 4 4 3 4  3 
Swe 21  4  4 4 4 1 4 4  4 
            
A u s  1   3   33423 4   2  
A u s  2   3   33333 2   1  
A u s  3   4   44431 1   1  
A u s  4   4   33432 4   2  
A u s  5   4   44431 2   2  
            
U S A  1   4   34332 4   2  
U S A  2   4   44431 1   1  
U S A  3   4   23433 4   0  
U S A  4   3   33334 3   3  
U S A  5   3   22333 0   0  
U S A  6   3   23311 1   3  
U S A  7   3   33311 1   2  
U S A  8   4   44431 1   0  
            
S A  1   3   13313 1   3  
S A  2   4   44414 4   2  
S A  3   4   33414 4   4  
S A  4   2   13313 2   2  
S A  5   4   44414 4   2  
            
Thailand 1  2 3 3 3 2 3 3  4 
Thailand 2  3 3 3 3 3 3 2  3 
Thailand 3  2 3 3 3 1 3 3  4 
Thailand 4  3 3 3 3 3 3 4  4   354
Thailand 5  4 3 3 3 2 3 4  4 
Thailand 6  3 3 3 3 2 3 3  3 
Thailand 7  3 3 3 3 2 3 3  3 
Thailand 7  3 3 3 3 3 4 2  2 
Thailand 9  3 2 3 3 3 3 4  4 
Thailand 10  4  4 3 4 0 2 2  2 
Thailand 11  3  3 3 3 1 1 4  4 
Thailand 12  4  3 3 3 3 2 4  4 
Thailand 13  3  3 3 3 3 3 4  4 
Thailand 14  4  4 4 4 2 4 2  3 
Thailand 15  3  3 3 3 2 3 3  4 
Thailand 16  3  3 3 3 2 3 3  4 
Thailand 17  3  3 3 3 2 3 3  4 
 
Country  Reply  QB3 QB4 QB5 QB6 QB7 QB8 QB9 QC1 
Swe  1 4 4 3 4 2 3 2  4 
Swe  2 3 4 4 3 3 3 3  2 
Swe  3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3  2 
Swe  4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3  4 
Swe  5 4 4 3 3 4 3 3  3 
Swe  6 2 3 3 3 4 3 3  2 
Swe  7 4 4 3 3 4 3 3  2 
Swe  8 4 4 3 3 4 3 3  2 
Swe  9 4 4 3 3 4 4 2  4 
Swe  10 4 4 4 3 4 3 3  4 
Swe  11 3 4 3 2 1 3 3  4 
Swe  12 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  2 
Swe  13 4 4 3 3 4 4 2  2 
Swe  14 4 4 3 3 4 4 3  2 
Swe  15 3 3 4 4 2 0 4  2 
Swe  16 4 4 3 4 4 3 3  2 
Swe  17 4 4 3 3 4 3 2  3 
Swe  18 4 4 3 3 4 3 3  2 
Swe  19 4 4 3 4 4 4 4  4 
Swe  20 4 2 4 3 4 4 4  2 
Swe  21 4 4 3 3 4 3 3  2 
           
Aus  1 4 3 3 3 2 3 4  2 
Aus  2 0 3 2 0 2 3 0  0 
Aus  3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3  2 
Aus  4 0 3 4 3 1 4 2  3 
Aus  5 4 4 4 3 2 3 1  2 
           
USA  1 2 4 2 3 4 3 2  2 
USA  2 2 3 3 2 4 3 3  2 
USA  3 3 3 2 2 4 4 3  4 
USA  4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3  4 
USA  5 4 1 4 2 2 2 3  1 
USA  6 4 3 1 1 4 3 2  2 
USA  7 2 3 2 3 2 2 2  0 
USA  8 2 4 3 3 4 3 4  3   355
           
SA  1 4 4 2 2 4 4 4  3 
SA  2 4 3 2 2 2 4 3  4 
SA  3 4 4 2 2 3 4 3  3 
SA  4 2 3 1 2 2 3 2  0 
SA  5 4 3 2 2 2 4 3  4 
           
Thailand  1 4 4 4 1 2 2 2  1 
Thailand  2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3  2 
Thailand  3 4 4 4 1 2 2 2  1 
Thailand  4 4 4 2 3 1 3 2  3 
Thailand  5 4 3 3 3 4 4 3  4 
Thailand  6 4 1 2 2 2 4 2  3 
Thailand  7 4 1 2 2 2 4 2  3 
Thailand  7 1 4 2 3 2 3 2  3 
Thailand  9 4 4 3 4 0 1 3  4 
Thailand  10 4 3 4 4 4 4 3  3 
Thailand  11 1 4 4 3 4 4 3  4 
Thailand  12 4 4 3 3 4 4 2  3 
Thailand  13 4 4 2 3 2 4 4  4 
Thailand  14 4 1 2 1 4 3 3  4 
Thailand  15 4 4 2 3 4 3 3  3 
Thailand  16 4 4 2 3 4 3 3  3 
Thailand  17 4 4 2 3 4 3 3  3 
 
Country  Reply  QC2 QC3 QC4 Total 
Swe  1 4 4 3 67
Swe  2 4 3 4 61
Swe  3 4 4 4 54
Swe  4 4 3 4 68
Swe  5 4 1 4 64
Swe  6 4 3 4 62
Swe  7 3 2 4 63
Swe  8 3 2 2 63
Swe  9 4 4 4 67
Swe  10 4 4 4 72
Swe  11 3 2 1 54
Swe  12 4 3 4 69
Swe  13 4 3 4 66
Swe  14 4 3 4 65
Swe  15 4 3 4 63
Swe  16 4 2 4 65
Swe  17 4 3 4 66
Swe  18 4 3 4 66
Swe  19 4 3 4 74
Swe  20 4 3 4 68
Swe  21 3 3 4 65
      
Aus  1 2 1 2 53
Aus  2 0 2 2 35
Aus  3 3 2 2 54  356
Aus  4 3 2 4 54
Aus  5 2 0 1 50
      
USA  1 0 0 0 47
USA  2 4 2 3 53
USA  3 4 2 3 57
USA  4 4 2 2 60
USA  5 0 2 0 37
USA  6 2 2 0 41
USA  7 0 0 0 33
USA  8 2 2 3 54
      
SA  1 3 3 4 55
SA  2 4 3 3 61
SA  3 3 3 3 61
SA  4 0 0 0 32
SA  5 4 3 3 61
      
Thailand 1 4 4 3 54
Thailand 2 3 1 2 51
Thailand 3 4 4 3 53
Thailand 4 3 1 1 53
Thailand 5 4 3 2 63
Thailand 6 3 3 2 51
Thailand 7 3 3 2 51
Thailand 7 4 3 4 54
Thailand 9 0 3 2 53
Thailand  10 4 3 3 60
Thailand  11 4 4 3 60
Thailand  12 3 3 3 62
Thailand  13 3 4 2 62
Thailand  14 4 4 4 61
Thailand  15 3 4 3 60
Thailand  16 3 4 3 60
Thailand  17 3 4 3 60
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Appendix 5: ‘the promise’ evaluation template 
This is the Australian version of ‘the promise’. To accommodate for 
variations between the countries of study, some of the parameters were 
changed, for instance the fee and charges increments. 
Evaluation Template 
“The Promise” 
 
 
Overall: 
 
Generic aims of FOI legislation: 
Provide access to personal information held by government agencies for control 
and correction of errors. 
 
Scrutiny (to achieve accountability of political representatives and public 
servants) of administration and political decisions/processes and policy making by 
providing access (both first party and third party) to government held information. 
 
Inhibit and prevent maladministration and corruption via increased transparency 
and openness. 
 
Increase the quality of policy making by increased public participation in the 
policy process via increased access to government held information. 
 
 
Main Means of legislation: 
 
Main Aims/Objects of legislation: 
 
Comment/analysis: 
   358
Part I – Access to documents (in this case the term documents refers to 
information stored on: hardcopy, computer files, audio formats and video 
formats) 
 
 
1) Does the Act stipulate a fee when lodging a FOI request? 
    
a)  N o         
b)  AUS$10 – 20     
c)  AUS$21 – 30     
d)  AUS$31 – 40     
e)  AUS$41 – 50     
 
Notes: 
 
2) Does the Act allow the agencies to charge processing fees? 
 
a)  No 
b)  Yes – but only to cover costs for copying of documents and audio and 
videotapes 
c)  Yes – but the agency has to substantiate the charge 
d)  Yes – no maximum fee 
e)  Yes – no guidlines are given 
 
Notes: 
 
 
3) How much initial processing time are agencies given? 
 
a)  As fast as possible referring to days rather than weeks 
b)  5-10 days 
c)  11-20 days 
d)  21-30 days 
e)  31-40 days 
 
Notes: 
 
4) How long does the Act give the agency to make a decision on the reqeust? 
 
As fast as possible referring to days rather than weeks 
a)  5-10 days 
b)  11-20 days 
c)  21-30 days 
d)  31-40 days 
e)  more than 40 days 
 
Notes: 
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5) What request formats does the Act allow? 
 
a)  phone requests and alternatives b to c 
b)  e-mail 
c)  fax 
d)  face-to-face meeting 
e)  written and mailed only 
 
Notes: 
 
6) Does the Act require agencies to keep a running diary over archived documents? 
 
a)  Yes – and the diary is public 
b)  Yes – to a certain extent and the diary is public 
c)  Yes – but the diary is not public 
d)  No – but after a request you receive a summary of what is available 
e)  No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
7) Does the Act allow agencies to decide in what way the documents should be 
released? 
 
a)  No -  the applicant can chose the mode of access 
b)  Yes – it can decide whether to deliver copies via ordinary mail or in electronic 
form 
c)  Yes – the agency can request the copies to be picked up in person 
d)  Yes – it can decide on sighting of documents only – notetaking allowed 
e)   Yes – it can decide on sighting of documents only – notetaking not allowed 
 
Notes: 
 
8) Are any federal/national agencies exempt from the Act? 
 
a)  No 
b)  Yes 1-3 agencies 
c)  Yes  4-6 
d)  Yes 7-9 
e)  Yes 10 or more 
 
Notes: 
 
9) In case of an appeal – is the ruling by the court/ombudsman/commissioner legally 
binding? 
 
a)  Yes – and it is practice that the agency follow the ruling 
b)  Yes – and agencies follow the ruling in most cases 
Deleted: ¶  360
c)  Yes – but experience shows that agencies often stall and follow the rulings 
irregularly 
d)  No – but it is practice that the agency should follow the ruling 
e)  No – it is a recommendation only and the agency does not have to follow the 
ruling 
 
Notes: 
 
10) Does an appeal involve any costs for the applicant? 
 
a)  Yes – in most cases 
b)  Yes – subject to the public interest 
c)  Yes – subject to the applicant winning the appeal 
d)  Yes – at the discretion of the state 
e)  No 
 
 
Notes: 
 
11) Is the FOI Act(s) part of the constitution? 
 
a)  Yes – and the Act(s) can only be changed by two different sessions of 
parliament 
b)  Yes – and the Act(s) can only be changed by a qualified majority in parliament 
c)  No – it is a separate Act, but changes can only be made by two different sessions 
of parliament 
d)  No – it is a separete Act, but changes can only be made by a qualified majority 
in parliament 
e)  No – and the government of the day can change the Act 
 
 
Notes: 
 
12) Does the Act apply to the private sector? 
 
a)  Yes – it applies to any information held by private companies that is not 
classified as business confidential 
b)  Yes – it applies to information held by private companies relating to contracts 
assigned by government agencies 
c)  Yes – it applies to government agencies that have adopted a ’corporate structure’ 
d)  As ’c’ but only to information that is not classified as bussiness confidential 
e)  No 
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Part II – Protection of Journalistic Sources 
 
1) What level of protection of journalistic sources exists? 
 
a)  The source has full legal protection 
b)  The source has limited legal protection – there are some instances where a 
journalist can be forced to reveal a source 
c)  The source has very limited legal protection – a reporter must reveal the source 
in all legal proceedings 
d)  Legislation exists to support and protect media ’whistleblowers’ 
e)  The government offers no protection for media ’whistleblowers’ 
 
 
Notes: 
 
2) When can journalists be forced to reveal their source?   
 
a)  In a very limited number of instances such as treason cases and matters of 
national security 
b)  In some court cases of serious nature, such as homicide 
c)  In any court case 
d)  By the agency head enquiring about a leak relating to his/her specific agency 
e)  By any government official enquiring about the reporter’s source 
 
Notes: 
 
 
3) Are journalists in any way bound not to reveal their source? 
 
a)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and substantial fine (more than AUS$1000) if 
they reveal their source to anyone – including colleagues and editor 
b)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and symbolic fine (less than AUS$1000) if 
they reveal their source to anyone 
c)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and substantial fine if they reveal their source 
to anyone but their editor 
d)  They are not legally bound, but ethical practice is not to reveal sources to 
anyone 
e)  No 
 
Notes: 
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4) Are colleagues and managers (eg the Minister and chief public servant) of a 
government agency in any way prevented from investigating the source of a ’leak’ to 
the press? 
 
a)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and substantial fine (more than AUS$1000) if 
they make any inquires what so ever 
b)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and symbolic fine (less than AUS$1000) if 
they make any inquires 
c)  Yes – they risk a criminal charge and substantial fine if they ask the journalist 
who the source is 
d)  No – but ethical practice is not to investigate a source 
e)  No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
5) If legal protection of journalistic sources exists – is the legislation part of the 
constitution or a separate Act?   
 
a)  Yes – and the Act(s) can only be changed by two different sessions of 
parliament 
b)  Yes – and the Act(s) can only be changed by a qualified majority in 
parliament 
c)  No – it is a separate Act, but changes can only be made by two different 
sessions of parliament 
d)  No – it is a separate Act, but changes can only be made by a qualified 
majority in parliament 
e)  There is no Act 
 
 
Notes: 
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Appendix 6: coded data ‘the promise’ 
Country 
Question 
A1  QA2 QA3 QA4 QA5 QA6 QA7 QA8 
S w e  43   444444  
A u s  21   200010  
U S A  42   230343  
S A  31   110044  
T h a i l a n d  40   002323  
 
Country  QA9 QA10  QA11  QA12  QB1 QB2 QB3 QB4 
S w e   2  4  424444  
A u s   2  1  000210  
U S A   4  1  002210  
S A   4  3  340210  
T h a i l a n d  2  0  000200  
 
Country QB5  Total 
Swe 4  63 
Aus 0  12 
USA 0  31 
SA 0  31 
Thailand 0  18 
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Appendix 7: the Ashcroft Memo 
Statement of Attorney General Ashcroft Regarding  
Implementation of FOIA 
October 12, 2001 
Memorandum for Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies 
From: John Ashcroft, Attorney General 
Subject: The Freedom of Information Act 
     As you know, the Department of Justice and this Administration are 
committed to full compliance with the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). It is only through a well-informed 
citizenry that the leaders of our nation remain accountable to the 
governed and the American people can be assured that neither fraud nor 
government waste is concealed.  
     The Department of Justice and this Administration are equally 
committed to protecting other fundamental values that are held by our 
society. Among them are safeguarding our national security, enhancing 
the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive 
business information and, not least, preserving personal privacy.  
     Our citizens have a strong interest as well in a government that is 
fully functional and efficient. Congress and the courts have long 
recognized that certain legal privileges ensure candid and complete 
agency deliberations without fear that they will be made public. Other 
privileges ensure that lawyers' deliberations and communications are 
kept private. No leader can operate effectively without confidential 
advice and counsel. Exemption 5 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), 
incorporates these privileges and the sound policies underlying them.  
     I encourage your agency to carefully consider the protection of all 
such values and interests when making disclosure determinations under 
the FOIA. Any discretionary decision by your agency to disclose 
information protected under the FOIA should be made only after full and 
deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal 
privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the 
information.  
     In making these decisions, you should consult with the Department of 
Justice's Office of Information and Privacy when significant FOIA issues 
arise, as well as with our Civil Division on FOIA litigation matters. 
When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold 
records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of 
Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or   365
present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other 
agencies to protect other important records.  
     This memorandum supersedes the Department of Justice's FOIA 
Memorandum of October 4, 1993, and it likewise creates no substantive 
or procedural right enforceable at law. 
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